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ABSTRACT 
 
Lin, Mei-Hua. Ph.D., Human Factors and Industrial/Organizational Psychology Program, 
Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2008. 
Analytic-Holistic Thinking, Information Use, and Sensemaking During Unfolding 
Events. 
 
 
 In complex domains such as commerce, military operations, transportation, and 
humanitarian efforts, practitioners are sometimes overwhelmed by uncertain, 
contradictory, and dynamic information. They must obtain, organize, interpret, and use 
this information often under time pressure and high stakes during sensemaking. While 
sensemaking is a gateway to information management, sensemaking also depends on 
information management; the gathering and use of information provides the raw material 
for sensemaking. These processes work together to help people understand complex 
situations but are vulnerable to cultural as well as individual variation in cognition. This 
study investigated individual cognitive and personality differences that may affect 
information management and sensemaking. Analytic-Holistic (AH) thinking was 
expected to influence information use and sensemaking (Lin & Klein, 2008).  
I investigated sensemaking using two scenarios in which dispositional and 
situational information was introduced sequentially. Each time new information, either 
dispositional or situational, was presented, participants identified problems and made 
decisions. I expected that analytic thinkers would make dispositional attribution and 
holistic thinkers would make situational attribution. Participants also selected and rated 
the relevance of the information presented. In addition, participants recalled information 
from an earlier scenario. I used moderated multiple regression analyses and correlation 
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analyses to understand the relationships between individual differences, information use, 
and sensemaking. 
Five important research findings emerged:  
• Analytic-Holistic thinking was related to initial sensemaking judgments 
particularly with limited information. This suggests that when faced with a 
sensemaking opportunity, people are not a blank slate. They bring with them 
cognitive patterns, past experiences, and beliefs that both set a framework for 
sensemaking, and determine how information is selected, judged, interpreted, and 
remembered. This can interfere in situations when a common understanding is needed 
to deal with complex problems. 
• Analytic and holistic thinkers used information differently during sensemaking. 
Holistic thinkers changed their sensemaking based on new information and were 
more influenced by the types of information presented. This relationship was weaker 
for analytic thinkers. The effect of AH thinking on information presented disappeared 
when new contradictory information was presented. While characteristic of a person 
was important in initial sensemaking, information content influenced sensemaking in 
the long run. 
• In contrast to AH thinking, two personality variables, the Need for Cognitive 
Closure and the Need for Cognition, were more related to information recall than to 
information use and sensemaking. While people high in need for cognition recalled 
more information, people high in need for cognitive closure recalled less. The 
complex influences of individual variation in cognition and personality on 
sensemaking suggest the need for additional research. 
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• Attribution, a component of AH thinking, was related to information use. It 
explained situational information use while overall AH thinking did not. This 
suggests the usefulness of AH thinking components for specific information use.  
• The sensemaking context provided an opportunity to investigate information use 
and how people remember information. People who selected and rated dispositional 
information to be relevant remembered primarily this information. People who 
selected and rated situational information as more relevant recalled both situational 
and dispositional information. This suggests distinctive individual information 
management strategies. Some people considered the breadth of information during 
sensemaking while others focus on specific information.  
This is a new research area that investigates the individual cognitive and 
personality differences in information use during sensemaking. The findings suggest the 
importance of understanding sensemaking over time, information management, and 
additional contextual and cultural factors. While this study has generated an initial 
understanding of this complex issue, more research is needed to describe the interplay of 
cognition, personality, and contextual constraints on the complexity of sensemaking and 
information management. 
Organizations face many challenges. Like individuals, organizations need to make 
sense of their environment through effective information management. People in 
organizations must make sense of dynamic information that can fluctuate overtime. 
Organizations have people with different expertise, cognitive patterns, personalities, and 
cultural roots. Research in this area provides guidance for communication patterns, 
conflict resolutions, decision making, and information management.  
vi 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Challenges in Organizations 
The advancement of technology has facilitated globalization and created a global 
flow of information. Globalization created opportunities as well as new challenges. 
People from distant lands are reachable, economies are becoming more interdependent, 
and problems around the world require and receive international involvement. 
Information is key to understanding and it is not static but rather dynamic and complex 
over time. Individuals in domains including national security, discoveries, and global 
business, use information to make sense of their dynamic environment and what changes 
mean for their organization.  
The challenge of dynamic information flow has implications for how people 
manage information and how they make sense of it. Through sensemaking, they need to 
recognize and detect changes, anomalies, and problems. Sensemaking depends on the 
availability and interpretation of information from the information environment (Choo, 
1998a). Information management is crucial for sensemaking as it provides the needed 
raw material. Both individual factors such as absorptive ability (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990), attribution biases (Fiske & Taylor, 1993), personality (Tetlock, 1992), cognitive 
style, and cognitive complexity (Hayes & Allinson, 1998, 1994), and contextual factors 
such as social networks (Anderson, 2002), power, goals, and incentives and control 
systems (O’Reilly, 1983) may affect the information management process. They add to 
the complexity of information management and sensemaking. 
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In a volatile environment, it is important for an organization to make sense of its 
internal and external environment to ensure survival. This means that organizations must 
interpret information in a way that will affect decision making and lead to productive 
actions. When sensemaking fails, businesses may fail, when it is successful, 
organizations can be adaptive. Similar to an organization, an individual decision maker 
needs to interpret information from his or her internal environment through sensemaking. 
Research is needed to examine variations in how and where decision makers obtain the 
information they use in decision making (Jones & MacLeod, 1986).  
This dissertation addresses how individual cognition affects information processes 
and sensemaking. Figure 1 represents the framework for this study. This framework is 
consistent with the notion that behavior is a function of an individual and his or her 
environment (Heider, 1958; Lewin, 1935). Here the behavior is the sensemaking 
outcome. The environment is defined as the internal and external information 
environment including contextual constraints (Anderson, 2002; O’Reilly, 1983). 
Individuals are described by their cognition and personality differences. In a complex 
environment individuals have to identify the problem and make decisions but are 
bounded by the context as well as by the information that is available. Individuals bring 
with them cognitive and personal tools that influence the judgment of the available 
information to affect their sensemaking.  
In the following sections, I will first describe the general process of sensemaking, 
its importance, and its variations identified in the research literature. I will discuss two 
sensemaking outcomes: problem identification and decisions. Second, I present the 
complexities of information management. Here, I will explore the information 
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manipulations used in this study. Third, I will describe how a cognitive dimension, 
Analytic-Holistic (AH) thinking and its four components, influence individual process 
information and sensemaking. Finally, I will describe how personality differences can 
influence information use. Two potentially important personality factors are presented. In 
the section following these, I will present the method, results, and discussion.  
Sensemaking 
Sensemaking refers to the placement of information into frameworks, the 
identification of surprises and anomalies, redressing problems as a situation changes, and 
constructing meaning, interacting in pursuit of understanding, and patterning (Weick, 
1995). Individuals attend to the information from the external environment that is 
relevant to form possible explanations. As part of sensemaking, they identify and solve 
problems.  
In dynamic environments, we face an unpredictable stream of changing events 
and information. While much of the available information may be ignored, some of it 
demands explanation, interpretation, and action. “Why did that happen?” “What does 
this mean?” “What should we do now?” We must organize, interpret, and use the 
information to make sense of continual changes but identifying what is relevant and what 
is just noise can be difficult (Choo, 1998b). People use their past experiences to 
reinterpret situations and to form possible explanations as new information becomes 
available.  
Weick’s Approach 
Weick’s general model of sensemaking suggests five key steps in the sensemaking 
process (see Figure 2) (Daft & Weick, 1984; Huber, 1991; Milliken, 1990; Thomas, 
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Clarke, & Gioia, 1993). Sensemaking begins when a person notices or identifies a 
change, anomaly, surprise, problem, chaos or important issue in the stream of information 
(Milliken, 1990; Koppes & Billings, 1988; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). The 
recognition of any of these conditions can initiate the gathering of additional information 
(i.e. Hambrick, 1981, 1982; Thomas, Gioia, & Ketchen, 1997). Categorizing information 
allows us to verify findings by comparing similar cases, past and present. This may 
suggest plausible explanations or propose effective actions. Information is interpreted as 
it is gathered (Thomas et al., 1997). Interpretation leads to actions or decisions (Daft & 
Weick, 1984). Actions can produce changes in the environment or other performance 
outcome (Thomas, Shankster, & Mathieu, 1994) that reflect the effectiveness of one’s 
sensemaking. This in turn can lead to closure, propel additional actions, or suggest 
reinterpretations (Thomas et al., 1994). In this way, sensemaking is a dynamic and 
ongoing process. 
Klein et al.’s Data Frame Approach 
Klein, Phillips, Rall and Peluso (2007) suggested a data/frame model of 
sensemaking to describe the deliberate effort undertaken to understand events (see Figure 
3). They proposed that incoming information suggests frames – mental models for 
organizing and understanding. These frames are similar to Minsky’s (1975) notion of 
frames as structures for representing known situations. They may include information 
about dynamic relationships among components, expectations for the future, and 
appropriate actions. These frames, in turn, delineate what counts as data and guide the 
search for additional information. Contradictions and inconsistencies may provide cues 
for elaborating the frame or reconsidering previously discarded data (re-framing). If 
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people cannot explain events by elaborating on their initial accounts, they may question 
their frame, perhaps reject it, and shift to another in their repertoire. People differ in how 
hard they work to preserve their original frame. They may, for example, be lured down a 
‘garden path’ to explain away inconsistent data by deciding that the data is unreliable. 
They may also rebuild a new frame based on available data. Some people may track 
several frames simultaneously and, as events develop, compare these frames to find 
which one fits best. Both Weick’s and Klein et al.’s frameworks identify crucial 
sensemaking processes. Their formulations suggested several questions about 
sensemaking and the variation it exhibits.   
The Present Study 
 These different sensemaking models and approaches posit several important 
processes: detecting and identifying problem, information gathering and use, making 
sense of information for explanation, and taking actions or making decisions. They also 
represent the dynamic nature of sensemaking.  
Based on the models, five points are important during sensemaking. First, during 
sensemaking, we have to identify the problem or anomaly in order to act on it (Weick, 
1995). Identifying a problem is important but what is considered a problem may differ 
from one person to another. Hence, varying cognition and personality can influence 
problem identification. This is especially true when problems are ill-defined. When 
problem identification differs, sensemaking will also differ.  
Second, when people are faced with an opportunity for sensemaking, they are not 
blank slates. Past experiences, beliefs, and values provide ‘frames’ to guide sensemaking 
(Klein et al, 2007). Hence, the availability of a frame may differ from one person to 
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another. People use their past experiences to suggest frame(s) for a specific situation and 
these frames guide further exploration. When people have had different experiences, they 
are likely to use different frames. 
Third, people may differ in what they count as causal explanation when trying to 
identify a problem. When causal explanations are broad, it is likely that additional factors 
will be considered as potential sources of problems. With increased potential sources of 
problems, causal explanation of an event may become more complex. People who differ 
in causal beliefs will accept different causal explanations (Nisbett, 2003). This difference 
is important because sensemaking explain ongoing events in a way that generates and 
shapes future actions.  
Fourth, when gathering and using information during sensemaking, what is the 
range and the type of information, a person will consider during sensemaking. Even 
when there is a common goal for understanding, people vary in the scope and the types of 
information to which they attend. Because attention filters the raw material available, it is 
a critical step for sensemaking. Information is selected based on its relevance to the 
current state of the situation and the explanatory frames that are being used (Klein et al., 
2007). Because people use differing frames, the information they select can differ. This 
means they have different material accessible for sensemaking. 
Lastly, even when people have a good sense of a situation, new information may 
be presented. In dynamic situations, people can face contradictory information and this 
has been exacerbated with the advent of the Internet. People differ in how individuals 
differ in their openness to new and to contradictory information (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). 
Inconsistent information propels the questioning and changing of frames during 
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sensemaking. New contradictions may change problem identification as well as 
decisions. 
 In this study, these five points provided the guidelines for developing a 
sensemaking assessment tool. This assessment tool uses scenarios to simulate a 
sensemaking situation. Information is introduced sequentially. Sensemaking and 
information management processes were assessed periodically. Hence, the assessment 
tool has the following two characteristics. First, the scenarios probe for changes as well 
as for an understanding of those changes. The tool measured: quantitative and qualitative 
changes in sensemaking. Here, quantitative sensemaking describes the changes, and 
qualitative sensemaking is used to understand the reason for the changes. Two 
quantitative sensemaking outcomes were selected: Problem Identification (PI) and 
Decision (see oval 3 in Figure 1). The qualitative sensemaking is exploratory in this 
study. Second, information was presented sequentially (see oval 2 in Figure 1) to 
represent the nature of information gathering, information types, and information 
judgments. The section below describes the two quantitative sensemaking outcomes. The 
second characteristic, sequential information presentation, is described in a later section. 
Problem identification 
Problem identification is a part of both making sense of an event and solving 
problems. To do this, individuals must attend to relevant information, form possible 
explanations from past experiences, and reinterpret situations with the new information. 
This study focused on two types of PI: dispositional and situational (oval 3 in Figure 1). 
Dispositional problems would suggest that factors affecting a problem are dispositions or 
internal characteristics of a person (e.g. abilities, motivations, personality, beliefs, 
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intentions, etc.). Situational problems would suggest that factors other than the person 
affected a problem. These include situational forces that facilitated a problem (e.g. 
contextual constraints, time pressures, goals, etc.).  
Decision  
Decision making in complex dynamic situation is inherently biased; it is not based 
on comprehensive rationality where perfect information is used to maximize utility, and 
neither does it use information according to some specific and ordered preference. 
Instead, decision making involves imperfect expectations, limited and focused 
information search, selective perception, and information processing. This study focused 
on two types of decisions: dispositional and situational (oval 3 in Figure 1). A 
dispositional decision suggests a decision to solve the problem by taking action towards a 
person (e.g. firing, warning, training etc.). A situational decision suggests a decision to 
solve the problem by taking action towards the situation (e.g. changing company policy, 
changing structure, changing industry rules and regulations etc.). 
Sensemaking uses available information. The effectiveness of sensemaking is as 
good as the available information. Thus, information management is crucial process for 
sensemaking. Below is a description of information management and information 
properties examined in this study. 
Information Management 
Individual information management processes are important for sensemaking and 
have high stakes. In organizations, managers must make important decisions by making 
sense of the internal and external environment (Weick et al., 2005). They have to sort 
through a flux of information to detect problems and make decisions based on the 
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information at hand. However, a situation can change with new information, and 
managers may have to readdress, and redefine the problem, and make new decisions. 
These complex processes involve the interplay of many factors and constraints. 
Information provides the raw material for sensemaking, and the amount, type, and 
relevance of information may influence sensemaking, and vice-versa. This study 
simulated the challenges a person faces with sequential and varying information (oval 2 
in Figure 1). It traces the changing of problem identification and decision judgments at 
each point when information was received.    
Information Properties 
Several factors influence the selection of information for processing or 
interpretation. First, attention influences the amount of information selected. A broader 
rather than focused attention provides a larger information pool. Second, information is 
selected or ignored depending on its perceived relevance. The more relevant it is, the 
more likely it would be interpreted. Perceived relevance, therefore, can influence the type 
of information selected for sensemaking. Third, following the theory of cognitive 
dissonance, individuals are more likely to use information that confirms their existing 
belief structures (Festinger, 1957). Hence, individuals with different belief structures or 
someone who is not susceptible to cognitive dissonance may select different information. 
Because of the implications of cognition on attention, relevance, and cognitive 
dissonance (Choi, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2004; Choi & Nisbett, 2000), I focused on two 
information properties: types of information and amount of information. 
Type of information: Attribution 
Two factors influence the types of attributional information people need. First, an  
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individual’s need for different types of information can be determined by his or her 
values, beliefs, previous experiences as well as a particular problem or a goal (O’Reilly, 
1983). For example, one’s initial frame or initial understanding of a situation not only 
influences what counts as explanation but also drives the search for particular 
information. Second, cognitive dissonance theory posits behavior-attitude consistency 
(Festinger, 1957). When faced with cognitive dissonance, a person can adopt ways to 
reduce the effectiveness of discrepant information from his or her current beliefs by 
derogating the source, excluding the source from communication, or distorting the 
information (O’Reilly, 1980). Hence, the use of attributional information may depend on 
its consistency with one’s belief structures and one’s susceptibility to cognitive 
dissonance. 
In the present study, attributional information refers to information that 
contributed to how a person draws causal explanations. Information presented can be 
dispositional or situational in nature. Dispositional information is information that 
described personal attributes, such as personality, beliefs, feelings, and attitudes towards 
an event, object, or person (Bhawuk, 2001; Triandis, 1995). Situational information is 
information that described external cues such as information surrounding the person and 
how those cues influence events.  
In order to simulate the challenges a person may face when incoming and varying 
information is received, the material designed in this study presented information at two 
points in time. Information presentation was manipulated based on the attributional 
characteristics described above. This manipulation, consistent with Figure 1, introduces 
the information environment or the contextual constraints available to the participant 
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during sensemaking. While, the information presentation served as the manipulation, 
individuals might only use information that was relevant for judgments. Hence, this study 
also examined the extent to which each dispositional and situational information item was 
judged relevant for sensemaking.   
Amount (Quantity) 
Information management is a process for organizing information (Choo, 1998b). 
Information varies in amount. In this study, the amount of information is defined as the 
number of informational items selected by an individual during sensemaking. While the 
amount of information was not manipulated, it serves as a measure of information need. 
The dilemma for a person during a complex situation regarding information is: How 
much information do I need? How much can I retain? Is too little or too much 
information better? Shortage of information prevents the consideration of all the facts 
prior to making a decision. Excesses of information make it difficult to identify the most 
important and relevant information. In this information age, obtaining information can be 
quick but processing it may not be as rapid, so the concern may be overload not scarcity 
(Choo, 1998b; O’Reilly, 1980). Information explosion increases the difficulty of 
gathering and selecting the right kind of information, leading to a loss of sense (Weick, 
1995). In order to manage information and avoid overloading, data from the external 
environment needs to be selected, organized, and interpreted with care. The important 
questions are: Will there be differences in how individuals with their limited capacities 
gather, select and integrate information from the vast amount available? How would 
these differences influence the sensemaking process?  
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People differ in the amount of information they need. Some people might need 
more information before making decisions while others may avoid excess information. 
Because of different belief structures, they might have preferences for different kinds of 
information in varying amounts. Consistent with the earlier types of information, this 
study also examined the amount of dispositional and situational information needed for 
sensemaking. 
In the previous sections, I explained sensemaking and information management 
processes, then presented and suggested ways to tap sensemaking outcomes and 
important information characteristics that individuals may prefer. In the next section, I 
explain how individuals may differ in their judgments of information and how that may 
affect sensemaking. As mentioned earlier, past experiences influence sensemaking. As 
individuals’ experiences are embedded in a cultural context that influences their thinking 
(Berry, 1986; Hutchins, 1995; Klein, 2004), I propose cognitive patterns would affect the 
way they manage information and make judgments (see oval 1 in Figure 1). One purpose 
of this study was to examine the influence of a cultural cognitive dimension, AH 
thinking, on information processes (Choi et al., 2004) and sensemaking. While AH 
differences were found cross-culturally, AH thinking also varies a within group (Choi, 
Koo, & Choi, 2007; Lin, 2004). Hence, the present study is the first study that examines 
AH difference within a national group in the context of information use and sensemaking.  
Cultural Cognitive Dimension: Analytic-Holistic Thinking 
Globalization and Complexities 
With globalization, an organization’s environment becomes increasingly large 
and complex. Multinational interactions are important and inevitable. Teams are likely to 
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be diverse and crucial to solving complex problems. As organizations span national 
borders, complications can arise with national differences in information management 
and sensemaking. Sensemaking, that is constructing meaning from what has been sensed 
about the environment, is problematic because information about the environment, 
especially in an international context, can be ambiguous and therefore subject to multiple 
interpretations. When people from different nations work together on complex problems; 
the processes underlying sensemaking can vary greatly. Each national group brings a 
distinct view of the world and different mental models and categories (Klein, 2004). 
Different causal frames for sensemaking can lead to different interpretations of situations 
(Bhagat, Harveston & Triandis, 2002), different problems, and different decisions. 
Hence, a within group study without the variability introduced with national differences 
is the first step to understanding the complexities of sensemaking.  
AH thinking distinguishes important differences in perception, judgment of 
information, and attribution. This study examined this dimension and its effect on 
information evaluation and sensemaking. AH thinking was treated as an individual 
difference in this study.  
Analytic-Holistic Thinking 
Analytic and holistic differences can be understood from two perspectives. First, 
the Ecocultural Model posits different ecological constraints facilitated field independent-
interdependent and cognition (Berry, 1976). For example, groups who engaged in hunting 
and gathering exhibit field independent perception while those engaged in farming 
exhibit field dependent perception (Berry, 1986). These ecocultural constraints provided 
a lens through which members of a group see the world (Klein, 2004).  
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A second perspective for understanding AH cognitive differences came from two 
ancient philosophic traditions: Greek Aristotelian philosophy and Chinese Confucius 
philosophy (Nisbett, 2003). The individual’s sense of personal agency, tradition of 
debate, and social and political systems as well as different strategies to understand the 
world facilitated different cognition (see Cromer, 1993; Lloyd, 1991; Nisbett, 2003 for 
details). The Greeks Aristotelian philosophy facilitated analytic thinking and the Chinese 
Confucius philosophy cultivated holistic thinking. 
Analytic-Holistic Thinking, Information Management, and Sensemaking 
A main difference between analytic and holistic thinkers is the inclusion of 
context. Holistic thinkers are more likely to include the context than analytic thinkers. 
This resulted in several differences (see Table 1). Analytic thinkers view the world as 
composed of separate elements that can be understood independently; they focus on 
objects and dispositions while holistic thinkers focus on the relationships among different 
elements and context (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Choi, Peng, & Norenzayan, 2001).  
Choi, Koo, and Choi (2007) proposed four components subsumed under AH 
thinking. These components provided the conceptual basis for the present analysis. 
Attention defines the scope of information considered or needed: Analytic thinkers focus 
on central features in the field while holistic thinkers attend to the field as a whole. 
Causal Attribution directs the search for explanations to situational or dispositional 
causes. Analytic thinkers target dispositional causes while holistic thinkers also include 
situational causes. Tolerance for Contradiction describes the difference between analytic 
differentiation - polarizing goals and options to define the most important on one hand, 
and holistic naïve dialecticism - merging goals and options by synthesis on the other. 
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Perception of Change describes beliefs about change, whether phenomena are viewed as 
linear by analytic thinkers or as cyclical, non-static patterns by holistic thinkers. These 
differences in cognition can influence sensemaking. These components provide a general 
understanding of AH thinking and are described later in detail (also see Lin & Klein, 
2008 for a comprehensive review). Perception of Change will not be followed through as 
no hypothesis was formed based on this component. 
One goal of this study was to examine how Analytic-Holistic orientations in 
cognition influence the way people view information and use it in PI and making 
decisions. In the present study, a problem or an anomaly can be attributed to the 
dispositions of a person or the characteristics of a situation. Similarly, a person can make 
the decisions to take action with the person or to make changes to the situation. These PI 
and decision judgments were measured four times in the study. Because of differences in 
belief structures about causes, I expect higher holistic thinking tendencies will have 
higher initial situational PI and initial decisions judgments (Hypotheses 1 and 4). Because 
holistic people consider both situational and dispositional information in making 
attributions, no hypotheses on initial dispositional judgments were included. The overall 
score on the Analytic-Holism Scale (Choi et al., 2007) was used to define analytic-
holistic tendency. A higher score indicates holistic thinking. The specific hypotheses 
based on the contribution of AH thinking are as follow: 
H1: Analytic-Holistic (AH) scores will be positively correlated with initial 
situational problem identification judgment.  
Because of the differences in attention scope, belief in causal structure, and 
different strategies dealing with information, I expect analytic and holistic thinkers to 
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vary in their information use at each introduction of new information, resulting in 
different PIs and decisions during sensemaking. In order to examine how analytic and 
holistic thinkers use information to affect judgments, consistent with the framework in 
Figure 1, a person’s analytic-holistic tendency will affect the use of certain information to 
make sense of the situation. Because holistic thinkers orient to the context, they are more 
inclusive in their information use. Below are the hypotheses that test AH thinking as a 
moderator of information presentation (IP) and judgments. Influences will be reflected in 
the judgment of PI (Hypotheses 2 and 3) and decisions (Hypotheses 5 and 6) after new 
information is presented.  
H2: The interaction between AH score and Information Presentation (IP) 1 will 
significantly affect both situational and dispositional problem identification 
(PI) judgments in Time 2, after controlling for PI judgments in Time 1, IP 1, 
and AH score. The slope between IP 1 and both situational and dispositional 
PI judgments in Time 2 will be steeper for people high in holistic thinking 
than people low in holistic thinking. 1See Footnote 
H3: The interaction between AH score and IP 2 will significantly affect both 
situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 3, after controlling for PI 
judgments in Time 2, IP 2, and AH score. The slope between IP 2 and both 
situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 3 will be steeper for 
people high in holistic thinking than people low in holistic thinking. 
                                                 
1 A visual misrepresentation of the slopes was inconsistent with the conceptual logic of the relationship 
between Analytic-Holistic Thinking and information use. The hypothesis on simple slopes analysis was 
changed to reflect the logic of the hypothesis. The subsequent Hypotheses 3, 5, and 6 also reflected this 
change. 
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H4: AH score will be positively correlated with initial situational decision 
judgment.  
H5: The interaction between AH score and IP 1 will significantly affect both 
situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 2, after controlling 
decision judgments in Time 1, IP 1, and AH scores. The slope between IP 1 
and both situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 2 will be 
steeper for people high in holistic thinking than people low in holistic 
thinking. 
H6: The interaction between AH score and IP 2 will significantly affect both 
situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 3, after controlling 
decision judgments in Time 2, IP 2, and AH score. The slope between IP 2 
and both situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 3 will be 
steeper for people high in holistic thinking than people low in holistic 
thinking. 
Components of Analytic-Holistic Thinking 
The three components, Attention, Causal Attribution, and Tolerance for 
Contradiction, considered in this study stem from the AH distinction (i.e. Nisbett, 2003; 
Nisbett et al., 2001). I define each component; describe the supporting research; outline 
implications to information management and sensemaking in the following sections, and 
present the research hypotheses. 
Attention: Field vs. Parts 
Attention helps define the scope of information available for consideration, and 
this may limit the information available for sensemaking in a complex environment. 
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Consistent with early mother-child communication patterns, holistic thinkers look 
towards the relationship between the object and the field (Fernald & Morikawa, 1993). 
This leads to attention to the whole picture and emphasizing relationships and 
interconnections, a more field interdependent view. Analytic thinkers look to individual 
objects rather than to the field as a whole (Fernald & Morikawa, 1993). The focus is on 
individual parts, a more field independent view.  
 Importance of context: perceptual.   Several studies have measured the 
differences in attention using field dependence, a measure of the extent to which people 
differentiate objects from the context (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Witkin, Lewis, 
Hertzman, Machover, Meissner, & Karp, 1954). Cross-cultural research in attention and 
cognition had shown that holistic thinkers were more field-dependent and analytic 
thinkers more field independent (Nisbett, 2003). Masuda and Nisbett (2001) found that 
Japanese participants, typically holistic thinkers, recalled more contextual information 
(i.e. background stimuli), and relationships among objects than were American 
participants, typically analytical thinkers. Japanese were also better than Americans at 
remembering objects with original presented backgrounds than when objects were placed 
with novel backgrounds. This further support the hypothesis that holistic thinkers had 
difficulty in separating objects from their context. In other studies, East Asians were also 
found to be more context or field dependent than Westerners (Kitayama, Duffy, 
Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003; Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 
2006). East Asians included contextual information while Westerners attended to focal 
information at the expense of contextual information. 
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This attentional difference is further supported in a study of the activation of 
frontal and parietal brain regions associated with attentional control (Hedden, Ketay, 
Aron, Markus, & Gabrieli, 2008). Activation was greater when individuals were given a 
culturally non-preferred judgment task than a culturally preferred judgment task, 
indicating a greater need for attention for the unfamiliar task. They found consistent 
results with between and within cultural group comparison.  
Differences in attention were not limited to perception in the physical 
representation, but extended to emotional judgments in a social representation. Masuda 
and colleagues (2008) showed a sample of Americans and Japanese participants a central 
cartoon figure with either Happy, Neutral, or Sad facial expression together with four 
smaller background cartoon figures also with either Happy, Neutral, or Sad expression. 
East Asians modulated their judgments of the central figure by the emotions of the 
background figures while the Americans did not. If a neutral figure was surrounded by 
happy figures, the East Asians rated the figure as more happy. Their judgment of emotion 
reflected that they attended to the social context of the cartoon figure, not to the figure 
alone. Here again, holistic thinkers would have more peripheral social information 
available for later use. Klein and colleagues (2006) extended this finding with additional 
East Asian groups. 
Importance of context: information. The role of attention was also seen when 
people made sense of a complex situation. People in individualistic cultures who see the 
‘self’ as independent of the immediate social environment are more likely to focus on 
knowledge about personal attributes (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). On the other hand, 
people in collectivistic cultures who see the ‘self’ as functioning within the immediate 
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social environment are more likely to focus on external cues and how those cues 
influence events. In solving a complex computer simulated decision making task, Asian 
Indians and Germans were asked to take the role of a developmental aide worker and 
work to improve the conditions of a semi-nomadic tribe over time by requesting 
necessary information (Strohschneider & Guss, 1999). Even though Indian participants 
generally asked for less information than the German participants, they asked for more 
background and contextual information, such as the social conditions, in their effort to 
accomplish the task.   
In a similar study, Gelfand, Spurlock, Sniezek and Shao (2000), extended the role 
of attention to judgments of information usefulness. Participants were given relational or 
individual information about a target person across four situations. Chinese students saw 
relational information such as social groups, family, social class, as more useful for 
predicting own and target’s behavior, whereas U.S. students favored individual 
information such as personal accomplishments. Because of this difference, it is likely that 
analytic and holistic thinkers would have different information available for 
sensemaking. 
The role of attention was also seen when people were asked to establish a motive 
for an ambiguous situation. Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, and Park (2003) found the broader 
attention associated with holistic thinking had implications for the amount of information 
one considered in a sensemaking situation. Americans, with their analytic thinking, 
excluded more information as irrelevant than did a sample of Koreans. The same 
difference was found when Americans were compared to samples of Japanese, Korean, 
and Taiwanese students (Klein et al., 2006). Consistent with the earlier findings, 
21 
 
Westerners attended to a more focused range of information while East Asians attended 
to information that was more diverse.  
Relation to sensemaking.   Sensemaking starts with awareness of an anomaly or a 
problem. It continues to the selection and evaluation of a frame to provide a sense of the 
situation. When cultural groups differ in their attention to visual fields, to social contexts, 
and to problem spaces, they are likely to notice different anomalies. In addition, 
differences in attention and the reliance on context suggest that the relevance of 
information and the meaning of information may be influenced by context. When people 
vary in the range of information they consider relevant, they will have available different 
examples and counter examples for use in sensemaking. Holistic thinkers appear to use 
information more intuitively because they have more information available to consider. 
Analytic thinkers favor rule or cost-benefits analysis because they attend to a narrow set 
of information (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002). Taken together, attention 
directs PI and sets the stage for subsequent sensemaking. 
Attention influences the scope of information pool for sensemaking. Analytic 
thinkers see each piece of information as relatively independent of its context (Markus, 
Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996). In contrast, holistic thinkers looked for contextual cues in 
each piece of information (Kagitcibasi, 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 
1995). In order to examine the range of information one considers during sensemaking, I 
hypothesized that holistic people with a wider attention scope will select more 
information (Hypothesis 7) and find this information to be more relevant (Hypothesis 8) 
during sensemaking while analytic people, with a more focused attention, will select less 
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information. A higher attention score represents broader attention. Based on this 
reasoning, the hypotheses are: 
H7: Attention scores will be positively related to the percentage of information 
items selected. 
H8: Attention scores will be positively related to the rated relevance of available 
information. 
Causal Attribution: Dispositional vs. Situational  
Attribution describes how people assign cause (Heider, 1958) and this has 
implications for the selection and the use of information. Dispositional attribution 
identifies internal causes such as competence, personality, and values as most 
explanatory.  Situational attribution looks also to external causal factors such as task 
demands, environment barriers, and surrounding people. Analytic thinkers typically 
attribute behavior to the actor’s disposition while overlooking situational causes. Holistic 
thinkers use both situational and dispositional factors to identify the driving forces for 
behavior and events (i.e. Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Lin, 2004; Morris & Peng, 
1994). Differences were also found in the way they use information to explain causes.  
Differences in causal explanation.   Research in Western settings finds that people 
attributed behavior to the actor’s disposition, while giving less importance to situational 
causes of behavior (Fiske & Taylor, 1993; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Gilbert, Pelham, & 
Krull, 1988; Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977; Van Boven, Kamada, & Gilovich, 
1999). This contradicted the attribution theory that warned that one should not explain 
behavior with dispositions when it could be explained by the situation. The law of 
noncommon effects (Jones & Davis, 1965) and discounting principal (Kelley, 1967) are 
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examples that illustrate the attribution process. This tendency of attribution occurred so 
frequently that it was dubbed the ‘fundamental attribution error’ (FAE) (Ross et al., 
1977) or correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In this study, dispositional 
attributors were expected to be more susceptible to this ‘error.’ 
Three studies illustrate that people use different causal frames for explanation 
during sensemaking. First, Miller (1984) presented Americans and Hindu Indians with a 
scenario describing a motorcycle accident and asked “Why did the driver leave the 
passenger at the hospital without staying to consult about the seriousness of the 
passenger’s injury?” Americans were more likely to attribute the behavior to the 
disposition of the driver, such as irresponsibility or the drive to succeed at work. The 
Indians, in contrast, were more likely to mention situational attributions, such as 
responsibilities and obligations at work. One accident, different attributions.  
Next, Morris and Peng (1994) found different causal explanations for naturalistic 
events. They examined media treatment of two well-covered mass murders, one by a 
Chinese graduate student and the other by an Irish-American postal worker. The English 
language newspaper accounts reflected significantly more dispositional attributions such 
as “having a very bad temper,” and “had repeatedly threatened violence.” The Chinese 
language newspaper provided more situational explanations such as “was isolated from 
the Chinese community,” and “followed the example of a recent mass slaying in Texas.” 
A laboratory investigation of these probable causes was consistent with the journalistic 
report. American students included more dispositional causes and rated them as more 
important while the Chinese students included both dispositional and situational causes 
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and rated both as important. Taken together, this research confirmed attribution 
differences.  
Finally, Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, and Kitayama (2006) showed 
differences in causal explanations of success. They examined Japanese and American 
media responses for explanations of Olympic performances. The Japanese medal winners 
responses to a journalist’s question, “How did you succeed?” included more categories 
describing athletes’ positive and negative personal attributes, but also more background, 
and social and emotional experience. American media accounts included fewer categories 
and emphasized positive personal characteristics and features of the competition. Result 
from a follow-up laboratory study found Americans chose dispositional information as 
relevant while the Japanese used more categories and found situational information more 
compelling to explain success. In all three examples, attribution guided the selection of 
causal frameworks, dispositional or situational, to explain events.  
Information use in causal explanation.   While causal frames influence the 
relevance of information, research also suggested the power of information to influence 
causal attribution differences. Choi and Nisbett (1998) manipulated situational 
information saliency to determine causal attribution. They found no differences between 
Koreans and Americans in dispositional attribution when situational information was 
limited, but Americans were more likely than Koreans to ignore information when 
situational information was salient. They stay with their dispositional frame while 
Koreans were likely to change frames by incorporating the situational information. In 
making sense of two organizational scenarios, Lin (2004) presented Malaysians and 
Americans with both dispositional and situational information in two scenarios. The 
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study found Malaysians to be more holistic in their thinking than Americans. They 
remembered significantly more situational information and identified both dispositional 
and situational explanations while Americans rated situational causes as less likely than 
Malaysians. The different value placed on situational information would be expected to 
lead to different explanations during sensemaking.  
Relation to sensemaking.   Because people vary in the causal explanations they 
use, I expect them to begin with different causal frames, they attend to, value, and accept 
different information. They use information differently to explain situations and make 
predictions about later events (i.e. Choi et al., 1999; Choi & Nisbett, 1998). These 
differences shape their sense of the problem space and direct decision making and 
planning.  
Causal attribution influences the information selected and used for sensemaking. 
Dispositional attributors believe that causes are determined by the attributes of a person. 
The focus on dispositional information means they will consider less information and use 
fewer categories of information. Situational attributors believe in a causal interaction 
between the environment and the person. The focus on both dispositional and situational 
information will increase the information items selected. A higher attribution score 
represents a higher tendency for a situational causal explanation. The hypotheses are as 
follow: 
H9: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to percentage of 
information items selected. 
A consideration of the context by situational attributors increases the selection of 
situational information and the judgment of relevance during sensemaking.   
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H10: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to the percentage of 
situational information items selected.  
H11: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to mean of situational 
information rated as relevant.  
To replicate Markus and colleagues (2006) study on categories of information, I 
hypothesized that situational attributors will use more categories during sensemaking.  
H12: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to the number of 
categories of information selected.  
Contradiction: Differentiation vs. Dialectical  
Tolerance for Contradiction describes how people typically manage divergent 
information. The first approach, characteristic of analytic thinkers, uses differentiation 
and avoids contradictions whenever possible by polarizing goals and options (Peng & 
Nisbett, 1999). Consistent with Western logical systems, where each statement must be 
true or false but not both, information, goals, and options are polarized to define the most 
important. The second approach uses naïve dialecticism. Holistic thinkers deal with 
contradiction dialectically by searching for the “Middle Way” between opposing 
propositions, retaining basic elements of each by synthesizing them. Holistic thinkers 
tolerate contradiction because they see truth in opposing views (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).  
Peng and Nisbett (1999) compared dialectical and non-dialectical proverbs from 
traditional Chinese and American cultural folk wisdom. Dialectical proverbs contain 
contradiction such as “beware of your friends not your enemy” while non-dialectical 
proverbs contain no contradiction such as “for example is not proof.” The Chinese 
sources have four times as many dialectical as compared to American sources suggest 
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contradiction plays a larger role in the Chinese folk wisdom. American participants 
preferred non-dialectical proverbs while the Chinese participants preferred dialectical 
proverbs. Similar results were obtained using Yiddish proverbs as a control for 
familiarity of proverbs.  
Tolerance for contradiction influences openness to opposing positions during 
sensemaking. Choi and Nisbett (2000) investigated the judgment of contradiction using 
the Good Samaritan paradigm. Koreans and Americans reacted differently to a 
contradictory conclusion. Koreans, displayed more hindsight bias, showed less surprise 
when told a character described as religious, generous, and helpful but under time 
pressure and stress did not provide help to a victim. The Americans were more surprised 
with the conclusion which contradicted their expectation. The same finding was 
confirmed with a story where the target was described negatively but ended up 
performing a positive action.  
To study this same distinction, Peng and Nisbett (1999) asked participants to 
judge how true pairs of contradictory statements were. The Chinese, thinking 
dialectically, judged two statements as non-contradictory and as parts of a whole rather 
than as dichotomous descriptions. They accepted the seeming contradictions as multiple 
perspectives of a single truth (Chu, Spires, & Sueyoshi, 1999; Nakamura, 1985). In 
contrast, differentiating reasoning, typical of Westerners, seek constancy. Contradictory 
propositions were unacceptable by formal logic. Hence, contradictory statements cannot 
both be true. Propositions were considered in a restricted context rather than embedded in 
a broader context (Cromer, 1993). Thus, Westerners saw contradictory statements as 
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opposing. They polarized contradictions, deciding which position was correct, and 
explaining away other positions.   
Relation to sensemaking.   During sensemaking, tolerance for contradiction may 
influence the way goals are chosen. Differentiation thinkers to seek the best goal may 
reduce cognitive dissonance by avoiding or quickly dismissing divergent information and 
options but may favor information that supports the goal. This simplification may reduce 
information overload (O’Reilly, 1980; Weick, 1979) but may also exclude information 
needed as new information emerges and existing frames are reexamined or changed. 
Dialectical thinkers seek to assimilate contradictory positions for an intermediate goal 
mean they are more comfortable with divergent information and experience less 
dissonance (Choi et al., 1999; Hiniker, 1969). Seeing more information as related (Choi 
et al., 2003), they seek to fit information to form a bigger picture of the complex 
situation. They may be more prone to information overload but may also be more 
prepared for changes and surprises. These differences between dialectical and 
differentiation reasoners provide conflicting paths in complex situations. 
During sensemaking, information is used to reduce ambiguity (Weick, 1995). 
People who avoid opposing information may err in not considering alternate positions. 
People who are comfortable with contradiction may remain open to new information 
longer. They may track several frames simultaneously so that they can merge frames or 
modify them. Their readiness to change their sense of the situation and their decisions 
depending on the situation can prolong the sensemaking process. These differences can 
hinder collaboration when high tolerance people are more flexible in decision making and 
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view the low tolerance people as rigid. Low tolerance people seek to complete work 
would view high tolerance people’s flexibility as indecisive.  
Tolerance for contradiction affects PI and decisions in sensemaking. People high 
in tolerance for contradiction believe that some truths exist in two opposing positions and 
may retain an intermediate position. They may not identify causes as conflicting and thus, 
may choose several approaches to solve the problem. During sensemaking, people who 
have a low tolerance for contradiction believe that two opposing views cannot be correct 
at the same time and will choose the cause that contributes most to the problem. This 
belief will also affect decision judgments. A higher score on tolerance for contradiction 
suggests a greater likelihood to synthesize opposing positions and prefer an intermediate 
solution. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H13: People with high tolerance for contradiction will show less absolute 
difference between their final dispositional and situational problem 
identification judgments than people with low tolerance for contradiction. 
H14: People with high tolerance for contradiction will show less absolute 
difference between their final dispositional and situational decision 
judgments than people with low tolerance for contradiction. 
Personality Differences And Information Use 
People differ in their propensities for processing information. Several personality 
variables are associated with information processing (Anderson, 2002). People may 
handle the same information in different ways. They may prefer different forms of data 
and information, like different sources, and handle unreliable information in different 
ways. In addition, making sense out of this information can be overwhelming during time 
30 
 
pressure and the changing environment. Personality differences can influence how people 
handle information during these situations and have implication on decision effectiveness 
(Anderson, 2002; Davenport & Prusak, 1998). Hence, the need for cognitive closure and 
the need for cognition are included in this study to give a broader perspective on 
individuals’ information selection and use. 
Need for Cognitive Closure 
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) defined the need for cognitive closure as a 
dispositional construct that is manifested through differences in desire for predictability, 
preference for order and structure, discomfort with ambiguity, decisiveness, and close-
mindedness. It is related to an individual’s motivation with respect to information 
processing and judgment. Individuals motivated to attain cognitive closure were more 
likely to use early information in forming judgments compared with individuals 
motivated to avoid closure (Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). 
These individuals with high dispositional need for cognitive closure also considered less 
information before making judgments, yet they were more confident in their judgment 
and required less time to form it (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). They had the tendency to 
commit FAE (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Veronica, 2000) and were less susceptible to 
persuasion (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  
The need for cognitive closure has been linked to attribution. Chiu and colleagues 
(2000) found that dispositional attribution varies as a function of the need for closure. 
People with high cognitive closure were more likely to make attributions to individual 
dispositions whereas those with low cognitive closure made situational attributions. 
Consistent with this past research, I posit that cognitive closure will be related to the type 
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of information considered during sensemaking. Because dispositional attribution may be 
an easier process (Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff, 1985; Winter & Uleman, 1984), those 
with high cognitive closure will look for dispositional information rather than for 
situational information (Knowles, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 2001) while those with low 
cognitive closure may equally attend to both kinds of information. A higher score 
represents a higher need for cognitive closure. This reasoning leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H15: Need for Cognitive Closure scores will be positively related to the 
percentage of dispositional information items selected. 
As described earlier, the tendency to dispositional attribution in the presence of 
available situational explanation is called FAE. FAE is common in dispositional 
attributors (Gilbert & Malone, 1995) and also in people with a higher need for closure 
(Webster, 1993). While research has shown that both individually contributed to FAE, I 
explore the joint effect of attribution and need for cognitive closure on FAE. Because 
individuals high in need for closure are motivated to achieve closure, they may be more 
likely to make dispositional attributions. Together with the tendency to make 
dispositional attribution, people high in both need for cognitive closure and dispositional 
attribution are more likely to be susceptible to FAE. This leads to the following 
hypothesis:  
H16: There will be a significant interaction between Attribution scores and the 
Need for Cognitive Closure scores on final dispositional PI judgments. The 
slope between Attribution and final PI judgments will be steeper for people 
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high in need for closure than people low in need for closure to reflect their 
dispositional tendency for PI. 
Need for Cognition 
The need for cognition describes the amount of thought an individual typically 
puts forth in daily activities (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982). Individuals high in intrinsic motivation to exercise their mental faculties are 
characterized as high in need for cognition (chronic cognizers) whereas individuals low 
in intrinsic motivation to engage in effortful cognitive endeavors are characterized as low 
in need for cognition (chronic cognitive misers) (Cacioppo et al., 1996). These individual 
differences were found to influence the acquisition or processing of information relevant 
to dilemmas or problems. High levels of cognition are found to be negatively related to 
the tendency to ignore, avoid, or distort new information (Venkatraman, Marlino, Kardes, 
& Sklar, 1990). People high in need for cognition sought out, scrutinized, and used 
relevant information when making decisions and solving problems more than did people 
with low need for cognition (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992).  
Individuals with high need for cognition were more likely to seek information 
across domains. They were more likely to have acquired, thought about, and reflected 
back on information to make sense of events. In contrast, individuals with low need for 
cognition were more likely to rely on other people, cognitive heuristics, or social 
comparison processes. The need for cognition is expected to affect the amount of 
information gathered during sensemaking. A person with a lower need for cognition is 
likely to select less information items while someone with a higher need for cognition 
may want and select more information. Based on this research, I hypothesized: 
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H17: The Need for Cognition scores will be positively related to the percentage of 
information items selected. 
The relationship of the need for cognition and AH thinking might itself influence 
the tendency for a person to commit FAE. Because individuals high in need for cognition 
have the intrinsic motivation to process and consider more information, they may be less 
likely to make dispositional attributions. Because individuals high in holistic thinking 
will take the context into account when making judgments, they may also be less likely to 
make dispositional attributions. Together, people high on both need for cognition and 
holistic thinking are less likely to be susceptible to FAE. The reasoning leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H18: There will be a significant interaction between AH scores and Need for 
Cognition scores on the final dispositional PI judgments. The slope between 
AH scores and final PI judgments will be steeper for people low in need for 
cognition than people high in need for cognition to reflect their dispositional 
tendency for PI. 
In the next section, I described the methods design to assess the changes in 
sensemaking and the materials used to tap individual differences described earlier in this 
study.  
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II. METHOD 
Research Design 
This research used a mixed factorial design. There were two between subject 
factors and a within subject factor. The between subject factors were 2 (Scenario Order) x 
2 (Information Presentation Order). Participants received the two scenarios in a 
counterbalanced order resulting in two scenario orders. In each scenario, dispositional 
(D) information and situational (S) information were presented sequentially to tap 
information use and change in judgments.  The counterbalancing of information 
presentation order created two versions of information presentation in each scenario. One 
version began with information that suggested a dispositional cause followed by 
information that suggested a situational cause (D-S). In the other version, the order was 
reversed (S-D). Participants received both scenarios either in D-S order or S-D order.  
The main order I am interested in is Information Presentation (D versus S). While 
the information presentation is different, the content in each scenario was the same. Each 
participant received both scenarios and the same content. Hence, all participants received 
the same materials, making a within subject factor. 
The 2 (Scenario Order) x 2 (Information Presentation Order) design created four 
booklets. Participants were each given a booklet with one of the specific order shown in 
Table 2. For example, participants with Booklet 1 received Scenario 1 followed by 
Scenario 2, both with a D-S information presentation order in both scenarios. Participants 
also completed five questionnaires, a memory task, and a demographic sheet.  
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Materials 
 There were two types of materials. Table 3 shows an overview of the measures 
used in this study. The first was the Sensemaking Assessment Package that included two 
unfolding scenarios, here labeled Sensemaking Scenarios, with questions inserted to 
assess the outcome measures, and a Memory Recall task. Different sections in each 
scenario presented the unfolding of the scenario. Figure 4 illustrates the five sections of a 
scenario where Sections A to E describe the sequences in the unfolding scenarios while 
the Response column in Table 3 shows what was measured in each Section. 
The second type of material measured the predictor variables: Analytic-Holism 
Scale (AHS), Need for Cognition Scale (NfCog), Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC), 
and Tolerance Ambiguity Scale (TAS). See Response column in Table 3 for the measures 
in each section of the questionnaires. Each of these measures is described in the section 
below. 
Sensemaking Assessment Package: Sensemaking Scenarios 
Sensemaking Assessment Development  
The final sensemaking assessment was developed in six pilot studies. Pilot 
Studies 1, 2, and 3 developed the sensemaking scenarios based on interviews, 
information development, and evaluation of scenarios and information. In Pilot Study 1, 
undergraduates were interviewed to find relevant scenarios and to understand the use of 
information. In Pilot Study 2, information for each scenario was developed from the 
interviews and earlier research materials (Lin, 2004). Undergraduates rated how relevant 
each information item was to dispositional cause and situational cause. Items were re-
written to clarify the scenarios. In Pilot Study 3, graduate students evaluated information 
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items, overall scenarios for the balance and strength of information, and scenarios interest 
for undergraduates. Changes were made iteratively to refine scenarios. 
Pilot Study 4 further developed the two scenarios into sensemaking assessments 
by incorporating the outcome measures: problem identification (PI) judgments, decision 
judgments, information selection, information relevance, information need, information 
trust, and qualitative sensemaking. In Pilot Study 5, the sensemaking assessments 
together with other measures used in the study were tested. Completion time was noted. 
A memory task was added. In Pilot Study 6, the sensemaking assessment package was 
finalized to incorporate needed improvement and changes for the final sensemaking 
assessment package for the study. See Appendix A for details of each pilot study. 
Final Sensemaking Assessment Scenarios 
Two sensemaking assessment scenarios were developed from the pilot studies, 
Production Dilemma (PD) and Westerly Foundation (WF). Production Dilemma involved 
a chaotic commercial production department and a CEO who wanted a fair report on the 
activities of the department. Westerly Foundation involved a non-profit organization that 
was facing a shortage of funds and the Board of Directors who wanted recommendation 
to solve the problem. See Appendix B for the two sensemaking scenarios.  
As illustrated in Figure 4, there were five sections in each final scenario. Each 
scenario started with an initial problem presentation that suggested a dilemma between 
two possible causes, the particular person or the changes in the organization. Participants 
were asked to make the initial PI and decision judgments as to what they think happened 
and what they would decide to do [Section A]. They were then asked to select 
37 
 
information from different categories of information to help make sense of the problem 
[Section B]. 
Each scenario then presented additional information that represented dynamic 
changes in the stories [Section C and D]. Either information about the person is presented 
first, followed by changes in the situation, or vice-versa. In each scenario, there were 
thirteen items in each of the two information presentation manipulations with a total of 26 
items. In the information presentation that suggested dispositional or person cause, there 
were eleven dispositional items and two situational items. In the information presentation 
that suggested a situational cause, there were eleven situational items and two 
dispositional items. In these sections, participants were asked to re-judge causes and 
decisions as they received the additional information, and they evaluated the relevance of 
the information presented at each point.  
Participants were then presented all twenty six information items and they again 
selected information [Section E]. Here, they made the final PI and decision judgments. 
Ratings of information need and trust were also collected. 
Sensemaking Assessment Outcomes in Each Scenario 
As the sensemaking assessment generated the outcomes used to analyze the study 
hypotheses, it is important to describe how these outcomes were measured. See Appendix 
B for all items and Table 4 for combined and individual scenario reliabilities. Below are 
the descriptions of each outcome: 
Problem identification.  Two types of problems were identified: situational and 
dispositional. For items, three for each type of PI, participants were asked “How likely do 
you think that each of this is the problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely).” 
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These were measured at four points in the scenario. Situational PI items reliabilities for 
the two combined scenarios from Time 1 to Time 4 were .63, .72, .65, and .74 (n=6), 
respectively. Dispositional PI items reliabilities from Time 1 to Time 4 were .79, .88, .83, 
and .81 (n=6), respectively.  
Decision.  There were two types of decisions: situational and dispositional. Six 
items measured the decisions, three for each type of decision. Participants were asked 
“How likely are you to recommend these actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most 
likely).” These were also measured four times. The reliabilities for the two combined 
scenarios from Time 1 to Time 4 were .69, .75, .71, and .73 for situational decision items 
(n=6) and .71, .75, .67, and .66 for dispositional decision items (n=6).  
Information selection.   There were two parts in the scenarios where information 
selection was assessed. The first information selection was before Information 
Presentation (IP) 1. Nine categories each with a range of 3-5 information items in each 
category were presented. A total of 36 items were presented. Participants were asked to 
“Mark ‘X’ for items that will best help you understand the problem.” The responses were 
dichotomous, either an item was marked or it was not. The reliability for Information 
Selection 1 for the combined scenarios (n=72) was .92.  
 The second information selection was after IP 2 but before the final judgments. It 
consisted of the 26 information items created for the study. Participants were asked to 
“Please select information that is relevant for your report by marking ‘X’ in the boxes 
below.” The responses were dichotomous, either an item was marked or it was not. The 
reliability for Information Selection 2 for the combined scenarios (n=52) was .84.  
Categories of information selection.   In Information Selection 1, nine categories 
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of information tested the range of categories of information used. Selection of a category 
was defined as having at least one item selected from that category. For example, if the 
item ‘Group Composition’ was selected, that means the category ‘Work Group 
Information’ was selected. The reliability for category selection for the combined 
scenarios (n=18) was .89. 
Information relevance.   There were two types of information: dispositional and 
situational were used for the two information manipulation presented. There were thirteen 
items for dispositional items and thirteen situational items for a total of 26 information 
items. The relevance of these information items were assessed after each information 
presentation. Participants were asked “Please rate from 1 (Not at all Relevant) to 7 (Very 
Relevant) how relevant is each item.” The reliabilities for the combined scenarios for 
situational items (n=26) was .86 and .87 for dispositional items (n=26).  
Information need.   One item was used to assess information need. Participants 
were asked “Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to 
investigate the problem.” This was measured four times. 
Information trust.   One item was used to assess information trust. Participants 
were asked “How much do you trust the information that was presented to you?” They 
rated from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot). This was measured twice, one time in each section 
of the information presentation. 
Qualitative sensemaking.   In parallel with the measures describe above, an open 
ended question, “What do you now think happened?”, was asked four times to find what 
participants thought happened in the scenario (see Appendix B). These queries tap 
sensemaking qualitatively to chart how participants change their assessment of the 
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scenarios as additional and contrary information is given. This measurement of 
sensemaking allows participants to justify their PI in the scenarios. Appendix C showed 
the sequence of coding for responses and the description of the response codes.  
The open ended question, asked four times, provided four responses. In the 
scenario participant first responded to the initial frame with limited information [Respond 
1 (R1)] (the first page of Appendix C illustrates an example). Next, participants receive 
the first information presentation [Information Presentation 1 (IP1)]. The first 
information presentation could be consistent (=) or inconsistent (≠) with participants’ first 
response. Participant could stay with (=) or change (≠) their first response in the second 
response [R2] based on the first information presentation. They then received a second 
information presentation [IP2] in which the content was always contrary to content of the 
first information presentation. The second information presentation could be consistent 
(=) or inconsistent (≠) with the second response. Participants could stay with (=) or 
change (≠) their second response in the third response [R3]. Before the fourth response 
[R4], no new information was given but participants were presented with all previous 
information and they selected the information deemed important for the scenario.  
Open ended responses were coded for situational, dispositional, or both types of 
explanations. For each open ended response, a participant’s need for more information 
was also coded as present or absent. The four open ended responses yielded codes that 
depended on the consistency of a participant’s initial explanation and on the first 
information presented as well as on subsequent response to the second information 
presentation. In Appendix C, combinations of qualitative sensemaking patterns based on 
responses over information presentation are illustrated for a person with an initial 
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dispositional response. From the qualitative data collected from participants, nine 
sensemaking patterns were identified (see second page of Appendix C for Codes 
descriptions).  
Participant responses were coded in the following way: The occurrence of the first 
question taps a participant’s Initial Frame of the problem. Individuals who were able to 
give a reason(s) for the problem by identifying causal factors were those who started 
sensemaking with an initial frame. They stated cause(s) in the open ended question. For 
example, “In my experience financial problems are caused by poor planning by 
management.” 
The first and second information presentations allow for changes in the second 
and third responses. The responses to these information presentations tapped two other 
forms of sensemaking, Questioning and Preserving. In questioning a frame, a participant 
was ready to change their understanding of the situation. They may not trust the 
information they were given. For example, “It is not Andy’s fault as I previously thought. 
I don’t believe what his co-workers said about him because I think they were just using 
Andy.” In preserving a frame, participants are establishing a base to maintain their 
previous understanding of the situation. They will hold to their original conclusion even 
if they are presented with new contradictory information and will use information 
consistent with the conclusion to strengthen the conclusion. For example, “It is Andy’s 
fault as I previously thought. I know the previous supervisor may think well of him but 
there are so many negatives about Andy.”  
Sensemaking Assessment Package: Memory Recall Task 
Included in the Sensemaking Assessment Package was the memory recall task.  
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This task assessed the kind of information items participants remembered from the first 
scenario they received. To do this, they completed a memory recall task. Participants 
were reminded about the first scenario they were presented with in the study. For 
example, “Earlier in this session, you were presented with the [Scenario Name] 
scenario.” They were then presented with the initial problem from the scenario. For 
example, “You are an advisor for non-profit organizations…Your job is to understand the 
situation and recommend action.” Participants were then asked to recall as many 
information items as they could from the scenario. This task measured the number and 
type of information items a participant recalled. See Appendix D for memory recall task.  
Coding  
Information was coded for Dispositional-Situational information and Confirming-
Disconfirming information. Dispositional-Situational information was coded into three 
mutually exclusive categories: Dispositional Target (DT), Dispositional Non-Target 
(DNT), and Situational (S). Confirming-Disconfirming information was coded into two 
exclusive mutually categories: Confirming and Disconfirming. 
Dispositional Target information recall was defined as recall of information that 
was related to internal attributes of the target person such as personality, beliefs, feelings, 
physical attributes, etc (i.e. Michael or Andy). Some examples are “Michael is new to 
non-profit organization” and “Andy is a troublemaker.” Dispositional Non-Target 
information recall was defined as recall of information that was related to internal 
attributes of a non target person such as personality, beliefs, feelings, or physical 
attributes, etc. For example, information about other directors and employees in WF and 
Chris and other employees in PD are non target information. Some examples are “Mr. 
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Spector set up foundation policy” and “Chris is the new supervisor.” Situational 
information recall was defined as recall of information that was related to external factors 
of a person (i.e. events surrounding the person, industry and organizational information, 
economy, etc.). Some examples are “two other foundations were set up” and “new 
machines were brought in.”  
 Confirming Information was information that was consistent and supported a 
current sense of a situation. This was defined as information that confirmed a cause to be 
the problem. For example, “Andy is a troublemaker” supported an individual to be the 
problem and “The economy is facing a recession” supported the situation to be the 
problem. Disconfirming Information was information that was inconsistent and could 
change the current sense of a situation. This was defined as information that refuted a 
cause to be the problem. For example, “Andy knows a lot about the production process” 
refuted an individual to be the problem and “The management met with and explained the 
planned changes to production workers” refuted the situation to be the problem. When 
information recall was neither confirming nor disconfirming, each category received an 
absent code. See Appendix E for Memory Coding description.  
Analytic-Holism Scale (AHS) 
 In order to measure an individual’s Analytic-Holistic (AH) thinking, I used the 
Analytic-Holism Scale (AHS; Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007). This scale is relatively new in 
cross cultural research but it is one of the few psychometrically valid scales available to 
measure AH thinking. The score on AHS was used as a moderator (H2, H3, H5, & H6) 
and predictor (H1, H4, & H18) in this study. The three subscales on AHS, Attention, 
Causal Attribution, and Contradiction, were also used as predictor scores for hypotheses  
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(H7-H8; H9-H12, H16; H13-H14, respectively). See Appendix F for the scale. 
This scale consisted of 24 items measuring the four components of AH thinking 
on a 7-point Likert scale. Five items from Perception of Change subscale and one from 
Contradiction subscale were reverse coded items. A higher score signifies a higher 
holistic tendency. Example items include “The whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts,” “Any phenomenon has numerous numbers of causes, although some of the causes 
are not known.” “It is more desirable to take the middle ground than go to extremes,” 
and “Future events are predictable based on present situations.” 
Choi and colleagues (2007) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .73 for the overall 
scale, and .67, .76, .71, and .71 for Attention, Causal Attribution, Contradiction, and 
Perception of Change subscales, respectively. The present study has an alpha of .60 for 
the overall scale, and 62, .71 .52, and .48 for Attention, Causal Attribution, Contradiction, 
and Perception of Change subscales, respectively. Choi et al. (2007) found that a four-
factor model (χ2 (246) = 802.61, χ 2/df = 3.26, GFI = .88) had a better fit. As in Choi and 
colleagues (2007), all subscales were significantly correlated with the overarching scale 
(AHS). In the present study, Perception of Change subscales not related to Contradiction 
and Causal Attribution.  
The Need for Cognition Scale (NfCog) 
 In order to measure the need for cognition, an individual’s tendency to engage in 
and enjoy thinking, I used the short form of the Need for Cognition Scale (NfCog; 
Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). The score on the NfCog was used as a predictor and 
moderator (H17 and H18, respectively). See Appendix G for the scale. 
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The original scale had 34 items and the short form has 18 items on a 5-point 
Likert scale. Half of the items were reverse-scored items. Example items form the short 
form include “I would prefer complex to simple problems,” “Thinking is not my idea of 
fun,” and “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.” The two forms 
were correlated at .95. One factor structure accounted for 37% of the variance. It 
represents a single continuum of interindividual variations in the general tendency to 
engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors. The scale has a Cronbach alpha of .90 
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). Cronbach’s alpha value for the present study was .87.  
The Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC) 
The need for cognitive closure describes an individual’s motivation to attain a 
conclusion or desire for predictability, preference for order and structure, discomfort with 
ambiguity, decisiveness; and, close-mindedness. To measure this, I used the short form of 
the Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NFCC; Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2005). The score on 
NFCC was used as a predictor and moderator (H15 and H16, respectively). See Appendix 
H for the scale.  
The NFCC (long form) consists of five subscales: Preference for Order, 
Preference for Predictability, Decisiveness, Discomfort with Ambiguity, and Closed 
Mindedness. It has a Cronbach's alpha of .84 and the reliability of the subscale ranges 
from .62 to .82. The test-retest reliability coefficient over a 12-week period is .86 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). This scale has 42 items.  
A short form of NFCC consists of 16 items on a 6-point Likert scale. Example 
items include “I prefer activities where it is always clear what is to be done and how it 
need to be done,” and “I get very upset when things around me aren’t in their place.” 
46 
 
Two items form a lie score are “I never been late for work or for an appointment,” and 
“I have never hurt another person’s feelings.” Pierro and Kruglanski (2005) found 
attenuated correlations between shortened revised NFCC and previous version of NFCC 
in U.S. and Italian samples are .92 and .93, respectively. Reliability was satisfactory at 
.80 in a U.S. sample and .79 in an Italian sample. Cronbach’s alpha value for the present 
study was .73.  
Tolerance for Ambiguity Scale 
MacDonald (1970)’s scale of tolerance for ambiguity measures an individual’s 
perception of ambiguous or inconsistent situations as desirable; or tendency to perceive 
or interpret ambiguous environment as threatening or undesirable, was used for 
exploration in this study. It has 20 items. This is a dichotomous scale with true-false 
responses. Example items include “I don’t like to work on a problem unless there is a 
possibility of coming out with a clear-cut and unambiguous answers,” and “Sometimes I 
rather enjoy going against the rules and doing things I’m not supposed to do.” The scale 
had an alpha of .78. Cronbach’s alpha value for the present study was .48. See Appendix 
I for the scale.  
Demographics 
 Participant’s gender, age, ethnic identity, level of education, GPA, and working 
experience information was collected. See Appendix J for demographic sheet. 
Procedure 
Data was collected in groups of 10 or fewer participants. Each session took 
approximately 90 minutes. First, participants were provided a description of the study and 
were asked their consent to participate. They were then given the package of testing 
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materials and instructions on how to proceed. Written instructions were included with 
each section of materials. Participants completed each scenario at their own pace. After 
participants completed both scenarios, they completed the questionnaires in the following 
order: Analytic-Holism Scale, the Need for Cognition Scale, the Need for Cognitive 
Closure Scale, Tolerance for Ambiguity Scale, and the memory recall task. Finally, they 
completed a demographic sheet. Participants were then debriefed and questions were 
answered. 
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III. RESULTS 
In the first section, I describe the sample and scenario characteristics. In the 
second section, I present hypotheses testing using correlation analyses and moderated 
multiple regressions. Lastly, I explored additional analyses: the relationships among the 
individual measures, memory recall, and qualitative sensemaking using two exploratory 
measures.  
Sample and Scenario Characteristics 
Sample Characteristics 
Three hundred and thirty six undergraduates from Introductory Psychology 
courses participated in this study. Twenty four participants were excluded from the 
sample based on exclusion criteria of foreign born, incomplete data, or misunderstanding 
of instructions. The final sample included 312 participants.  As described in the Method 
section, there were four booklets. Seventy eight participants received one of the four 
booklets. The sample consisted of 26.6% male and 73.4% female with an average age of 
19.61 years (SD = 3.66). Participants were primarily freshmen (72.4%) and Caucasian 
American (64.7%). A majority majored in Health Sciences (34.0%), followed by 
Social/Behavioral Sciences (15.1%).  See Table 5 for detailed demographics information 
on schooling, childhood background, and work experience. 
Scenario Differences 
Because two scenarios were used, scenarios were compared for outcome differences 
using repeated measures and multilevel random coefficient (MRC) modeling analyses. 
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Analyses were performed on outcomes related to selection of categories, the percentage 
of information items selected, the percentage of types of information items selected, 
relevance judgments of types of information, problem identification (PI) and decision 
judgments, and the differences for final judgments.  
Using repeated measure analyses, scenarios did not differ for information 
selection - the number of categories selected, percentage of information items selected, 
percentage of situation information items selected, and percentage of dispositional 
information items selected. However, differences were found for ratings of situational 
information relevance, Pillai’s trace = .11, Wilks’s lambda = .89, F = 39.18, p < .001; 
dispositional information relevance, Pillai’s trace = .01, Wilks’s lambda = .99, F = 3.91, 
p < .05; and overall information relevance, Pillai’s trace = .02, Wilks’s lambda = .98, F = 
6.54, p < .05. See Table 6 for details. 
Using MRC modeling analyses as suggested in Bliese and Ployhart (2002), PI and 
decision judgments over four measurement times were compared between scenarios 
while controlling for scenario order and information presentation order. Scenarios, 
scenario order, and information presentation order were level-2 variables while Time was 
a level-1 variable. For PI judgments, scenarios were not significantly different for either 
dispositional PI or situational PI. For decision judgments, scenarios were significantly 
different only for dispositional decision, B = 0.11, df = 2179, t = 2.13, p < .05.  
The difference scores between the final situational and dispositional PI judgments 
for the two scenarios were compared. I also compared the difference scores between the 
final situational and dispositional decision judgments. Scenarios were significantly 
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different for the PI judgments, Pillai’s trace = .10, Wilks’s lambda = .90, F = 36.02, p < 
.001 but not for the decision judgments. See Table 6 for details. 
In order to simplify analyses for hypotheses testing, I first used combined scores 
of both the scenarios to provide general findings. I additionally conducted hypotheses 
testing on individual scenarios with associated outcomes differences found in analyses of 
scenario differences. These include dispositional decision judgments, information 
relevance, and the difference between the final PIs judgments. For the additional 
analyses, combined scores were used. 
Hypotheses Testing 
I examined three sets of research hypotheses. The first set looked at AH thinking 
with PI (H1, H2, H3) and decision judgments (H4, H5, H6). Specifically, how AH 
thinking influenced initial PI and decision judgments (H1, H4) and how it interacted with 
the two information presentations to affect subsequent PI and decision judgments (H2, 
H3, H5, H6). The second set, components of AH thinking, was hypothesized to be related 
to the information characteristics: Information selection (H7, H9, H10, H12) and 
Information relevance (H8, H11). Additionally, Tolerance for Contradiction was posited 
to relate to the absolute difference scores between two PI and two decision judgments 
(H13, H14). The third set examines two individual personality differences in information 
selection (H15, H17) and the combination of each of these individual differences with 
AH thinking in affecting PI judgments (H16, H18). The hypotheses were assessed using 
correlation analyses or moderated multiple regressions as appropriate. 
Analytic-Holistic Thinking 
There were several commonalities among the hypotheses tested here. First,  
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Analytic-Holistic thinking was hypothesized to influence initial situational PI and 
decision. Because holistic thinkers use a situational causal framework during 
sensemaking, they would begin with situational causes. Hypotheses 1 and 4 test this 
assumption using correlational analyses. Second, because analytic and holistic thinkers 
might seek different types of information, they might use information differently to 
identify problems and make decisions. This was tested using two sequential information 
presentations. Hypotheses 2, 3, 5 and 6 test this assumption using moderated multiple 
regressions.  
Moderated multiple regression is a form of hierarchical multiple regression that 
uses a hierarchical entry of the predictor variables to determine if the relationship 
between one of the predictors and a criterion variable is influenced by a third moderating 
variable. A significant interaction indicates a moderating effect and will be followed by a 
simple slopes analysis. This analysis is used for hypotheses with moderators, H2, H3, H5, 
H6, H16, and H18. In Hypothesis 2, the moderated multiple regression is described in 
detail, while subsequent hypotheses following similar steps are briefly described. 
H1: AH scores will be positively correlated with initial situational PI judgments. 
 
To test Hypothesis 1, the mean overall Analytic-Holistic (AH) scores and the 
initial situational PI judgment scores [Combined: Problem Identification Sit T1]2 were 
correlated. The AH scores were significantly correlated with initial situational PI 
judgment scores, r = .13, p < .05. Hypothesis 1 was supported. People higher in holistic 
thinking were more likely to identify problems to be situational in their initial judgment. 
See Table 7.  
                                                 
2 Brackets here and in later results indicate labels in tables.  
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H2: The interaction between AH scores and Information Presentation (IP) 1 will 
significantly affect both situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 2, after 
controlling for PI judgments in Time 1, IP1, and AH scores. The slope between IP1 
and both situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 2 will be steeper for high 
holistic thinking than people low in holistic thinking.  
To test Hypothesis 2, the influence of AH thinking on the relationship between 
IP1 and the PI judgments, moderated multiple regression analyses were used. Analyses 
were examined independently for situational PI and dispositional PI judgment outcomes.  
Situational PI judgment.   Situational PI judgment at Time 2 was selected as the 
outcome. I regressed this on situational PI judgment at Time 1, IP1, AH scores, and the 
interaction term of IP1 and AH scores in three steps. In Step 1, situational PI judgment at 
Time 1 was entered to predict situational PI judgment at Time 2. In Step 2, IP1 and AH 
scores were entered. In Step 3, the interaction term computed as a cross-product of 
predictors (IP1 x AH scores) was entered. See Table 8 for results.   
In Step 1, situational PI judgment at Time 1 predicted situational PI judgment at 
Time 2. Variance accounted for by this initial model was significant, R2 = .19, F (1, 310) 
= 71.15, p < .001, indicating that situational PI judgment at Time 1 predicted situational 
PI judgment at Time 2. In Step 2 two other predictors, IP1 and AH scores, were added. 
The variance accounted for by this model was R2 = .32. The incremental variance was 
significant, Δ R2 = .14, Δ F (2, 308) = 30.73, p < .001, revealing that the addition of 
information presentation and AH thinking increased the predictive power of the model. In 
Step 3, when the interaction term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .33. The 
incremental variance was also significant, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = 5.13, p < .05. The 
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interaction term was significant, B = .45, t = 2.27, p < .05, indicating that the situational 
PI judgment at Time 2 depended upon the interaction of IP1 and AH scores.  
A significant interaction of IP1 and AH scores on situational PI judgments 
suggested that AH thinking influenced how information was used in making situational 
PI judgments. This allowed for further simple slope analyses. 
A simple slope analysis describes the effect of AH tendency on the relationship 
between IP1 and the situational PI judgments. These simple slopes are the regression of 
the outcome, situational PI judgments at Time 2, on the predictor, IP1 at specific values 
of the moderator, AH scores. Two means of AH scores, representing one standard 
deviation above and below the mean of AH scores, were created to indicate high and low 
AH thinking (Aiken & West, 1991). These generated two simple regression lines of 
situational PI judgment on IP1 as a function of two levels of AH thinking. See Figure 5. 
These regression lines were not parallel reflecting the interactions effects. The 
relationship between situational PI judgments and IP1 changed as a function of AH 
scores. The slope for people with higher holistic scores was steeper than that of people 
lower in holistic thinking, as hypothesized. This shows that higher holistic thinking used 
the situation information presented in a way that is reflected in their situational PI 
judgment. However, the effect is significant but small, as indicated by incremental 
variance of 1%. Another interpretation is that they are more susceptible to situational 
information presentation. Hypothesis 2 was supported for situational PI judgment.  
Dispositional PI judgment.   The moderated multiple regression analysis was 
repeated for dispositional PI judgment at Time 2. See Table 8 for results. Variance 
accounted for in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .08, F (1, 310) = 28.02, p < .001, indicating 
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that dispositional PI judgment at Time 1 predicted dispositional PI judgment at Time 2. 
The variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .60. The incremental variance was 
significant, Δ R2 = .51, Δ F (2, 308) = 196.14, p < .001. In Step 3, when the interaction 
term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .78. The incremental variance was also 
significant, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = 9.23, p < .01. The interaction term was significant, 
B = -.67, t = -3.04, p < .01, indicating that the dispositional PI judgment at Time 2 
depended upon the interaction of IP1 and AH scores.  
The interaction of IP1 and AH score on dispositional PI judgments at Time 2 
supports the interaction effect in Hypothesis 2. AH thinking influences how information 
was used when making judgments during sensemaking. The simple slopes analysis for 
dispositional PI judgment is similar to that described for situational PI judgment. Two 
regression lines of high and low AH scores were graphed. See Figure 6. 
The non-parallel regression lines indicate that the relationship between 
dispositional PI judgments and IP1 changed as a function of AH scores. Again, the 
steeper slopes were for people with higher holistic scores than people lower in holistic 
scores. The slopes showed that people higher in holistic thinking seemed to be more 
susceptible to whatever information they are presented. When dispositional information 
was presented, they rated dispositional PI judgment to be higher and when situational 
information was presented, they judged the dispositional PI to be lower. Again, effect is 
significant but small. Hypothesis 2 was supported for dispositional PI judgment.  
H3: The interaction between AH scores and IP2 will significantly affect both 
situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 3, after controlling for PI 
judgments in Time 2, IP2, and AH Scores. The slope between IP2 and both 
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situational and dispositional PI judgments in Time 3 will be steeper for people high in 
holistic thinking than people low in holistic thinking. 
 Hypotheses 3 followed the same analyses as Hypotheses 2 except that the 
outcome scores were judgments at Time 3. In Step 1, I controlled for judgments at Time 
2. Step 2 and 3 followed those in Hypothesis 2 except that IP2 replaced IP1. Again 
situational and dispositional PI judgments were investigated independently. See Table 8 
for results. 
Situational PI judgment.   In Step 1, the variance accounted for was significant, 
R2=.18, F (1, 310) = 66.50, p < .001. Situational PI judgment at Time 2 predicted 
situational PI judgment at Time 3. In Step 2, the variance accounted for was R2 = .26 
when IP 2 and AH scores was added. The incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = 
.09, Δ F (2, 308) = 17.62, p < .001. In Step 3, the variance accounted for was R2 = .26. 
The incremental variance with the added interaction term was not significant, Δ R2 = .00, 
Δ F (1, 307) = 1.73, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = .22, t = 1.32, p 
> .05. Situational PI judgment at Time 3 did not depend on the interaction of IP2 and AH 
scores. Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
Dispositional PI judgment.   The variance accounted for Step 1 was not 
significant, R2 = .00, F (1, 310) = .39, p > .05. Dispositional PI judgment at Time 2 did 
not predict dispositional PI judgment at Time 3. See Table 8 for results. The variance 
accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .28 with an incremental variance of Δ R2 = .28, Δ F (2, 
308) = 60.70, p < .001. In Step 3, the variance accounted for was R2 = .29. The 
incremental variance, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = .77, p > .05 and the interaction term, B = 
-.22, t = -.88, p > .05, were not significant. Dispositional PI judgment at Time 3 did not 
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depend upon the interaction of IP 2 and AH scores. Hypothesis 3 was not supported. A 
simple slope analysis would not be meaningful.  
H4: AH scores will be positively correlated with initial situational decision 
 
 judgments.   
 
To test Hypothesis 4, the mean overall AH scores and the initial situational 
decision judgment scores [Combined: Decision Sit T1] were used in a correlation 
analysis. The AH scores were significantly correlated with the initial situational PI 
judgment scores, r = .17, p < .01. Hypothesis 4 was supported. People higher in holistic 
thinking were more likely to recommend a situational solution in their initial judgment. 
See Table 7.  
H5: The interaction between AH scores and IP1 will significantly affect both 
situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 2, after controlling decision 
judgments in Time 1, IP1, and AH scores. The slope of IP1 and both situational and 
dispositional decision judgments in Time 2 will be steeper for people high in holistic 
thinking than people low in holistic thinking. 
The analyses for Hypotheses 5 and 6 were consistent to those three steps 
described in Hypotheses 2 and 3, respectively, using decision judgment scores rather than 
PI judgments at their respective measurement times. See Table 9 for results. 
Situational decision judgment.   In Step 1, situational decision judgment at Time 1 
predicted situational decision judgment at Time 2. The variance accounted for was R2 = 
.19, F (1, 310) = 74.78, p < .001. In Step 2, the variance accounted for was R2 = .43. The 
incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = .24, Δ F (2, 308) = 64.29, p < .001. In Step 
3, when the interaction term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .43. The 
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incremental variance was also significant, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = 4.89, p < .05. The 
significant interaction term, B = .45, t = 2.21, p < .05, indicates that the situational 
decision judgment at Time 2 depended upon the interaction of IP1 and AH scores.  
A significant interaction of IP1 and AH scores on situational decision judgments 
outcome suggested that AH thinking influences how information was used when making 
decision judgments in sensemaking supporting the interaction effect in Hypothesis 5. The 
simple slopes analysis in Figure 7 shows the relationship between IP1 and the situational 
decision judgments at two levels, high and low, of AH thinking.  
As in earlier analyses, the slope was steeper for people higher holistic thinking 
than people lower holistic thinking. Higher holistic thinkers used situational information 
to affect their situational decision judgments. When dispositional information was 
presented, they used dispositional information to be wary of adopting a situational 
decision showing a lower situational judgment. The incremental variance of 1% indicates 
the effect is small. Hypothesis 5 was supported for situational decision judgment. 
Dispositional decision judgment.   As reported in the scenario differences section, 
differences over time were found for the dispositional decision judgment. The analysis 
associated with this variable first used combined score then scores from each scenario. I 
used dispositional decision judgment at Time 2 as the outcome. Variance accounted for in 
Step 1 was significant, R2 = .15, F (1, 310) = 53.06, p < .001. See Table 9 for results. 
Dispositional decision judgment at Time 1 predicted dispositional decision judgment at 
Time 2. The variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .56. The incremental variance was 
significant, Δ R2 = .42, Δ F (2, 308) = 146.81, p < .001. In Step 3, when the interaction 
term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .57. The incremental variance, Δ R2 = 
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.01, Δ F (1, 307) = 6.20, p < .05 and the interaction term, B = -.52, t = -2.49, p < .05, 
were significant. Dispositional decision judgment at Time 2 depended upon the 
interaction of IP1 and AH scores.  
A significant interaction of IP1 and AH scores on dispositional decision 
judgments outcomes suggested that AH thinking influences how information was used 
when making dispositional decision judgments. This supported the interaction effect of 
Hypothesis 5.  
The simple slopes analysis in Figure 8 shows the relationship between IP1 and the 
dispositional decision judgments at high and low AH thinking. As in earlier analysis, the 
slopes suggest that people higher in holistic thinking are more susceptible to whatever 
information they are presented. When dispositional information was presented, they 
judged dispositional decisions to be higher, when presented with situational information, 
they judged the dispositional decisions to be lower. Again, effect is significant but small. 
Hypothesis 5 was supported for dispositional decision judgment. 
Dispositional decision judgment: Analysis by scenario.   The same analysis was 
performed independently for each scenario. See Table 10 for details. The WF result 
showed a significant interaction as did the combined scenarios results. The PD scenario 
had a non-significant interaction. In PD, the variance accounted for in Step 1 was 
significant, R2 = .11, F (1, 310) = 39.23, p < .001. The variance accounted for in Step 2 
was R2 = .25. The incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = .14, Δ F (2, 308) = 27.80, 
p < .001. In Step 3, when the interaction term was added, variance accounted for was R2 
= .25. The incremental variance, Δ R2 = .00, Δ F (1, 307) = .30, p > .05 and the 
interaction term, B = .17, t = .55, p > .05, was not significant. Dispositional decision  
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judgment at Time 2 did not depend upon the interaction of IP1 and AH scores. 
In WF, variance accounted for in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .18, F (1, 310) = 
69.62, p < .001. The variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .45. The incremental 
variance was significant, Δ R2 = .27, Δ F (2, 308) = 74.57, p < .001. In Step 3, when the 
interaction term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .46. The incremental 
variance, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = 3.97, p < .05 and the interaction term, B = -.55, t = -
1.99, p < .05, was significant. Dispositional decision judgment at Time 2 depended upon 
the interaction of IP1 and AH scores. The simple slopes analysis in Figure 9 shows 
similar direction as the combined scores except when situational information is presented, 
people higher in holistic thinking did not judge dispositional judgment to be lower. 
H6: The interaction between AH scores and IP2 will significantly affect both 
situational and dispositional decision judgments in Time 3, after controlling decision 
judgments in Time 2, IP2, and AH scores. The slope of IP2 and both situational and   
dispositional decision judgments in Time 3 will be steeper for people high in holistic 
thinking than people low in holistic thinking. 
Situational decision judgment.   In Step 1, the variance accounted for was R2 = 
.22, F (1, 310) = 87.62, p < .001. See Table 9 for results. The variance accounted for in 
Step 2 was R2 = .33. The incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = .11, Δ F (2, 308) = 
24.81, p < .001. In Step 3, the variance accounted for was R2 = .33. The incremental 
variance was not significant when the interaction term was added, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 
307) = 2.36, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = .29, t = 1.54, p > .05, 
indicating that the situational decision judgment at Time 3 did not depend upon the 
interaction of IP2 and AH scores.  
   
60 
Dispositional decision judgment.   Variance accounted for in Step 1 was 
significant, R2 = .05, F (1, 310) = 14.56, p < .001. See Table 9 for results. Dispositional 
decision judgment at Time 2 predicted dispositional decision judgment at Time 3. The 
variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .25. The incremental variance was significant, 
Δ R2 = .20, Δ F (2, 308) = 41.50, p < .001. In Step 3, the variance accounted for was R2 = 
.26. When the interaction term was added, the incremental variance was not significant Δ 
R2 = .01, Δ F (1, 307) = 3.87, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = -.47, t 
= -1.97, p > .05. Dispositional decision judgment at Time 3 did not depend upon the 
interaction of IP 2 and AH scores. Because the interaction terms were not significant 
Hypothesis 6 was not supported using combined scores. No simple slopes analyses were 
required for the combined scores. 
Dispositional decision judgment: Analysis by scenario.   Because there were 
differences between the scenarios for disposition decision judgments, the same analysis 
was performed independently for each scenario. While the PD scenario had a significant 
interaction, the WF scenario as the combined scenarios did not show a significant 
interaction. In WF, variance accounted for in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .13, F (1, 310) 
= 44.67, p < .001. See Table 10 for details. The variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 
= .24. The incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = .13, Δ F (2, 308) = 24.95, p < 
.001. In Step 3, variance accounted for was R2 = .25, with a non significant incremental, 
Δ R2 = .00, Δ F (1, 307) = .03, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = -.05, 
t = -.16, p > .05. Dispositional decision judgment at Time 3 did not depend upon the 
interaction of IP2 and AH scores. 
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In PD, variance accounted for in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .02, F (1, 310) = 
6.65, p < .05. See Table 10 for details. The variance accounted for in Step 2 was R2 = .14. 
The incremental variance was significant, Δ R2 = .12, Δ F (2, 308) = 20.70, p < .001. In 
Step 3, when the interaction term was added, the model was significant, R2 = .16, with a 
significant incremental, Δ R2 = .02, Δ F (1, 307) = 6.79, p < .05. The interaction term was 
significant, B = -.86, t = -2.61, p < .05. Dispositional decision judgment at Time 3 
depended upon the interaction of IP2 and AH scores.  
The simple slopes analysis in Figure 10 shows the relationship between IP2 and 
the dispositional decision judgments at high and low AH thinking for PD scenario. The 
slope was steeper for people with higher holistic scores than for people lower in holistic 
thinking. People higher in holistic thinking seemed to be more susceptible to whatever 
information they were presented. When dispositional information was presented, they 
judged dispositional decisions to be higher. When presented with situational information, 
they judged the dispositional decisions to be lower. Hypothesis 6 was supported for the 
PD scenario. 
In summary, the results in H1 and H4 showed that higher holistic thinking was 
related to higher initial situational PI and decision judgments. In all cases for significant 
interactions, slopes of high AH were steeper than low AH, supporting all interactions 
hypotheses. It did not matter if judgments were dispositional or situational, people higher 
in AH thinking were more sensitive to both situational and dispositional information 
presented. All effects, however, were small. Specific results in H2 and H5 (except for 
WF) showed that AH thinking interacted with the first information presentation to affect 
both situational and dispositional PI and decision judgments at Time 2. These interaction 
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effects did not carry over at Time 3 as examined in H3 and H6 (except for PD). The 
judgments at Time 2 accounted for much of the variance of judgments in Time 3. AH 
thinking did not appear to have an effect on later judgments; it did not predict judgments 
while information presentation did (See Lower portion of Table 8 and 9: Step 2). 
Components of AH Thinking 
AH thinking components, Attention, Causal Attribution, and Tolerance for 
Contradiction, influence on the percentage of information items selected, information 
rated as relevant, the judgment differences between dispositional and situational PIs, and 
the differences between dispositional and situational decision judgments, were 
investigated. 
Attention 
 People higher in holistic thinking, with wider attention scope, were assumed to 
seek more peripheral information in their sensemaking. This was expected to result in a 
higher percentage of information items selected and higher ratings of information 
relevance. Hypotheses 7 and 8 tested these outcomes, respectively, using correlation 
analyses. 
H7: Attention scores will be positively related to the percentage of information items 
selected. 
To test Hypothesis 7, the mean of Attention scores of the AHS [Attention] and the 
mean percentage of items selected from Information Selection 1 and Information 
Selection 2 [Combined: % of Information Selected (1&2)] were used. The attention 
scores were not significantly correlated with percentage of items selected, r = -.04, p > 
.05. Hypothesis 7 was not supported. A wider attention scope did not influence the 
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selection of information items. Additional separate analyses of attention on Information 
Selection 1 and Information Selection 2, respectively, were also not significant. See 
Table 13.  
H8: Attention scores will be positively related to the rated relevance of available 
information. 
In order to test Hypothesis 8, the mean of Attention scores of the AHS [Attention] 
and the mean rating of information relevance [Combined: Overall Info Relevance] were 
used. The attention scores were not significantly correlated with mean information 
relevance, r = .06, p > .05. I tested the individual scenarios as the relevance scores were 
different for the two scenarios. The correlations were non significant, WF: r = .03, p > 
.06 and PD: r = .07, p > .05. Hypothesis 8 was not supported. A wider attention scope did 
not influence the relevance judgments of information items. See Table 14.  
Causal Attribution 
 Because people with holistic thinking were expected to include context in their 
causal attribution, it was hypothesized that they would include a variety of information in 
their sensemaking, resulting in a higher percentage of information items selected, a 
higher percentage of situational information items selected, higher rating for situational 
information relevance, and a more diverse use of information categories. Hypotheses 9 to 
12 tested each of these outcomes, respectively, using correlation analyses. 
H9: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to the percentage of 
information items selected. 
To test Hypothesis 9, the mean of Causal Attribution scores of the AHS [Causal 
Attribution] and the mean percentage of items selected from Information Selection 1 and 
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Information Selection 2 [Combined: % of Information Selected (1&2)] were used. The 
mean of attribution scores was not significantly correlated with the percentage of items 
selected, r = .10, p > .05. A situational perspective of causality did not increase the 
percentage of information items selected. Additional separate analyses of attribution on 
Information Selection 1 and Information Selection 2, respectively, were also not 
significant. See Table 13.  
H10: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to the percentage of 
situational information items selected.  
To test Hypothesis 10, the mean of Causal Attribution scores of the AHS [Causal 
Attribution] and the mean percentage of situational items selected in Information 
Selection 2 [Combined: % of Sit Information Selected 2] were used. The mean of 
attribution scores were significantly correlated with the percentage of situational items 
selected, r = .18, p < .01. This indicated that people with a situational perspective on 
causal attribution selected more situational information. Hypothesis 10 was supported. 
See Table 13.  
H11: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to mean of situational 
information rated as relevant.  
To test Hypothesis 11, the mean of Causal Attribution scores of the AHS [Causal 
Attribution] and the mean rating of situational information relevance [Combined: Sit Info 
Relevance] were used in a correlation analysis. The mean of attribution scores were 
significantly correlated with mean of situational information relevance, r = .18, p < .01. 
Hypothesis 11 was supported. This indicated that people with a situational perspective on 
causal attribution rated situational information as more relevant. In the individual 
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scenarios, the relationship was not significant for WF, r = .09, p > .05 but was significant 
for PD, r = .22, p < .001. See Table 14.  
H12: Causal attribution scores will be positively related to the number of categories 
of information selected. 
To test Hypothesis 12, the mean of Causal Attribution scores of the AHS [Causal 
Attribution] and the number of information categories selected [Combined: Numbers of 
Category Selected] were used in a correlation analysis. The mean of attribution scores 
were not significantly correlated with the number of information categories selected, r = 
.04, p > .50. Hypothesis 12 was not supported. Attribution did not influence the use of 
information categories. See Table 13.  
Tolerance for Contradiction 
 Because people with holistic thinking see truths in two seemingly opposing views, 
they were more likely to use dialectical reasoning when dealing with ‘conflicting’ 
situations. That is, they would synthesize two approaches instead of contrasting them. 
This would result in people higher in holistic thinking showing a smaller difference 
between dispositional and situational options of PI and if decision judgments. Hypotheses 
13 to 14 tested each using correlation analysis, respectively.  
H13: People with high tolerance for contradiction will show less absolute difference 
between their final dispositional and situational PI judgments than people with low 
tolerance for contradiction. 
To test Hypothesis 13, the mean of Tolerance for Contradiction scores of AHS 
[Contradiction] and the absolute difference scores between the ratings of final 
dispositional and situational PI judgments [Combined: Abs Difference in PI T4] were 
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correlated. A larger absolute difference score indicates that the judgments were polarized. 
The mean of tolerance for contradiction scores were not significantly correlated with the 
absolute difference between the dispositional and situational PI judgments, r = .03, p > 
.05. The relationship was also not supported in the individual scenarios, WF: r = .03, p > 
.05 and PD: r = .01, p > .05. Hypothesis 13 was not supported. This means the tolerance 
for contradiction did not affect the choice between the two PI judgment options. See 
Table 15.  
H14: People with high tolerance for contradiction will show less absolute difference 
between their final dispositional and situational decision judgments than people with 
low tolerance for contradiction. 
To test Hypothesis 14, the mean of Tolerance for Contradiction scores of AHS 
[Contradiction] and the absolute differences between final judgments in decision 
judgments [Combined: Abs Difference in Decision T4] were correlated. A larger absolute 
difference score indicated that the judgments were polarized. The mean of tolerance for 
contradiction scores was not significantly correlated with the absolute difference between 
the dispositional and situational decision judgments, r = .03, p > .05. These were also not 
significant in the individual scenarios, WF: r = .03, p > .05 and PD: r = .01, p > .05. 
Hypothesis 14 was not supported. This means tolerance for contradiction did not affect 
the choice between the two decision judgments. See Table 15. 
In summary, of the three components of AH thinking investigated, only causal 
attribution showed a significant relationship with information selection and information 
relevance. Attribution was related to situational information items selected and situational 
information relevance but not related to overall percentage of information items selected 
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and to categories of information used. Attention seemed unrelated to information 
characteristics. This could be because participants read all information presented in each 
scenario, that is, they were forced to attend to all information, not selective attention. The 
tolerance for contradiction was not related to the absolute difference score between both 
PI and decision judgments.  
Individual Personality Differences 
 In order to find if individual differences measures were related to sensemaking 
process, two personality variables associated with individual information processing 
characteristics were included: The Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC) and the Need for 
Cognition (NfCog). 
The Need for Cognitive Closure  
Because people with high NFCC seek quick conclusions, they were expected to look 
for and use information that would support this goal. Because dispositional attribution 
was posited to be easier to process (Winter et al., 1985; Winter & Uleman, 1984), 
Hypothesis 15 tested if the NFCC score was correlated with the percentage of 
dispositional items selected. Because a disposition conclusion might be easier to reach, 
people with high need for cognitive closure and dispositional attribution would also be 
more likely to attribute to dispositions when situational explanations were available or 
FAE. This was tested in Hypothesis 16 using a moderated multiple regression. 
H15: The Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC) scores will be positively related to the 
percentage of dispositional information items selected. 
To test Hypothesis 15, the mean of NFCC scores [The Need for Cognitive 
Closure] and the percentage of dispositional information items selected in Information 
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Selection 2 [Combined: % Dis Information Selected 2] were used in a correlation 
analysis. The mean of NFCC scores were significantly correlated with the percentage of 
dispositional information items selected, r = -.19, p < .001. However, these correlations 
were negative, opposite from the hypothesized results. This was also significantly 
negative for percentage of situational items selected, r = -.17, p < .001. Hypothesis 15 
was not supported. See Table 13. 
H16: There will be a significant interaction between Causal Attribution scores and the 
NFCC scores on final dispositional PI judgments. The slope of Causal Attribution and 
final PI judgments will be steeper for people high in need for closure than people low 
in need for closure to reflect their dispositional tendency for PI. 
To test Hypothesis 16, the Causal Attribution scores on the AHS and the NFCC 
scores were used to predict dispositional tendency reflecting the fundamental attribution 
error (FAE). A significant joint effect of attribution and NFCC on final dispositional PI 
judgment while controlling for final situational PI judgment, Attribution scores, and 
NFCC scores would reflects dispositional tendency. Analysis was carried out in three 
steps. In Step 1, situational PI judgments were entered to predict dispositional PI 
judgment. In Step 2, Attribution scores and NFCC scores were entered to predict 
dispositional PI judgment. In Step 3, the cross-product term of Attribution scores and 
NFCC scores was entered to predict dispositional PI judgment.  
Variance accounted for in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .02, F (1, 310) = 7.02, p < 
.05. Situational PI judgment predicted dispositional PI judgment. In Step 2, variance and 
incremental variance accounted was significant, R2 = .04, Δ R2 = .02, Δ F (2, 308) = 3.16, 
p < .05. As a set, Attribution scores and NFCC scores predicted dispositional PI 
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judgment. Individual coefficients show Attribution but not NFCC significantly predicted 
the outcome. In Step 3, the variance accounted for was R2 = .04. When interaction term 
was added, the incremental variance was not significant, Δ R2 = .00, Δ F (1, 307) = .52, p 
> .05.  The interaction term was not significant, B = -.02, t = -.72, p > .05. Dispositional 
PI judgment did not depend upon the interaction of Attribution and the NFCC. 
Hypothesis 16 was not supported. No simple slope analysis was required. See Table 16 
for details. 
The Need for Cognition 
People high in the need for cognition, enjoy thinking, were expected to look for 
and use more information. Hypothesis 17 tested this assumption using correlation 
analysis. Because of the wider selection of information and the willingness to explore 
cognition, people with high need for cognition and high in AH thinking might be less 
likely to commit FAE. This was tested in Hypothesis 18 using moderated multiple 
regressions. 
H17: The Need for Cognition (NfCog) scores will be positively related to the 
percentage of information items selected. 
To test Hypothesis 17, the mean of NfCog scores [The Need for Cognition] and 
the mean percentage of items selected from Information Selection 1 and from 
Information Selection 2 [Combined: % of Information Selected (1&2)] were used. The 
mean of NfCog scores were not significantly correlated with the percentage of items 
selected, r = .07, p > .05. Hypothesis 17 was not supported. Additional separate analyses 
of attention on Information Selection 1, r = .04, p > .05, and Information Selection 2, r = 
.08, p > .05, respectively, were also not significant. See Table 13.  
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H18: There will be a significant interaction between AH scores and the NfCog scores 
on the final dispositional PI judgments. The slope of AH scores and final PI 
judgments will be steeper for people low in need for cognition than people high in 
need for cognition to reflect their dispositional tendency for PI. 
To test Hypothesis 18, the overall AH scores and the NfCog scores were used to 
predict dispositional tendency. The steps in this analysis were similar to those used in 
Hypothesis 16. In Step 1, situational PI judgments were entered to predict dispositional 
PI judgments. In Step 2, AH scores and NfCog scores were entered to predict 
dispositional PI judgment. In Step 3, the cross-product term of AH scores and NfCog 
scores was entered to predict dispositional PI judgment.  
Variance accounted in Step 1 was significant, R2 = .02, F (1, 310) = 7.02, p < .05, 
indicating situational PI judgment predicted dispositional PI judgment. See Table 16 for 
results. In Step 2, variance and incremental variance accounted for was not significant, R2 
= .02, Δ R2 = .02, Δ F (2, 308) = .28, p > .05. As a set, AH thinking and need for cognition 
did not predict dispositional PI judgment. In Step 3, when the interaction term was added, 
the variance and incremental variance accounted for was not significant, R2 = .03, Δ R2 = 
.01, Δ F (1, 307) = .71, p > .05. The interaction term was not significant, B = .18, t = .63, 
p > .05. Dispositional tendency did not depend upon the interaction of AH thinking and 
the need for cognition. Hypothesis 18 was not supported. No simple slope analysis was 
required. 
In summary, hypotheses related to the need for cognitive closure and the need for 
cognition did not show an effect on the hypothesized information selection. Perhaps these 
two personality differences affect other processes in sensemaking rather than information 
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characteristics. Each hypothesized moderating effect was also not significant. The need 
for cognitive closure did not it interact with attribution to affect dispositional tendencies. 
The need for cognition did not interact with AH thinking to affect dispositional 
tendencies.  
Additional Analysis 
 To provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship between AH thinking, 
information management, and sensemaking, several post hoc analyses were undertaken. 
First, I explored the relationships among the individual scales used in the study. As AH 
thinking is a new scale, it is important to understand how it relates to other individual 
measures. Second, I examined the types of information recalled as a different 
measurement of the attention process of participants during sensemaking. This revealed 
what kind of information participants deemed relevant for sensemaking. Lastly, the 
patterns of qualitative sensemaking responses were explored. 
Relationships Among Individual Differences Scales 
I compared the overall AH scores and the components score with the other scales 
used in the study. Overall AH scores was not related to the NfCog but the Causal 
Attribution subscale was related, r = .18, p < .05. People with high need of cognition 
were also people with a situational approach to causal attribution. A person who includes 
situational aspects in causal attribution showed a higher need for cognition. See Table 7. 
Overall AH scores was not related to the NFCC but the Perception of Change 
subscale was, r = -.12, p < .05. The correlation showed that people with a nonlinear 
perspective have a lower need for cognitive closure. A belief about the flexibility of the 
universe appears to be inconsistent with the need for cognitive closure. Attention was 
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positively correlated with the NFCC, r = .12, p < .05. The correlation showed that people 
with wider attention scope have a higher need for cognitive closure. This could be 
because their wider attention requires a higher need for closure in order to prevent 
information overload. See Table 7. 
The overall AH scores and subscales were not related to Tolerance for Ambiguity. 
The lack of relationships between AHS and the other scales indicated that AHS was 
measuring construct different from these other individual scales. See Table 7. 
 Table 7 also showed that the other scales in the study were moderately related to 
each other. The NfCog was negatively correlated with the NFCC, r = -.49, p < .001. 
People with higher need for cognition have lower need for cognitive closure. People with 
higher need for cognition are less of a cognitive miser show less need for cognitive 
closure. Whereas people with low need of cognition are cognitive misers show a higher 
need for cognitive closure. This supported previous research (Petty & Jarvis, 1996; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).  
The NfCog was positively correlated with Tolerance for Ambiguity, r = .34, p < 
.001. People with higher need for cognition have higher tolerance for ambiguity. This 
relationship makes sense as people with high need for cognition enjoy thinking, they have 
the ability and motivation to try to disentangle information, making them less ambiguous, 
therefore, may have a higher tolerance for ambiguity. This supported previous research 
(Weary & Edwards, 1994). See Table 7. 
The NFCC was negatively correlated with Tolerance for Ambiguity, r = -.39, p < 
.001. People with higher need for closure do not tolerate ambiguity. Whereas a lower 
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need for cognitive closure may be comfortable with ambiguity. This supported previous 
research (Weary & Edwards, 1994). See Table 7. 
In summary, the overall AH scores was not related to the personality measures 
included in the study. This suggests AH thinking is different from these personality 
measures. Two components of AH thinking, perception of change and attention, were 
related to the need for cognitive closure. Previous research showed attribution to be 
related to the need for cognitive closure while this present study found perception of 
change and attention, but not attribution, was related to the need for cognitive closure. 
The personality measures were related to each other, suggesting a commonality among 
them as suggested by previous research (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
Memory Recall 
 Because individuals remember what they attend to and that are relevant, a 
memory recall task provides a powerful tool to understanding the types of information 
participants seek and find relevant. Participants were given a memory recall task of their 
first scenario at the conclusion of the study. Information was coded into categories of 
information as described previously in the Method section. See Appendix I for Memory 
Coding description.  
Ten participants’ data were used to establish coding reliability. Two coders 
independently coded the memory recall data after reliability was obtained. Each 
participant recalled more than one information item. This resulted in a total of 173 cases. 
Inter-rater reliability was established for each code. A kappa of .89, .57, and .75 was 
attained for Dispositional Target (DT), Dispositional Non Target (DNT), and Situational 
(S) respectively. A kappa of .84, and .69 was attained for Confirming and Disconfirming, 
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respectively. When all cases were coded, an inter-rater reliability was again established. 
A total of 2660 cases for 312 participants yielded a kappa of .90, .43, .77, .76 and .82 for 
DT, DNT, S, Confirming, and Disconfirming, respectively.  
The mean information items recalled in the sample was 8.53 (SD = 3.75). The 
mean number of accurate items information recalled in the sample was 7.48 (SD = 3.57). 
The mean information recalled for DT, DNT, and S, Confirming and Disconfirming in 
the sample was 3.89, .54, 3.05, 6.16, and 1.52, respectively. When a memory recall item 
was rare or ambiguous, the coders discussed and came to a unanimous agreement on the 
codes. 
Memory Recall and Individual Differences 
The result reported here combined dispositional non target (DNT) information 
with situational (S) information. Dispositional non target information was information 
that was external to the target (Andy or Michael). Hence, it was grouped as contextual. 
The 2 (Dispositional, Situational) and 2 (Confirming, Disconfirming) provided 
four types of information: Dispositional Confirming, Dispositional Disconfirming, 
Situational Confirming, and Dispositional Disconfirming. I compared the individual 
difference measures and the types of information recalled. See Table 18. Only the overall 
AH scores was related to memory recall for two types of information, dispositional 
disconfirming and situational confirming, r = .11, p < .05, and r = .15, p < .01, 
respectively. These two types of information lean toward situational attribution. People 
higher in need for cognition remembered more dispositional confirming, situational 
confirming, and disconfirming information, r = .17, p < .001, r = .21, p < .01, and r = .14, 
p < .05, respectively. A higher need for cognition may have reduced the focus to all 
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information. People with high need for cognitive closure remembered less dispositional 
confirming, situational confirming, and disconfirming information, r = -.17, p < .001, r = 
-.16, p < .001, and r = -.14, p < .05, respectively. A higher need for cognitive closure may 
have facilitated a weaker focus on all types of information. 
In summary, AH thinking was only related to two types of information recall 
while the need for cognitive closure and the need for cognition seemed to relate more to 
types of information recall. While people with high need for cognitive closure remember 
less information, people with high need for cognition recall more information. 
Memory Recall and Information Selection 
I examined the types of items selected from the sensemaking scenarios, and the 
types of information later recalled. See Table 19. The dispositional items selected were 
related only to dispositional information recalls. For example, dispositional confirming 
items selected was related to dispositional confirming information recalled, r = .17, p < 
.001.  This was also the case for disconfirming items selected. Dispositional 
disconfirming and situational disconfirming items selected were only related to 
dispositional disconfirming and situational disconfirming information recalled 
respectively, r = .11, p < .05 and r = .19, p < .001. On the other hand, situational 
confirming items selected were related to both situational confirming and disconfirming 
information recalled, r = .27, p < .001 and r = .19, p < .001, respectively, and to 
dispositional confirming information recalled, r = .11, p < .05.  
Situation and dispositional items selected and the types of information recalled 
also followed these patterns. Dispositional items selected were only related to 
dispositional confirming information recall, r = .14, p < .05, while situational items 
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selected were related to all three types of information recall, r = .12, p < .05 for 
dispositional confirming items, and r = .24, p < .001 and r = .22, p < .001 for situational 
confirming and disconfirming items, respectively.  
In summary, while dispositional and disconfirming items selected were related 
only to the respective memory recall, situational confirming items selected were related 
to more diverse information recalled. 
Memory Recall and Information Relevance 
I then examined the types of items rated as relevant from the sensemaking 
scenarios and the types of information recalled. See Table 19. The patterns showed that 
Dispositional items relevance were only related to the respective memory recall. For 
example, dispositional confirming items relevance were related to dispositional 
confirming information recalled, r = .20, p < .001 and dispositional disconfirming 
information recalled, r = .13, p < .05. Dispositional disconfirming items relevance were 
related to dispositional disconfirming information recalled, r = .13, p < .05. On the other 
hand, situational confirming items relevance is related to both dispositional confirming 
information recalled, r = .20, p < .001, and dispositional disconfirming information 
recalled, r = .13, p < .05. It was also related to situational confirming information 
recalled, r = .17, p < .001. Situation and dispositional items relevance and the types of 
information recalled also followed these patterns. Dispositional items rated as relevant 
were related to both dispositional confirming information recalled, r = .13, p < .05, and r 
= .11, p < .05 for dispositional disconfirming information recalled. Situational items rated 
as relevant were related to dispositional confirming and disconfirming information 
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recalled, r = .17, p < .05 and r = .13, p < .05, respectively, and to situational confirming 
information recalled, r = .14, p < .05.  
In summary, while dispositional and disconfirming items rated as relevant were 
related only to the respective memory recall, situational confirming items rated as 
relevant were related to more diverse information recalled. These patterns are consistent 
with those of information selection and memory recall. 
Memory Recall and Problem Identification and Decision 
I examined the final PI and decision judgments and the types of information 
recalled. See Table 19. The patterns showed that final dispositional PI was related to 
dispositional confirming information recalled, r = .18, p < .05. Final situational PI was 
related to situational confirming information recalled, r = .16, p < .001. Final decision 
judgments were not related to any types of information recalled. In summary, PI was 
consistent with the types of information recalled. 
Qualitative Sensemaking 
In order to tap qualitative sensemaking, an open ended question, “What do you 
now think happened?,” was asked four times. Participants’ responses were coded. See 
Appendix C. There were 624 responses coded from 312 participants. Due to missing and 
unclear responses, 41 (6.6%) responses were not coded. Four other responses (.6%) were 
given a special code of ‘withholding’. Participants with these responses, responded to the 
first and second open ended question as ‘not sure yet’ or ‘more information is needed.’ 
They withheld from responding until all information was presented. Five hundred seventy 
nine responses were each given one of the nine sensemaking codes in Appendix C. Two 
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trained coders coded the data independently and all coding was discussed. A rater 
agreement was established for every response.   
  The nine codes were conceptually divided into two groups. See Table 20. The 
first group was from people who had switched their frames to be consistent with the new 
information. They did this at both information presentations. Responses that received 
Code 4 and Code 5 were in this group. The only difference between Code 4 and Code 5 is 
that people assigned Code 4 had received information consistent with their initial frame 
in the first information presentation while people assigned Code 5 did not received 
inconsistent information. 
 The second group consisted of people who resisted change in their frames to at 
least one of the two information presentations. Responses that fall into this group were 
those assigned all other codes besides 4 and 5. 
Forty two percent (42%) of the responses displayed Code 4. There were 16.3%, 
Code 5, and 14.3%, Code 1. Code 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 had less than 10% each. See Table 
20 for details. There are 58.3% (n = 364) who switches with new information while 
34.8% (n = 215) resisted new information.  
To understand sensemaking within the two scenarios, the above codes were 
described for each scenario. For WF, there were a total of 312 responses; 20 (6.4%) 
responses that were not coded due to missing and unclear response while 3 responses 
(1.0%) were ‘withholding’ responses. There were 51.3% responses that displayed Code 4 
and 16.7% had Code 5. There were 10.3% with Code 1 while Code 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 had 
less than 5% each. When the codes were combined, 67.9% (n = 212) compared to 24.7% 
(n = 77) changes sensemaking based on the information they received.  
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 For PD, there were a total of 312 responses; 21 (6.7%) responses were not coded 
due to missing and unclear responses while 1 response (.3%) was a ‘withholding’ 
response. There were 32.7% responses that displayed Code 4 and 16.0% had Code 5. 
There were 18.3% with Code 1 while Code 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 had less than 10% each. 
When the codes were combined, 48.7% (n = 152) compared to 44.2% (n =138) switches 
their sensemaking based on the information they received.   
To investigate if participant’s responses were related to AH thinking and 
qualitative sensemaking, those who switched based on information presentation were 
compared to those who did not. In WF, no differences were found for AH thinking and its 
components as well as quantitative sensemaking. In PD, only the Attribution component 
was different among the two groups of sensemakers, F (1, 289) = 4.09, p < .05. However, 
the participants who switched less have higher situational attribution than those who had 
switched with the introduction of new information, F (1, 288) = 4.09, p < .05, (M = 4.92, 
SD = 1.03 versus M = 4.69, SD = .93). No differences were found in overall AH thinking 
and other components as well as quantitative sensemaking. 
In summary, several patterns of sensemaking were observed. In general, a 
majority of participants changed their sensemaking based on the new information while 
others stayed with earlier problem identification. Individual differences explored in this 
study did not predict the patterns of sensemaking. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
Globalization and advancement in technology adds complexity to the use of 
information. The abundance of information available from many sources including the 
Internet means that people face often ambiguous and contradictory information. 
Individuals must sort through and interpret this overload of information while balancing 
conflicting goals and time constraints. In addition, individual characteristics can 
complicate this process. Sensemaking is a way to deal with the complexity and overload 
of information (Choo, 1998b; O’Reilly, 1980; Weick, 1995). This study was designed to 
understand how individual differences influence sensemaking and information use. The 
individual differences under study were Analytic-Holistic (AH) thinking as well as two 
personality variables, the need for cognition and the need for cognitive closure. Two 
scenarios set the context in which sensemaking and information use were examined. 
This discussion consists of five sections. In the first two sections, understanding 
of sensemaking and understanding information use are discussed relative to the study 
hypotheses and exploratory questions. Exploratory questions include a qualitative 
measure of sensemaking that taps how people explain events with unfolding information 
and a memory recall task that assesses the types of information recalled. In the third 
section, limitations of the study and suggestions for improvements are outlined. Next, 
several theoretical and applied implications are presented. Finally, future directions are 
proposed. 
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Summary of Findings 
Sensemaking 
To understand sensemaking, several questions are addressed. The first three are 
related to AH thinking, AH thinking and information presentation, and components of 
AH thinking. The last two are related to the influence of two personality measures and 
memory recall on sensemaking. Analytic and holistic thinkers were expected to use 
different information because the importance of context would influence how they make 
sense of situations. Similarly, components AH thinking and personality differences were 
hypothesized to influence sensemaking. The relationship between memory recall and 
sensemaking is also described. 
How is AH thinking related to sensemaking? 
AH thinking was positively related to initial situational problem identification (PI) 
(H1) and decision judgments (H4). People with higher holistic thinking were more likely 
to find the problem to be situational and were more likely to make decisions to change 
the situation (i.e. changes in the organization). This confirms previous studies that 
associate holistic thinking with situational attribution (i.e. Choi et al. 2003) and extended 
the relationship to how we identify problems and make decisions.  
Unlike previous research that provided all information before judgments were 
made, the present study found differences even when partial information was presented. 
The results suggest that even with minimal information, people are able to make 
judgments because they bring with them past experiences and beliefs that influence their 
sensemaking. This is consistent with Klein and colleagues (2007)’s data/frame model in 
which past experiences and expertise provide an initial frame for sensemaking. Analytic 
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and holistic thinkers have different frameworks and these influence their initial PI and 
decisions.  
Does the joint effect of AH thinking and information presentation influence sensemaking? 
AH thinking together with the manipulation of information presentation affected 
PI and decisions. The results showed that the change from initial judgments at Time 1 to 
a subsequent judgment at Time 2 was affected by the breadth of information use (H2, 
H5). People with higher holistic thinking showed broader information use. When 
presented with situational information, holistic thinkers made more situational judgments 
and when presented with dispositional information, they made more dispositional 
judgments. While people lower in holistic thinking also displayed this pattern of 
judgments, it was less pronounced. This is consistent with earlier findings that people 
higher in holistic thinking are more inclusive of the context (i.e. Choi et al., 2007; 
Masuda & Nisbett, 2001). They were more willing to use both kinds of information to 
modify their sense of the scenarios. The findings suggest that the initial frame changes 
depend on cognitive patterns and how information was used. 
The joint effect of AH thinking and information presentation on Time 2 to Time 3 
judgments was not found when additional and contrary information was presented (H3, 
H6). The non significant interactions between AH thinking and information presentation 
on subsequent judgments showed that AH thinking did not influence judgments on the 
longer term. The focus appeared to have shifted from individual cognitive patterns to the 
information given. While a majority of the analyses from Time 2 to Time 3 were not 
significant, one interaction effect was significant for dispositional decision judgments in 
the PD scenario. Scenario differences will be discussed in a later section.  
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While most past research measures the effect of AH thinking only once, this 
research presents material sequentially to assess effect. The results extend the models of 
sensemaking to suggest that individual differences may not have a lasting effect in the 
process of sensemaking. The results here suggest that AH thinking matters in the initial 
use of the information but as additional information was given, the content becomes more 
important. Consistent with the idea of sensemaking, when we are faced with a new 
situation, we first make sense with our past experiences and may be more influenced by 
our individual characteristics. As more information is received about the situation, 
information influences sensemaking more than individual characteristics. 
Do the components of AH thinking affect sensemaking? 
I compared AH components with PI and decision judgments. Tolerance for 
Contradiction did not affect sensemaking (H12 and H13). People with higher Tolerance 
for Contradiction were expected to be less polarized between the situational and 
dispositional options. Results showed no significant relationships. The use of a more 
analytic sample instead of cross-national samples may have influenced the outcome. 
Because these participants are likely to see the options as contradictory, they may be less 
likely to adopt both options to the same degree as would a holistic sample. The negative 
relationship between situational and dispositional PI judgments, r = -.15, p < .01, 
suggests that even though the response format allowed for the adoption of both 
situational and dispositional approaches, participants in this study saw them as opposing 
options. This was also true between situational and dispositional decision judgments, r = 
-.16, p < .01. See Table 7.  
I also examined components of AH thinking in relation to fundamental attribution  
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error (FAE), which refers to making dispositional judgments even when situational 
factors are present during sensemaking. A higher rating of disposition judgments 
compared to situational judgments reflects FAE. Attribution was the only component of 
AH thinking that was related to the difference between disposition and situational PI 
during sensemaking, r = -.22, p < .05. See Table 15. Attribution was also negatively 
related to the differences in decisions, r = -.14, p < .05. See Table 15. The negative 
relationships supported the idea that people with a situational view of causal attribution 
were less susceptible to FAE. They adopted situational approaches and were less likely to 
indicate problems and solutions to be dispositional. This is consistent with previous FAE 
research (Gilbert & Malone, 1995).    
Does the joint effect of cognitive and personality differences influence sensemaking? 
The Need for Cognitive Closure was expected to interact with Attribution (H16) 
to make FAE higher for people with a high need for cognitive closure and low situational 
attribution. While Hong and colleagues (2000) found that a high need for cognitive 
closure moderated the relationship between attribution and the degree of FAE, this study 
did not replicate this finding. Because participants worked at their own paces, their need 
for cognitive closure may have been lessened. Perhaps the inclusion of ambiguous 
information and the addition of time pressures in scenarios would elicit the need for 
cognitive closure.  
The Need for Cognition was expected to interact with AH thinking (H18) to 
influence FAE. FAE was expected to be lower for people with a high need for cognition 
and a high AH thinking. The result did not support this expectation. Possibly, information 
presented in the scenarios was manageable. Perhaps the addition of information items and 
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increased complexity to the scenario may distinguish the responses of people with high 
and low need for cognition. 
How do final PI and decision judgments relate to types of memory recall? 
 I used a memory task to tap four types of information recall. The results showed 
that confirming information rather than disconfirming information is related to PI and 
decision judgments. Those who identified problems to be situational were more likely to 
remember situational confirming information. Those who identified problems to be 
dispositional were more likely to remember dispositional confirming information. These 
patterns showed that people use confirming information during sensemaking. While these 
patterns are interesting, we could not conclude the causal direction of a particular 
judgment and the confirming information recall. This needs further research. 
Qualitative Sensemaking 
I used qualitative methods to examine how participants respond when there is 
limited information for initial sensemaking and how sensemaking changes with 
inconsistent information. Almost all the participants appeared to have an initial frame for 
the event. While this could be influenced by the suggestion of causal factors in the 
beginning of each scenarios (i.e. director vs. external changes), participants were able to 
explain their initial frame even with this limited information. When inconsistent 
information was given, a majority of participants made changes in their sensemaking 
consistent with the information presented. A substantial percentage, however, ignored the 
inconsistent information and stay with their current frame. These patterns of sensemaking 
are consistent with forms suggested by Klein and colleagues (2007). Surprisingly, several 
responses indicate an opposite pattern of change. These participants’ subsequent 
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sensemaking were different from the information presented even though the information 
presented was consistent with their previous sensemaking. These patterns may be 
consistent with the models of correction for attribution discussed in Gilbert and Malone 
(1995) and Choi et al. (1999). Further research in this area is needed to understand the 
complexities of sensemaking. 
I divided the participants into those who switched with new information received 
and those who did not. I compared these two groups on their individual differences. No 
significant relationships were found between individual differences and qualitative 
sensemaking.  
In summary, AH thinking affected initial sensemaking. This means that people 
have past experiences, cognitive patterns, belief systems, and expertise that affect their 
sensemaking. The different AH frameworks determine how information was used during 
sensemaking. People interact with their information environment in a way that changes 
their sense to be consistent with ways they value information. The diminishing effect of 
AH thinking exemplifies the effect of time in understanding sensemaking. With 
additional information, the content of information played a more significant role during 
sensemaking. The qualitative data also support the use of information presented to 
modify sensemaking. The data revealed that people differ in the way they explain the 
same scenarios. While individual differences could not explain this difference, the 
memory recall data supports the availability of different information during sensemaking. 
Participants focused on confirming information that was consistent with their PIs in the 
scenario. The personality variables were not related to sensemaking. Lastly, there is some 
evidence that scenario differences might have affected results, again emphasizing the  
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importance of context for sensemaking. 
Information Management/Use 
The second goal was to understand information use. Choo (1998b) suggested 
several information characteristics important for information management in 
organizations. Among them are amount (number of items), type, and relevance. To 
examine how participants use information, I presented information sequentially and 
asked participants to select information items from different categories. Next, they rated 
the usefulness of dispositional and situational information. Components of AH thinking 
and two personality variables were included to understand information selection and 
rated usefulness. 
How do the components of AH thinking relate to information use? 
Attribution was the only component of AH thinking related to the information 
management characteristics investigated. While attribution was unrelated to both the 
overall items (H9) and dispositional items selected, it was related to the situational items 
(H10). This is consistent with the notion that people with situational perspectives of 
causal attribution look for situational information. Yet, no difference was found for the 
selection of dispositional information items. This supports the earlier finding that people 
with both dispositional and situational perspectives focus on dispositional information. 
The overall AHS score was not related to the types of information selected (See Table 
13). This supports the findings by Choi and colleagues (2003) that overall AH thinking is 
not related to dispositional or situational items selection. The present study suggests that 
the component of Attribution may be a better predictor of information selection than 
overall AH thinking. 
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People who had a situational perspective rated overall information and situational 
information to be more relevant (H11). Consistent with the result of information 
selection, people with a situational perspective also emphasized the relevance of 
dispositional information.  
None of the AH components were related to the number of categories used in this 
study (H12). This is inconsistent with Markus and colleagues (2006) who found Japanese 
participants used more diverse categories for explanation of events. They used qualitative 
data to explore participants used of categories for explanation while I used a quantitative 
approach. A methodological difference may explain this deviation. Several participants 
appeared to have misunderstood the instructions and selected one information item from 
each category. This resulted in all categories being selected.  
Attention was not related to information selection (H7) and information relevance 
(H8). Because participants were asked to read carefully all the information presented, this 
may have directed their attention and created an atypical attention focus. Previous 
research that found differences in attention used animated stimuli with short durations of 
presentation. This made attention more selective. Hence, the present scenarios or methods 
may not be good for eliciting differences in attention.    
How do personality differences relate to information use? 
The Need for Cognitive Closure was related to the selected dispositional 
information items in an opposite expected direction (H15). Winter and colleagues (1985) 
suggested that people with a higher need for cognitive closure make dispositional 
attributions as it is easier to reach a conclusion than it is to make situational attributions. 
The present study however suggests that this affinity towards attribution is not the result 
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of selecting more dispositional information. Instead, people with higher need for 
cognitive closure selected less dispositional information and also less situational 
information. This is consistent with the findings of Webster and Kruglanski (1994). They 
found participants with a higher need for cognitive closure considered less information 
when making judgments. The present study confirms that, regardless of available 
information, people with a higher need for cognitive closure are less likely to use the 
information. 
The need for cognition was not related to the number of information items 
selected (H17). It was also unrelated to specific types of items – dispositional, situational, 
confirming, and disconfirming information (See Table 13). Perhaps the need for 
cognition is important for other processes during sensemaking as suggested in the 
information recall section below.  
Is memory recall related to information use? 
I looked at the items selection and relevance to information recall. I found three 
patterns for the link between items selections and recall. First, people who selected more 
dispositional confirming items also remembered more dispositional confirming 
information. Second, those who selected more dispositional disconfirming items recalled 
more dispositional disconfirming information. Those who selected more situational 
disconfirming items recalled more situational disconfirming information. The two 
disconfirming types of items selection were related only to their respective types of 
memory recall. These two patterns support earlier research that found that people are 
likely to select and remember information they judge as important (Wiley, 2004). Finally, 
situational confirming items selection showed a broader overlap with other information 
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recall. Not only is it positively related to both confirming and disconfirming situation 
information recall, it is also positively related to dispositional confirmation information 
recall. These findings provided a better understanding of the effect that information 
selection has on information recall. 
The above patterns of memory recall with information selection were similar to 
those for information relevance. The patterns of relationships suggest that people with a 
situational frame consider situational information but also dispositional information 
during sensemaking, whereas people with dispositional frame emphasize dispositional 
information to the exclusion of situational information. These patterns seem to be 
consistent with the finding that holistic thinkers include both context and focal objects 
during sensemaking and with earlier research on free memory recall of visual animation 
images (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001).  
In summary, I found situational attributors focused on situational information. 
They selected and rated situational items to be more useful. However, dispositional 
information was also important for situational attributors. The memory recall data 
supported the idea that they also consider disposition information during sensemaking. 
Participants’ selection and ratings of situational confirming items and memory recall 
patterns suggest broader types of information were considered. While other components 
of AH thinking and the need for cognition were not related to information use, people 
with high need for cognitive closure selected less information items.  
Do individual differences affect types of items recalled? 
The results showed that holistic thinking was positively related to situational 
confirming and dispositional disconfirming recall of information. Both types of 
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information are types of information that suggest the context is the problem. Situational 
confirming information indicates the context is the problem while dispositional 
disconfirming information suggests the person is not the problem. This is consistent with 
Wiley’s (2004) findings that people often experience memory bias in favor of the 
information with which they agree. 
The Need for Cognition was positively related to the number of dispositional 
confirming information recalled, and both situational confirming and disconfirming 
information recalled, while the Need for Cognitive Closure was negatively related to 
these types of information. These results supported previous findings of the willingness 
of people with higher need for cognition to deal with information (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 
1992) and people with higher need for cognitive closure to consider less information 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Additionally, the present study looked at the different 
types of information. These two personality variables were found to play a role in 
memory recall. 
Limitations 
The first four limitations are related to the study’s scenarios while the last two are 
related to the generalizability of results. First, while the feedback from participants in the 
pilot studies suggested the equivalence of the scenarios, the scenarios comparison 
reported here indicated they were not equivalent. The content differences may have 
influenced the results. The roles of the target person in the scenarios were different, a 
director versus a line worker. Undergraduate participants appeared to identify more with 
the line worker. They may also attribute more responsibility to the director because he is 
a person of authority. While differences in scenarios may add complications to 
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interpretations of results they also add richness to different representations of the work 
environment. The differences suggest a variety of scenarios may be crucial to represent 
the complexity of sensemaking. This has implications for the need to generate different 
scenarios that represent the complexity in organizations as people encounter different 
problems in their work. 
The second limitation of the material is that the scenarios provided both 
dispositional information and situational information equated for amount and strength. 
While this is a good experimental control, it does not represent how people with different 
analytic and holistic tendencies search for information in a non-experimental setting. In 
natural environments, they are likely to focus on their preferred kind of information. 
Future research can assess how participants choose the information they view instead of 
presenting all kinds of information. This would better reflect natural information 
management. 
 The third limitation is that the order of information presentation may affect 
sensemaking. In this study, dispositional information was presented first and then 
situation information or vice versa. This presentation may have a canceling effect and led 
to judgments being less polarized between dispositional and situational judgments at 
Time 3. Future research may present information differently. Information in the scenarios 
could be presented to be progressively more dispositional or progressively more 
situational. This extends the understanding of effects of AH thinking and information 
presentation on sensemaking.  
 The fourth limitation is also related to the scenarios. The scenarios in this study 
were designed to tap causal attribution. Thus, Attribution, a component of AH thinking 
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may have matched the content of the sensemaking scenarios while other components of 
AH thinking may not. This may have contributed to their non-significant relationships. 
Using content related to the other components may have yielded different results. Hence, 
we should not be quick to conclude that other components were less important for 
information use. For example, using visual/video presentation may be more related to the 
Attention component and may result in a stronger relationship as shown in previous 
research by Masuda and Nisbett (2001; 2006). This method may make background 
information more salient for people with broader attention. 
The fifth limitation is related to the sensemaking processes in the study. 
Sensemaking is a complex phenomenon. The design of this study assumed that the 
information presented influenced PI and decision judgments. However, in reality, the 
relationship between judgments and information use is probably reciprocal and ongoing 
until an action has to be taken. In other words, judgments or current sense of the situation 
may also drive information gathering, which in turn may influence the perception of 
information relevance. To understand the casual effects of this relationship requires 
additional analyses (i.e. a cross-panel analysis). 
The final limitation is related to generalizability of the study to cross-cultural 
interaction. With the importance of international exchanges in the military, 
transportation, commerce, and humanitarian domains, it is important to understand the 
present study in a cross-cultural context. The AH thinking concept is borrowed from 
cultural psychology. While the results presented here suggest a difference between 
analytic and holistic thinkers, we need to be cautious if we wish to generalize these 
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results to national group differences. The present study needs to be replicated using 
national groups comparison.  
Implications 
Theoretical Implications 
The findings of this study demonstrate the complexity of sensemaking. This study 
is an initial look at the complexity of sensemaking and information management for 
analytic and holistic thinkers. In order to represent the complex processes of 
sensemaking, information presented over time and the ‘sense’ at each of those times was 
assessed. Because our understanding of a situation can be a dynamic process, it is crucial 
for understanding how AH cognition interacts with the information presented. We need 
to make sense of information that is both consistent with and contradicts our view. The 
results confirmed the importance of using scenarios that represent the processes involved. 
For example, with only two measurement points, we would have concluded that changes 
in sensemaking were due to varying use of information by analytic and holistic thinkers. 
However, by including addition measurement points, we saw a bigger picture. 
Subsequent sensemaking no longer differed by how analytic and holistic thinkers use 
information. The information content alone drove sensemaking. A different conclusion 
would have been reached without the additional measurement times.  
I attempted to link quantitative and qualitative sensemaking data to individual 
differences. The qualitative data shows individuals use different forms of sensemaking 
when presented with the same scenario. This study supports the Data/Frame model in an 
experimental setting. In some cases, participants changed their sensemaking even when 
information presented was consistent with their frame. This suggests that while 
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elaborating their frames, participants were able to directly reframe their understanding of 
the situation. The presence of inconsistent information might not be needed for them to 
question their frame. This suggests there might be idiosyncratic patterns that may not be 
represented by the model. Further research is needed. 
The results support that analytic and holistic thinkers may bring with them 
different frameworks of causal attribution and that their frameworks guide the selection 
of information during sensemaking. First, people higher in holistic thinking were more 
likely to identify situational problems and adopt situational-based solutions even with 
limited information. Second, their cognition coupled with the types of information 
presented changed their judgments. Nevertheless, this effect did not last long. Third, 
holistic thinkers’ focus on situational items supports differences in the information 
management process. Lastly, the patterns of recall show simultaneous focus on both 
situational and dispositional information while situational items were selected. However, 
no relationship was found for dispositional items selection and situational information 
recalled. These patterns of recall further emphasize the different information management 
processes. The different information needs of analytic and holistic thinkers support the 
idea that people bring with them past experiences and knowledge that may bias their 
information search processes. 
Practical Implications 
The AH thinking dimension was borrowed from cross-cultural literature. This 
may suggest that sensemaking and information use differences may be important during 
cross-cultural interactions. If holistic people need more information, this can limit their 
sensemaking when information is limited. Similarly, if analytic people are given more 
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information than they would normally seek, it may alter their sensemaking. This study 
used U.S. participants who in cross-cultural literature typically make dispositional 
attribution. However, in the present study they also could make situational attributions. 
They might not have made situational attributions as strongly as dispositional attributions 
if they selected their own information. This study suggests that multinational teams may 
need to learn how to channel information appropriately to arrive at a common 
understanding. 
Differing use of information has implications for information sharing in teams 
(Lin, Klein, Radford, Choi, & Lien, 2007). In multinational organizations, 
multidisciplinary and multinational teams often carry out much of the work. While 
national differences can enrich the team’s capacity, they can also complicate the 
teamwork and coordination. One critical task facing multinational teams is information 
management: making sense and using a myriad of complex information to achieve team 
goals and tasks. To do this, each team member must seek, select, organize, interpret, and 
share information.  Each team member has his or her own knowledge base, mental 
models, and dynamic representations of problems. People are continually adding to their 
knowledge base, redefining their mental models, and reinterpreting their dynamic 
representations of problems using both existing and new information (Hinsz, 1995). 
When people work on teams, information and knowledge is exchanged so that a shared 
sense of the situation can emerge. With incongruent perceptions of information needs, 
information exchange may be limited or overflowed, thereby distorting sensemaking. 
Analytic and holistic people may identify cause differently as a result of exposure to an 
unfamiliar set of information. The sharing of unaccustomed amounts of information may 
       
97 
also have a positive effect in providing focus to holistic thinkers and breadth to analytic 
thinkers. When there are differences in the selection of information during sensemaking, 
the outcome might be compromised or enhanced. Instead of assuming people use 
information the same way, understanding the cognitive differences of people from other 
nations can further predict communication conflict in multinational teams. 
Future Directions 
 While this study investigated aspects of sensemaking and information use, the 
complexity of these processes provided opportunities to explore dynamics beyond the 
initial effort. First, I suggested improving the current measure of AH thinking. Then, I 
suggested several additional information characteristics and cultural dimensions yet to be 
explored in the context of sensemaking. Next, I discussed how contextual factors can be 
included to represent the complexity of information use and sensemaking in real world 
settings.  Lastly, I presented several ideas for naturalistic investigations of sensemaking 
and information management. 
Analytic-Holistic Thinking Construct 
In the present study and in the literature, AH thinking is assumed to be a single 
dimension. The Analytic-Holism Scale (Choi et al., 2007) reflects this. However, all 
items in this scale tap holistic thinking and none tap analytic thinking. Future research 
should include items that tap analytic thinking to explore if a person could be high on 
both analytic and holistic thinking. This may extend further understanding of this 
construct. 
Additional Information Characteristics 
Choo (1998a) and O’Reilly (1983) listed many characteristics of information that  
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organizations consider when making decisions. This study looked at three: amount, type, 
and relevance. Other characteristics of information that still need to be investigated in the 
context of sensemaking include saliency, ambiguity, forms, credibility of sources, 
accessibility and valence. Using the current paradigm, information presented can be 
manipulated in terms of the ambiguity of the content, the sources of information, and 
different formats of information presentation (i.e. text, pictorial, base rates, etc.). For 
example, presenting information from different sources, such as formal versus informal 
sources, replicates information gathering in the real world. Including these characteristics 
would give a more comprehensive view of information use that mirrors the complexity of 
sensemaking. 
Additional Cultural Dimensions  
Besides AH thinking, other cultural dimensions, including Tolerance of 
Uncertainty and Hypothetical-Concrete reasoning, may influence the way we manage 
information and make sense. Tolerance of Uncertainty (Hofstede, 1980), describes how 
people function in the face of uncertainty. Uncertainty is stressful for those with low 
tolerance and they work to avoid it. They prefer specifics, consider details, abhor 
incomplete information, resist plan changes, and feel unsettled until there is a final 
decision (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). They prefer formal rules and ritualistic behaviors 
to enhance stability (Lane, DiStefano, & Maznevski, 1996). Consensus is valued because 
disagreement causes stress when it generates questions and uncertainty (Lane & 
DiStefano, 1992). In contrast, those who are high in Tolerance of Uncertainty are 
comfortable with ambiguity and incomplete information (Hofstede, 1980). They adapt 
readily to change and act with limited information (Hall & Hall, 1990). Rules and rituals 
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may be ignored or treated flexibly because they are viewed as ineffectual (Helmreich & 
Merritt, 1998). People high in Tolerance of Uncertainty accept dissent and are less 
threatened by deviant ideas.  
During sensemaking, information is processed to reduce ambiguity (Weick, 
1995). People who are low in tolerance for uncertainty may not be comfortable with 
frequent changes during sensemaking. Because they prefer certainty to changing plans, 
they may not seek information that showed a contradictory view in order to maintain 
stability in the process of sensemaking. People who are high in tolerance for uncertainty 
may be comfortable when information shifts, resulting in view changes. They are more 
likely to take action even with limited information, facilitating the process of 
sensemaking. In order to study Tolerance for Uncertainty in the current research 
paradigm, information would be manipulated to introduce ambiguity into the situation to 
test the effect on sensemaking. Time pressures and overload of information can also be 
introduced to increase uncertainty.  
Hypothetical-Concrete reasoning may also influence sensemaking. Hypothetical 
thinkers use mental playing out of alternative strategies to consider different outcomes 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). They separate reasoning from reality to consider options in 
an abstract, hypothesis-driven manner using “what if” questions. Concrete thinkers 
respect the constraints imposed by context and carefully integrate these constraints into 
their thinking (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Reasoning is grounded in past personal and 
national experience in similar contexts. Hypothetical thinking uses abstract speculation 
while concrete thinking analyzes events in grounded reality.  
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As hypothetical thinkers play out scenarios, the sensemaking process is more 
flexible and varied and they may generate more hypotheses. These people may have 
several frames and eliminate each in a hypothesis driven manner. Concrete thinkers may 
be more constrained but more precise in their sensemaking because they may fit 
information to previous experiences. While precise, concrete thinkers are highly 
committed to a particular course of action based on one interpretation of the information, 
they may lack flexibility and the ability to change strategies in light of new information. 
Concrete thinkers may use fewer but more elaborate frames during sensemaking. 
However, concrete thinkers may view hypothetical thinkers’ sensemaking as groundless. 
Hypothetical-Concrete thinkers can be compared in the qualitative forms of sensemaking 
they adopt. Different types of information such as if-then kind of reasoning versus base 
rates information can be presented to examine if hypothetical and concrete thinkers use 
them differently. 
Contextual Factors 
The selection and relevance of information may not only be biased by individual 
differences but also by situational constraints such as goals, decision purposes, time 
pressures, and sources of information (O’Reilly, 1983). To investigate the impact of these 
constraints, future research might include other aspects of situational constraints beyond 
information presentation. Again, these factors would extend the understanding of how 
people use information. In addition, we could observe the interplay of individual 
differences and the suggested situational constraints on sensemaking. For example, the 
scenarios could be augmented by including time pressure and changing goals. In the 
present study, individual personality differences did not affect the evaluation of 
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information characteristics or sensemaking. Perhaps including time pressure in the 
scenarios would enhance individual differences effects. Including a changing and 
conflicting goals environment may relate better to Tolerance for Contradiction as it 
provides a situation where participants have to make decisions about conflicting goals. 
They may differentiate or synthesize goals based on their tolerance for contradiction.  
Naturalistic Investigation 
Finally, the real test of laboratory outcomes is their ability to predict real world 
behaviors (Dobbins, Lane & Steiner, 1988). Hence, future research should investigate 
these processes in a naturalistic environment. Choo (1998b) and Bhagat and colleagues 
(2002) emphasized the importance of information sharing for organizations to be 
effective. Specifically, Bhagat and colleagues (2002) suggested that transfer of tacit 
knowledge between organizations may be easier for organizations with higher holistic 
thinking employees. The use of technology allows the tracking of information. For 
example, with information gathering and sharing over e-mail, transactions can be tracked 
objectively in organizations willing to participate in such research. Understanding how 
individuals share information and how this affects decisions and organization functioning 
would be important for understanding organizational effectiveness. Hence, future 
research needs to not only investigate the sensemaking processes at the individual level 
but also at the team and organizational level. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Often in an organizational context, goals may be ill-defined or lack consensus, 
information may be incomplete and ambiguous, decision makers may be pursuing 
multiple or competing objectives, and time constraints may be undermining the adequate 
use of available information. This study investigated how AH thinking is related to 
information management and sensemaking, two processes that are crucial for decision 
making and organizational action. When individuals experience high pressure and 
complexity they are likely to fall back on cognitive scripts for how to behave. Under 
these circumstances, individuals and more importantly, multinational teams, can make 
different plans, have different goal priorities, and draw different conclusions. When 
teams have different interpretations they differ in sensemaking. Although differences can 
lead to difficulties in establishing shared understanding, they can also provide different 
views and diverse solutions (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Orasanu & Salas, 1993; 
Triandis, Hall, & Ewen, 1965). Understanding AH thinking differences and their effects 
is a first step to understanding how multinational teams and organizations might channel 
information to arrive at a common understanding, shape communication based on a 
group’s information needs, and manage the additional demands for consensus building.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Differences between Analytic and Holistic Thinking (Nisbett, 2003) 
 
Analytic Thinking 
 
 
Holistic Thinking 
• Individualism • Collectivism 
• Westerners • East Asians 
• Detach from context • Orient to whole context 
• Attention: A focus on attributes 
of the objects, assign them to 
categories 
 
• Attention to relationships between 
focal object and the field 
• Use of formal logic • Use experience-based knowledge 
• Reasoning Style: Differentiation • Reasoning Style: Dialectical 
• Attribution: Dispositional • Attribution: Situational 
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Table 2. Design of Scenarios 
Scenario 
Order 
Information Presentation: D-S Information Presentation: S-D 
Scenario 1-
Scenario 2 
Booklet 1: 
 Scenario 1D-S Scenario 2D-S 
Booklet 2:  
Scenario 1 S-D Scenario 2S-D 
Scenario 2-
Scenario 1 
Booklet 3:  
Scenario 2D-S Scenario 1D-S 
Booklet 4:  
Scenario 2S-D Scenario 1S-D 
D-S = Dispositional first, Situation second 
S-D = Situational first, Dispositional second 
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Table 3. Overview of Measures 
 Section Response 
Se
ns
em
ak
in
g 
Sc
en
ar
io
s 
A. Problem Presentation 
 
1. Problem identification in Time 1 
2. Information need in Time 1 
3. Decision in Time 1 
4. Open ended question 1 
B. Selection of Information from 
Categories 
 
1. Selection of information 1 
2. Number of Categories selected 
C. Information Presentation 1: 
Information suggests Dispositional or 
Situational cause  
1. Problem identification in Time 2 
2. Information need in Time 2 
3. Information trust 1 
4. Decision in Time 2 
5. Open ended question 2 
6. Relevance of information 1 
D. Information Presentation 2: 
Information suggests Dispositional or 
Situational cause 
1. Problem identification in Time 3 
2. Information need in Time 3 
3. Information trust 2 
4. Decision in Time 3 
5. Open ended question 3 
6. Relevance of information 2 
E. Presentation of all Information 
 
1. Selection of information 2 
2. Problem identification in Time 4 
3. Information need in Time 4 
4. Decision in Time 4 
5. Open ended question 4 
Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
s 1. Analytic-Holism Scale 
2. The Need for Cognition Scale 
3. The Need for Cognitive Closure 
Scale 
4. The Tolerance for Ambiguity Scale 
(exploratory) 
5. Memory Recall Task 
6. Demographic Sheet 
1. Analytic-Holistic scores 
2. Need for Cognition scores 
3. Need for Cognitive Closure 
scores 
4. Tolerance for Ambiguity Scores 
 
5. Types of information recalled 
6. Demographic Information 
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Table 4. Reliabilities of Outcome Measures 
 Reliability 
Outcome Variables n Overall Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 
Situational PI 
   Combined 
   Production Dilemma 
   Westerly Foundation 
Dispositional PI 
   Combined 
   Production Dilemma 
   Westerly Foundation 
Situational Decision 
   Combined 
   Production Dilemma 
   Westerly Foundation 
Dispositional Decision 
   Combined 
   Production Dilemma 
   Westerly Foundation 
Information Selection 1 
   Combined 
   Production Dilemma 
   Westerly Foundation 
Information Selection 2 
   Combined 
   Production Dilemma 
   Westerly Foundation 
Categories Selection 
   Combined 
   Production Dilemma 
   Westerly Foundation 
Situational Info Relevance    
   Combined 
   Production Dilemma 
   Westerly Foundation 
Dispositional Info Relevance   
   Combined 
   Production Dilemma 
   Westerly Foundation 
 
 
6 
3 
3 
 
6 
3 
3 
 
6 
3 
3 
 
6 
3 
3 
 
72 
36 
36 
 
52 
26 
26 
 
18 
9 
9 
 
26 
13 
13 
 
26 
13 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.92 
.87 
.87 
 
.84 
.73 
.74 
 
.89 
.84 
.82 
 
.86 
.80 
.76 
 
.86 
.84 
.78 
 
.63 
.74 
.67 
 
.79 
.89 
.84 
 
.69  
.81  
.73 
 
.71  
.78 
.73 
 
.72 
.81 
.60 
 
.88 
.93 
.89 
 
.75 
.76 
.74 
 
.75 
.73 
.74 
 
.65 
.79 
.64 
 
.83 
.93 
.86 
 
.71 
.72 
.67 
 
.67 
.67 
.67 
 
.74 
.84 
.62 
 
.81 
.93 
.84 
 
.73 
.79 
.66 
 
.66 
.66 
.66 
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Table 5. Participant's Demographics 
 N=312 
Variables Frequency Percentage 
Gender Male   83 26.6 
 Female 229 73.4 
Age  18-21 281 90.1 
 22-25   20   6.4 
 > 25   11   3.5 
Ethnic Caucasian 202 64.7 
 African    83 26.6 
 Asian     2     .6 
 Hispanic    8   2.6 
 Other   17   5.4 
Childhood Urban    96 30.8 
Background Suburban 134 42.9 
 Rural   74 23.7 
 Other    5   1.6 
Year in  Freshman 226 72.4 
School Sophomore   57 18.3 
 Junior   12   3.8 
 Senior   14   4.5 
Major Engineering   24   7.7 
 Social/Behavioral Science   47 15.1 
 Natural Science   32 10.3 
 Business   36 11.5 
 Humanities/Fine Arts   23   7.4 
 Education   17   5.4 
 Health Sciences 106 34.0 
 Law    7   2.2 
 Undecided   16   5.1 
College GPA 3.0-4.0 174 88.1 
 2.0-2.99   89 28.5 
 1.0-1.99   11   3.5 
 0-.99     1     .3 
Work Hours < 10 hours   15   4.8 
 < 20 hours   62 19.9 
 < 30 hours   97 31.1 
 < 40 hours   61 19.6 
 > 40 hours   45 14.4 
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Table 6. Scenarios Comparison on Outcome Scores 
 PD WF  
 
Variables 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
Pillai's 
Trace 
 
Λ 
 
F  
Category Selection 
 
  5.81   2.69  5.92  2.58 .00 1.00 .77 
% Situational Info 
Selected 2 
 
64.65 20.51 64.15 18.51 .00 1.00 .19 
% Dispositional Info 
Selected 2 
 
56.78 24.30 56.39 20.30 .00 1.00 .09 
% Overall Info 
Selected 1 & 2 
 
56.29 15.60 56.21 15.37 .00 1.00 .02 
Situational Info 
Relevance 
 
  5.10   .96  5.39    .81 .11  .89 39.18**
 
Dispositional Info 
Relevance 
 
  4.91 1.10  4.79   1.01 .01  .99 3.91* 
Overall Info 
Relevance 
 
  5.09   .82  5.19    .75 .02  .98 6.54* 
Difference in Final PI 
Judgments 
 
-1.62  2.53   -.67   1.86 .10  .90 36.02**
Difference in Final 
Decision Judgments 
 
  -.97  2.50   -.95   2.03 .00 1.00 .02 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01
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Table 7. Individual Differences, Problem Identification, and Decision Judgments for Combined Scenarios
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 1                        
2  .57** 1                       
3  .72**  .20** 1                      
4  .59**  .19**  .21** 1                     
5  .26** -.25**  .06 -.11 1                    
6 -.05  .12* -.10 -.01 -.12* 1                   
7  .03 -.02  .18** -.04 -.09 -.49** 1                  
8 -.01  .00  .01 -.11  .08 -.39** .34** 1                 
9  .13*  .01  .15**  .09  .02  .06  .08 -.14* 1                
10 -.04  .05 -.01 -.08 -.06  .00 -.02 -.08  .05 1               
11  .12*  .03  .12*  .06  .05 -.04  .06 -.10  .43**  .08 1              
12  .10  .03  .08  .06  .04  .00 -.08  .01 -.03  .29** -.36** 1             
13  .17**  .03  .20** .12*  .00  .05  .01 -.09  .35**  .01  .42**  .12* 1            
14  .00  .07 -.04  .01 -.06 -.08  .03 -.06  .03  .40**  .21**  .04 -.05 1           
15  .20**  .02  .23**  .08  .10  .01  .00 -.10  .38** -.04  .45**  .04  .71** -.08 1          
16 -.07  .06 -.12* -.02 -.08 -.10  .00  .01  .00  .43**  .14*  .10 -.02  .80** -.15** 1         
17  .17**  .07  .17**  .12*  .00  .02  .12* -.14*  .64** -.07  .43** -.01  .37** -.02  .41** -.05 1        
18 -.02  .08 -.03  .03 -.14*  .10 -.05 -.10 -.07  .62**  .03  .28**  .01  .28** -.07  .32** -.05 1       
19  .00  .00  .02  .04 -.07 -.04  .09 -.07  .34**  .07  .74** -.45**  .34**  .20*  .36**  .17**  .44**  .06 1      
20  .11  .02  .10  .11  .01  .05 -.13* -.10  .04  .20** -.28**  .81**  .10  .01  .02  .04  .01  .38** -.39** 1     
21  .08  .02  .12*  .06 -.03  .06  .02 -.04  .27** -.05  .36**  .06  .63** -.07  .65** -.03  .46** -.05  .47**  .02 1    
22 -.04  .11 -.08  .01 -.15**  .04 -.02 -.10  .07  .36**  .13**  .11 -.06  .67** -.07  .66** -.01  .42**  .11  .21** -.06 1   
23  .14*  .05  .19**  .05 -.02  .01  .05 -.03  .27** -.11  .29**  .06  .50** -.17**  .67** -.18**  .43** -.05  .41**  .05  .77** -.10 1  
24  .02  .09 -.03  .10 -.14* -.06  .02 -.06  .07  .35**  .12*  .09 -.04  .62** -.12**  .67** -.01  .37**  .14**  .19** -.09  .82** -.16** 1 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
1. Overall AH Score 7. The Need for Cognition 13. Combined: Problem Identification  Sit T3 19. Combined: Decision Sit T2 
2. Attention 8. Tolerance for Ambiguity 14. Combined: Problem Identification  Dis T3 20. Combined: Decision Dis T2 
3. Causal Attribution 9. Combined: Problem Identification  Sit T1 15. Combined: Problem Identification  Sit T4 21. Combined: Decision Sit T3 
4. Contradiction 10. Combined: Problem Identification  Dis T1 16. Combined: Problem Identification  Dis T4 22. Combined: Decision Dis T3 
5. Perception of Change 11. Combined: Problem Identification  Sit T2 17. Combined: Decision Sit T1 23. Combined: Decision Sit T4 
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure 12. Combined: Problem Identification  Dis T2 18. Combined: Decision Dis T1 24. Combined: Decision Dis T4 
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Table 8. Hypotheses 2 and 3: Predicting Problem Identification (PI) Judgment at Time 2 and Time 3 
Predictor Variables Situational PI Time 2 Dispositional PI Time 2 
 R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B SE R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B SE 
Step 1 
    Sit/Dis PI (T1) 
 
Step 2 
    Sit/Dis PI (T1) 
    Info Presentation 1 (IP1) 
    AH Scores 
 
Step 3 
    Sit/Dis PI (T1) 
    Info Presentation 1 
    AH Scores 
    AH Scores X IP1 
 
.43 
 
 
.57 
 
 
 
 
.58 
 
.19 
 
 
.32 
 
 
 
 
.33 
 
.19 
 
 
.14 
 
 
 
 
.01 
 
71.15**
 
 
30.73**
 
 
 
 
5.13* 
 
   .51** 
 
 
   .49** 
   .75** 
   .22* 
 
 
   .49* 
-1.33 
  -.01 
   .45* 
 
.06 
 
 
.06 
.10 
.10 
 
 
.06 
.92 
.14 
.20 
 
.29 
 
 
.77 
 
 
 
 
.78 
 
.08 
 
 
.60 
 
 
 
 
.61 
 
.08 
 
 
.51 
 
 
 
 
.01 
 
28.02**
 
196.14**
  
 
 
 
    9.25**
 
.38** 
 
 
.44** 
-2.14** 
   .13 
 
 
.44** 
   .99 
.47** 
  -.67** 
 
    .07 
 
 
.05 
.11 
.11 
 
 
.05 
   1.03 
.16 
.22 
Predictor Variables Situational PI Time 3 Dispositional PI Time 3 
 R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B      SE R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B SE 
Step 1 
    Sit/Dis PI (T2) 
 
Step 2 
    Sit/Dis PI (T2) 
    Info Presentation 2 (IP2) 
    AH Scores 
 
Step 3 
    Sit/Dis PI (T2) 
    Info Presentation 2 
    AH Scores 
    AH Scores X IP2 
 
.42 
 
 
.51 
 
 
 
 
.52 
 
 
 
.18 
 
 
.26 
 
 
 
 
.26 
 
.18 
 
 
.09 
 
 
 
 
  .00 
 
66.50**
 
 
17.62**
 
 
 
 
   1.73 
 
   .33** 
 
 
   .41** 
   .47** 
   .13 
 
 
   .42** 
  -.53 
   .02 
   .22 
 
.04 
 
 
.04 
.09 
.08 
 
 
.04 
.77 
.11 
.17 
 
.04 
 
 
.53 
 
 
 
 
.53 
 
  .001
 
 
.28 
 
 
 
 
.29 
 
 .001 
 
 
  .28 
 
 
 
 
.01 
 
.39 
 
 
60.70**
 
 
 
 
.77 
 
.03 
 
 
   .46** 
-1.88** 
.04 
 
 
  .47** 
   -.85 
    .15 
   -.22 
 
.05 
 
 
.06 
.17 
.13 
 
 
.06 
   1.18 
.18 
.26 
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01
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Table 9. Hypotheses 5 and 6: Predicting Decision Judgment at Time 2 and Time 3 
Predictor Variables Situational Decision Time 2 Dispositional Decision Time 2 
 R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B      SE R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B SE 
Step 1 
   Sit/Dis Decision (T1) 
 
Step 2 
    Sit/Dis Decision (T1) 
    Info Presentation 1 (IP1) 
    AH Scores 
 
Step 3 
    Sit/Dis Decision (T1) 
    Info Presentation 1 
    AH Scores 
    AH Scores X IP1 
 
.41 
 
 
.66 
 
 
 
 
.66 
 
.19 
 
 
.43 
 
 
 
 
.44 
 
.19 
 
 
.24 
 
 
 
 
.01 
 
74.78**
 
 
64.29**
 
 
 
 
4.89* 
 
   .50**
 
 
   .48**
 1.11**
  -.06 
 
    
   .48* 
  -.96 
  -.29* 
   .45* 
 
.06 
 
 
.05 
.10 
.10 
 
 
.05 
.94 
.14 
.20 
 
.38 
 
 
.75 
 
 
 
 
.76 
 
.15 
 
 
.56 
 
 
 
 
.57 
 
.15 
 
 
.42 
 
 
 
 
.01 
 
53.06**
 
146.81**
  
 
 
 
   6.20* 
 
.47** 
 
 
.47** 
-1.71** 
   .15 
 
 
.47** 
   .69 
.41** 
  -.52* 
 
.07 
 
 
.05 
.10 
.10 
 
 
.05 
.97 
.15 
.21 
Predictor Variables Situational Decision Time 3 Dispositional Decision Time 3 
 R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B      SE R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B SE 
Step 1 
    Sit/Dis Decision (T2) 
 
Step 2 
    Sit/Dis Decision (T2) 
    Info Presentation 2 (IP2) 
    AH Scores 
 
Step 3 
    Sit/Dis Decision (T2) 
    Info Presentation 2 
    AH Scores 
    AH Scores X IP2 
 
.47 
 
 
.57 
 
 
 
 
.58 
 
.22 
 
 
.33 
 
 
 
 
.33 
 
.22 
 
 
.11 
 
 
 
 
.01 
 
87.62**
 
 
24.81**
 
 
 
 
  2.36 
 
   .41**
 
 
   .57**
   .74**
   .09 
 
 
   .58**
  -.62 
  -.06 
   .29 
 
.04 
 
 
.50 
.11 
.10 
 
 
.05 
.89 
.14 
.19 
 
.21 
 
 
.50 
 
 
 
 
.51 
 
.05 
 
 
.25 
 
 
 
 
.26 
 
.05 
 
 
.20 
 
 
 
 
.01 
 
14.58**
 
41.50**
  
 
 
 
3.87 
 
.19** 
 
 
.52** 
-1.37** 
  -.13 
 
 
.53** 
   .79 
   .11 
  -.47 
 
.05 
 
 
.57 
.15 
.12 
 
 
.06 
   1.11 
.17 
.24 
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01
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Table 10. Hypotheses 5 and 6: Predicting Decision Judgment at Time 2 and Time 3 for Individual Scenario 
Predictor Variables Dispositional Decision Time 2 (WF) Dispositional Decision Time 2 (PD) 
 R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B      SE R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B SE 
Step 1 
   Dis Decision (T1) 
 
Step 2 
    Dis Decision (T1) 
    Info Presentation 1 (IP1) 
    AH Scores 
 
Step 3 
    Dis Decision (T1) 
    Info Presentation 1 
    AH Scores 
    AH Scores X IP1 
 
.43 
 
 
.67 
 
 
 
 
.68 
 
.18 
 
 
.45 
 
 
 
 
.46 
 
.18 
 
 
.27 
 
 
 
 
.01 
 
69.62**
 
 
74.57**
 
 
 
 
3.97* 
 
   .51**
 
 
   .51**
-1.58**
 .36* 
 
 
  .51**
  .99**
  .64**
-.55* 
 
.06 
 
 
.05 
.14 
.14 
 
 
.05 
  1.29 
.20 
.28 
 
.34 
 
 
.50 
 
 
 
 
.50 
 
.11 
 
 
.25 
 
 
 
 
.25 
 
.11 
 
 
.14 
 
 
 
 
.00 
 
39.23**
 
27.80**
  
 
 
 
   .30 
 
  .37** 
 
 
  .35** 
1.11** 
    .08 
 
 
  .35** 
    .34 
   -.002 
    .17 
 
.06 
 
 
.05 
.15 
.15 
 
 
.05 
   1.42 
.22 
.31 
Predictor Variables Situational Decision Time 3 (WF) Dispositional Decision Time 3 (PD) 
 R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B      SE R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B SE 
Step 1 
    Dis Decision (T2) 
 
Step 2 
    Dis Decision (T2) 
    Info Presentation 2 (IP2) 
    AH Scores 
 
Step 3 
    Dis Decision (T2) 
    Info Presentation 2 
    AH Scores 
    AH Scores X IP2 
 
.36 
 
 
.50 
 
 
 
 
.50 
 
.13 
 
 
.25 
 
 
 
 
.25 
 
.13 
 
 
.13 
 
 
 
 
  .00 
 
44.67**
 
 
24.95**
 
 
 
 
    .03 
 
   .33**
 
 
   .52**
-1.17**
  -.17 
 
 
  .52**
  -.95 
  -.14 
  -.05 
 
.05 
 
 
.05 
.17 
.15 
 
 
.05 
  1.40 
.21 
.30 
 
.15 
 
 
.37 
 
 
 
 
.40 
 
.02 
 
 
.14 
 
 
 
 
.16 
 
.02 
 
 
.17 
 
 
 
 
.02 
 
 6.65* 
 
20.70**
  
 
 
 
6.79* 
 
   .14* 
 
 
   .35** 
-1.24** 
-.09 
 
 
   .35** 
   2.76 
     .34 
-.86* 
 
.05 
 
 
.06 
.20 
.17 
 
 
.06 
   1.55 
.23 
.33 
Note: * p < .05. ** p < .01
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Table 11. Individual Differences, Problem Identification, and Decision Judgments for Production Dilemma 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 1                        
2  .57** 1                       
3  .72**  .20** 1                      
4  .59**  .19**  .21** 1                     
5  .26** -.25**  .06 -.11 1                    
6 -.05  .12* -.10 -.01 -.12* 1                   
7  .03 -.02  .18** -.04 -.09 -.49** 1                  
8 -.01  .00  .01 -.11  .08 -.39**  .34** 1                 
9  .11  .00  .16**  .07 -.01  .02  .04 -.10 1                
10  .01  .13*  .01 -.05 -.09 -.01 -.05 -.06 -.23** 1               
11  .11 -.03  .12*  .07  .08 -.01  .04 -.09  .32** -.08 1              
12  .04  .03  .02 -.01  .04 -.02 -.06  .00 -.13*  .36** -.45** 1             
13  .16** -.01  .16**  .09  .09  .03 -.06 -.07  .35** -.11*  .36** -.02 1            
14 -.03  .08 -.06 -.02 -.07 -.08  .08 -.05 -.15**  .34**  .00  .14* -.35** 1           
15  .21**  .02  .21**  .09  .14*  .03 -.04 -.12*  .40** -.14*  .40** -.13*  .66** -.31** 1          
16 -.08  .07 -.15* -.03 -.07 -.05 -.01 -.03 -.19**  .36** -.05  .22** -.27**  .76** -.39** 1         
17  .10  .03  .10  .08  .00  .03  .02 -.09  .66** -.20**  .31** -.08  .39** -.10  .34** -.14* 1        
18  .01  .11* -.02  .03 -.13*  .09 -.02 -.13* -.22**  .51** -.02  .23** -.10  .19** -.13*  .23** -.16** 1       
19  .02 -.04  .03  .08 -.02  .00 -.02 -.04  .26** -.08  .67** -.43**  .27**  .00  .24** -.03  .34** -.06 1      
20  .04 -.01  .05  .05  .00  .03 -.10 -.08 -.07  .23** -.30**  .71** -.03  .02 -.05  .11 -.09  .36** -.40** 1     
21  .08  .00  .10  .05  .01  .05 -.06 -.04  .29** -.06  .31** -.07  .59** -.27**  .52** -.20**  .39** -.11*  .47** -.13* 1    
22 -.05  .14* -.09 -.01 -.18**  .03  .07 -.07 -.11  .25** -.04  .11 -.29**  .59** -.24**  .57** -.11*  .29** -.10  .15* -.26** 1   
23  .13*  .06  .15**  .04  .01  .04 -.05 -.03  .30** -.13*  .26** -.10  .44** -.29**  .57** -.30**  .34** -.17**  .41** -.12*  .73** -.25** 1  
24  .03  .12* -.02  .06 -.12* -.04  .04 -.07 -.13*  .23** -.03  .15** -.30**  .53** -.26**  .58** -.15**  .32** -.07  .23** -.26**  .79** -.29** 1 
 Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
1. Overall AH Score 7. The Need for Cognition 13. PD: Problem Identification  Sit T3 19. PD: Decision Sit T2 
2. Attention 8. Tolerance for Ambiguity 14. PD: Problem Identification  Dis T3 20. PD: Decision Dis T2 
3. Causal Attribution 9. PD: Problem Identification  Sit T1 15. PD: Problem Identification  Sit T4 21. PD: Decision Sit T3 
4. Contradiction 10. PD: Problem Identification  Dis T1 16. PD: Problem Identification  Dis T4 22. PD: Decision Dis T3 
5. Perception of Change 11. PD: Problem Identification  Sit T2 17. PD: Decision Sit T1 23. PD: Decision Sit T4 
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure 12. PD: Problem Identification  Dis T2 18. PD: Decision Dis T1 24. PD: Decision Dis T4 
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Table 12. Individual Differences, Problem Identification, and Decision Judgments for Westerly Foundation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
1 1                        
2  .57** 1                       
3  .72**  .20** 1                      
4  .59**  .19**  .21** 1                     
5  .26** -.25**  .06 -.11 1                    
6 -.05  .12* -.10 -.01 -.12* 1                   
7  .03 -.02  .18** -.04 -.09 -.49** 1                  
8 -.01  .00  .01 -.11  .08 -.39**  .34** 1                 
9  .09  .02  .06  .06  .04  .06  .08 -.11 1                
10 -.08 -.07 -.03 -.07 -.01  .01  .02 -.07 .20** 1               
11  .08  .09  .07  .03 -.02 -.07  .07 -.07 .31**  .19** 1              
12  .14*  .02  .12*  .12*  .03  .02 -.08  .01 -.02  .23** -.21** 1             
13  .10  .06  .13*  .09 -.10  .04  .08 -.06 .19**  .09  .40**  .02 1            
14  .03  .03  .01  .04 -.02 -.05 -.05 -.04 .12*  .34**  .21**  .16**  .07 1           
15  .11  .02  .16**  .04  .01 -.02  .04 -.05 .22**  .00  .40**  .05  .68**  .05 1          
16 -.02  .03 -.04  .00 -.05 -.11*  .00  .06 .12*  .37**  .20**  .15**  .06  .78**  .02 1         
17  .16**  .08  .17**  .10  .00  .00  .16** -.13* .54** -.03  .33** -.02  .28** -.01  .37** -.02 1        
18 -.05  .01 -.03  .01 -.10  .07 -.06 -.03 .03  .58**  .01  .31**  .02  .27 -.03  .31** -.06 1       
19 -.03  .04  .00 -.02 -.09 -.06  .17** -.07 .28**  .13*  .69** -.38**  .41**  .19  .43**  .18**  .40**  .05 1      
20  .14*  .04  .12*  .13*  .01  .05 -.11* -.09 .04  .20** -.20**  .79** -.01  .17 -.02  .17**  .01  .43** -.29** 1     
21  .05  .03  .09  .04 -.07  .04  .10 -.03 .17** -.05  .28**  .06  .55** -.04  .64** -.03  .37** -.03  .38** .03 1    
22 -.02  .03 -.04  .03 -.06  .03 -.11* -.08 .16**  .31**  .16**  .22**  .01  .73  .02  .69**  .07  .38**  .13* .36** -.01 1   
23  .09  .02  .16**  .04 -.05 -.03  .15** -.02 .12* -.07  .23**  .07  .48** -.10  .69** -.12*  .39** -.01  .37** .04  .68** -.10 1  
24  .00  .02 -.02  .09 -.09 -.05 -.01 -.02 .17**  .30**  .14*  .11  .05  .61  .01  .71**  .05  .33**  .16** .26** -.02  .75** -.12* 1 
 Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
1. Overall AH Score 7. The Need for Cognition 13. WF: Problem Identification  Sit T3 19. WF: Decision Sit T2 
2. Attention 8. Tolerance for Ambiguity 14. WF: Problem Identification  Dis T3 20. WF: Decision Dis T2 
3. Causal Attribution 9. WF: Problem Identification  Sit T1 15. WF: Problem Identification  Sit T4 21. WF: Decision Sit T3 
4. Contradiction 10. WF: Problem Identification  Dis T1 16. WF: Problem Identification  Dis T4 22. WF: Decision Dis T3 
5. Perception of Change 11. WF: Problem Identification  Sit T2 17. WF: Decision Sit T1 23. WF: Decision Sit T4 
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure 12. WF: Problem Identification  Dis T2 18. WF: Decision Dis T1 24. WF: Decision Dis T4 
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Table 13. Individual Differences and Information Selection  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1 1                          
2  .57** 1                         
3  .72**  .20** 1                        
4  .59**  .19**  .21** 1                       
5  .26** -.25**  .06 -.11 1                      
6 -.05  .12* -.10 -.01 -.12* 1                     
7  .03 -.02  .18** -.04 -.09 -.49** 1                    
8 -.01  .00  .01 -.11  .08 -.39**  .34** 1                   
9 -.02 -.07  .04 -.04  .02 -.08  .03 -.09 1                  
10  .03 -.01  .06 -.03  .04 -.03  .03 -.09 .90** 1                 
11 -.07 -.12*  .01 -.04  .00 -.12*  .03 -.06 .89** .61** 1                
12  .02 -.04  .10 -.01 -.01 -.19**  .07 -.07 .76** .70** .67** 1               
13  .08  .02  .12*  .00  .02 -.16*  .06 -.08 .70** .74** .51** .93** 1              
14 -.03 -.09  .07 -.02 -.04 -.19**  .06 -.04 .72** .55** .74** .93** .72** 1             
15  .00 -.05  .08 -.04  .00 -.12**  .04 -.07 .90** .83** .80** .89** .82** .83** 1            
16  .07  .00  .12* -.02  .03 -.08  .02 -.09 .82** .89** .58* .82** .87** .64** .91** 1           
17 -.07 -.10  .03 -.06 -.03 -.15**  .05 -.04 .83** .61** .88** .81** .62** .88** .91** .66** 1          
18  .05 -.01  .09  .02 -.02 -.21**  .08 -.04 .39** .36** .34** .85** .80** .78** .52** .48** .47** 1         
19  .06  .04  .08  .02  .00 -.19**  .08 -.04 .34** .34** .28** .77** .83** .59** .45** .46** .37** .92** 1        
20  .02 -.06  .10  .02 -.03 -.19**  .06 -.03 .37** .31** .36** .79** .63** .84** .50** .42** .49** .91** .67** 1       
21  .08 -.03  .18**  .05 -.05 -.17**  .07 -.05 .39** .36** .33** .75** .70** .69** .50** .48** .43** .83** .74** .79** 1      
22  .00  .01 -.01 -.01  .02 -.19**  .06 -.02 .29** .25** .27** .71** .67** .64** .39** .35** .37** .87** .82** .77** .46** 1     
23  .12*  .05  .17**  .06 -.05 -.12*  .02 -.08 .33** .33** .26** .63** .66** .50** .43** .44** .34** .69** .71** .54** .88** .33** 1    
24 -.01  .01 -.04 -.03  .04 -.17**  .10  .01 .20** .19** .17** .55** .61** .41** .28** .27** .23** .71** .81** .49** .30** .88** .15** 1   
25  .01 -.11  .13*  .02 -.04 -.18**  .11* -.01 .33** .29** .31** .67** .54** .70** .43** .38** .41** .76** .56** .83** .85** .47** .48** .38** 1  
26  .02  .01  .03  .02 -.02 -.15** -.01 -.05 .30** .24** .30** .67** .52** .72** .41** .33** .41** .79** .58** .86** .50** .82** .43** .45** .43** 1 
 Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
1. Overall AH Score 8. Tolerance for Ambiguity 15. Combined: % of Information Selected 1 22. Combined: % of Dis Information Selected 2 
2. Attention 9. Combined: Numbers of Category Selected 16. PD: % of Information Selected 1 23. PD: % of Sit Information Selected 2 
3. Causal Attribution 10. PD: Numbers of Category Selected 17. WF: % of Information Selected 1 24. PD: % of Dis Information Selected 2 
4. Contradiction 11. WF: Numbers of Category Selected 18. Combined: % of Information Selected 2 25. WF: % of Sit Information Selected 2 
5. Perception of Change 12. Combined: % of Information Selected (1&2) 19. PD: % of Information Selected 2 26. WF: % of Dis Information Selected 2 
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure 13. PD: % of Information Selected (1&2) 20. WF: % of Information Selected 2  
7. The Need for Cognition 14. WF: % of Information Selected (1&2) 21. Combined: % of Sit Information Selected 2  
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Table 14. Individual Differences and Information Relevance 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
1 1                       
2  .57** 1                      
3  .72**  .20** 1                     
4  .59**  .19**  .21** 1                    
5  .26** -.25**  .06 -.11 1                   
6 -.05  .12* -.10 -.01 -.12* 1                  
7  .03 -.02  .18** -.04 -.09 -.49** 1                 
8 -.01  .00  .01 -.11  .08 -.39**  .34** 1                
9  .10  .06  .15**  .02 -.02 -.11*  .04 -.09 1               
10  .12*  .07  .16**  .02 -.01 -.11*  .05 -.07 .92** 1              
11  .06  .03  .11**  .01 -.04 -.09  .02 -.09 .90** .65** 1             
12  .13*  .08  .18**  .03 -.05 -.11*  .05 -.08 .88** .79** .81** 1            
13  .04  .06  .08 -.06 -.02 -.07 -.03 -.07 .87** .81** .77** .66** 1           
14  .15**  .09  .22**  .02 -.03 -.09  .05 -.04 .77** .79** .59** .90** .56** 1          
15  .05  .01  .09 -.03  .05 -.10  .03 -.07 .73** .81** .49** .51** .86** .47** 1         
16  .06  .04  .09  .04 -.06 -.10  .03 -.10 .79** .59** .86** .86** .61** .56** .43** 1        
17  .01  .10  .04 -.07 -.08 -.01 -.10 -.05 .76** .56** .83** .61** .83** .47** .44** .62** 1       
18  .13*  .03  .17**  .05  .02 -.11  .06 -.11* .98** .90** .87** .84** .83** .74** .71** .75** .69** 1      
19  .02  .12*  .08 -.08 -.12* -.10 -.03 -.03 .84** .75** .78** .80** .79** .69** .60** .74** .75** .70** 1     
20  .12*  .06  .15**  .03  .00 -.11  .07 -.08 .88** .98** .61** .73** .78** .73** .80** .55** .52** .90** .64** 1    
21  .10  .10  .15** -.03 -.04 -.08 -.01 -.03 .78** .82** .58** .76** .70** .77** .65** .56** .52** .68** .86** .67** 1   
22  .11 -.01  .15**  .06  .03 -.08  .04 -.11 .85** .61** .95** .76** .69** .57** .45** .80** .73** .88** .61** .59** .52** 1  
23 -.05  .12*  .00 -.10 -.16** -.09 -.04 -.03 .70** .51** .77** .65** .68** .45** .41** .72** .77** .56** .89** .46** .52** .54** 1 
 Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
1. Overall AH Score 7. The Need for Cognition 13. Combined: Dis Info Relevance 19. Combined: Disconfirming Info Relevance 
2. Attention 8. Tolerance for Ambiguity 14. PD: Sit Info Relevance 20. PD: Confirming Info Relevance 
3. Causal Attribution 9. Combined: Overall Info Relevance 15. PD: Dis Info Relevance 21. PD: Disconfirming Info Relevance 
4. Contradiction 10. PD: Overall Info Relevance 16. WF: Sit Info Relevance 22. WF: Confirming Info Relevance 
5. Perception of Change 11. WF: Overall Info Relevance 17. WF: Dis Info Relevance 23. WF: Disconfirming Info Relevance 
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure 12. Combined: Sit Info Relevance 18. Combined: Confirming Info Relevance  
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Table 15. Individual Differences and Difference in Final Problem Identification and Decision Judgments  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 1                    
2  .57** 1                   
3  .72**  .20** 1                  
4  .59**  .19**  .21** 1                 
5  .26** -.25**  .06 -.11 1                
6 -.05  .12* -.10 -.01 -.12* 1               
7  .03 -.02  .18** -.04 -.09 -.49** 1              
8 -.01  .00  .01 -.11  .08 -.39**  .34** 1             
9 -.16**  .04 -.22** -.06 -.11* -.08  .00  .07 1            
10 -.16**  .04 -.21** -.06 -.12* -.05  .02  .04  .85** 1           
11 -.08  .01 -.12** -.02 -.05 -.08 -.02  .08  .70**  .22** 1          
12  .11* -.01  .14*  .03  .10  .04  .04 -.01 -.52** -.38** -.45** 1         
13  .09 -.03  .14*  .01  .07 -.02  .11  .07 -.48** -.50** -.21**  .84** 1        
14  .09  .01  .07  .03  .08  .10 -.08 -.10 -.32** -.05 -.54**  .71**  .22** 1       
15 -.07  .03 -.14*  .03 -.08 -.05 -.01 -.02  .71**  .57**  .53** -.41** -.37** -.25** 1      
16 -.06  .04 -.10  .01 -.08 -.05  .06 -.03  .55**  .64**  .15** -.23** -.32**  .00  .82** 1     
17 -.05  .01 -.11  .04 -.04 -.03 -.09 -.01  .54**  .20**  .72** -.42** -.25** -.44**  .72**  .19** 1    
18  .11 -.02  .16**  .03  .06  .03  .09 -.01 -.36** -.19** -.40**  .64**  .50**  .50** -.48** -.28** -.49** 1   
19  .06 -.06  .14*  .01  .03  .01  .11  .01 -.26** -.22** -.19**  .51**  .58**  .17** -.40** -.37** -.24**  .82** 1  
20  .12*  .04  .10  .03  .07  .04  .02 -.04 -.30** -.07 -.46**  .48**  .17**  .64** -.34** -.05 -.54**  .74**  .21** 1 
 Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
1. Overall AH Score 6. The Need for Cognitive Closure 11. WF: Difference in PI T4 16. PD: Difference in Decision T4 
2. Attention 7. The Need for Cognition 12. Combined: Abs Difference in PI T4 17. WF: Difference in Decision T4 
3. Causal Attribution 8. Tolerance for Ambiguity 13. PD: Abs Difference in PI T4 18. Combined: Abs Difference in Decision T4 
4. Contradiction 9. Combined: Difference in PI T4 14. WF: Abs Difference in PI T4 19. PD: Abs Difference in Decision T4 
5. Perception of Change 10. PD: Difference in PI T4 15. Combined: Difference in Decision T4 20. WF: Abs Difference in Decision T4 
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Table 16. Hypotheses 16 and 18: Predicting Fundamental Attribution Error 
 Dispositional PI Time 4 
Predictor Variables R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B      SE 
Step 1 
   Sit PI (T4) 
 
Step 2 
    Sit PI (T4) 
    NFCC Score  
    Attribution Score 
 
Step 3 
    Sit PI (T4) 
    NFCC Score  
    Attribution Score 
    Attribution X NFCC 
 
.15 
 
 
.20 
 
 
 
 
.21 
 
.02 
 
 
.04 
 
 
 
 
.04 
 
.02 
 
 
.02 
 
 
 
 
.00 
 
7.02** 
 
 
  3.16* 
 
 
 
 
    .52 
 
  -.21** 
 
 
  -.17* 
  -.20 
  -.14 
 
 
  -.17* 
  -.24* 
  -.07 
  -.02 
 
.08 
 
 
.08 
.11 
.08 
 
 
.08 
.12 
.12 
.03 
 Dispositional PI Time 4 
Predictor Variables R R 2 R 2 ∆ F ∆ B      SE 
Step 1 
   Sit PI (T4) 
 
Step 2 
    Sit PI (T4) 
    NfCog Score  
    AH Score 
 
Step 3 
    Sit PI (T4) 
    NfCog Score  
    AH Score 
    AH Score X NfCog 
 
.15 
 
 
.16 
 
 
 
 
.16 
 
.02 
 
 
.02 
 
 
 
 
.03 
 
.02 
 
 
.00 
 
 
 
 
.01 
 
7.02** 
 
 
   .28 
 
 
 
 
    .71 
 
-.21** 
 
 
  .08* 
 -.01 
 -.12 
 
 
 -.19* 
 -.89 
 -.74 
  .18 
 
.08 
 
 
.08 
.11 
.15 
 
 
.08 
  1.05 
.75 
.22 
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Table 17. Individual Differences and Situational-Dispositional/Confirming-Disconfirming Selection and Relevance 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 1                
2  .57** 1               
3  .72**  .20** 1              
4  .59**  .19**  .21** 1             
5  .26** -.25**  .06 -.11 1            
6 -.05  .12* -.10 -.01 -.12* 1           
7  .03 -.02  .18** -.04 -.09 -.49** 1          
8 -.01  .00  .01 -.11  .08 -.39**  .34** 1         
9  .10 -.02  .18**  .06 -.02 -.12*  .07 -.06 1        
10 -.01 -.03  .11 -.01 -.11 -.20**  .04 -.03 .42** 1       
11 -.01 -.04 -.03  .00  .05 -.20**  .08 -.01 .35** .36** 1      
12  .05  .13*  .05 -.02 -.07 -.10 -.03 -.04 .35** .36** .46** 1     
13  .16**  .06  .24**  .05 -.02 -.07  .05 -.11* .47** .29** .26** .28** 1    
14  .03  .10  .11* -.04 -.13 -.08  .00 -.02 .28** .47** .21** .31** .64** 1   
15  .08  .00  .07  .04  .05 -.12*  .06 -.08 .24** .25** .52** .28** .65** .49** 1  
16  .00  .12*  .03 -.09 -.09 -.09 -.05 -.03 .22** .23** .27** .53** .59** .60** .57** 1 
 Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
1. Overall AH Score 7. The Need for Cognition 13. Combined: Confirming Sit Info Relevance 
2. Attention 8. Tolerance for Ambiguity 14. Combined: Disconfirming Sit Info Relevance 
3. Causal Attribution 9. Combined: % Confirming Sit Info Selected 15. Combined: Confirming Dis Info Relevance 
4. Contradiction 10. Combined: % Disconfirming Sit Info Selected 16. Combined: Disconfirming Dis Info Relevance 
5. Perception of Change 11. Combined: % Confirming Dis Info Selected  
6. The Need for Cognitive Closure 12. Combined: % Disconfirming Dis Info Selected  
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Table 18. Individual Differences and Information Recall 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 1             
2  .57** 1            
3  .72**  .20** 1           
4  .59**  .19**  .21** 1          
5  .26** -.25**  .06 -.11 1         
6 -.05  .12* -.10 -.01 -.12* 1        
7  .03 -.02  .18** -.04 -.09 -.49** 1       
8 -.01  .00  .01 -.11  .08 -.39**   .34** 1      
9  .00 -.06  .05  .01  .00 -.17**  .17**  .04 1     
10  .11*  .05  .10  .06  .04 -.06  .02 -.04 .18** 1    
11  .15* -.04 .20**  .10  .05 -.16**  .21** -.09 .26** .13* 1   
12  .00 -.12*  .06  .09 -.02 -.14*  .14*  .05 .15** .14* .41** 1  
13  .03 -.05  .10  .06 -.06 -.11  .20** -.04 .57** .32** .73** .51** 1 
 Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
1. Overall AH Score 6. The Need for Cognitive Closure 11. Situational Confirming Items Recalled 
2. Attention 7. The Need for Cognition 12. Situational Disconfirming Items Recalled 
3. Causal Attribution 8. Tolerance for Ambiguity 13. Total Items Recalled 
4. Contradiction 9. Dispositional Confirming Items Recalled  
5. Perception of Change 10. Dispositional Disconfirming Items Recalled  
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Table 19. Information Recall, Information Selection, Information Relevance, Problem Identification, and Decision Judgments  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 1                     
2  .18** 1                    
3  .26**  .13* 1                   
4  .15**  .14*  .41** 1                  
5  .57**  .32**  .73**  .51** 1                 
6  .12*  .02  .24**  .22**  .24** 1                
7  .14*  .10  .02  .06  .14*  .46** 1               
8  .11*  .00  .27**  .19**  .22**  .95**  .40** 1              
9  .09  .06  .08  .19**  .18**  .68**  .41**  .42** 1             
10  .17*  .08  .02  .06  .13*  .41**  .96**  .35**  .36** 1            
11  .01  .11*  .03  .03  .12*  .41**  .69**  .35**  .36**  .46** 1           
12  .17**  .13*  .14*  .10  .24**  .47**  .32**  .42**  .39**  .27**  .31** 1          
13  .13*  .11*  .00 -.01  .11*  .28**  .49**  .24**  .26**  .43**  .42**  .66** 1         
14  .20**  .13*  .17**  .08  .26**  .46**  .30**  .47**  .29**  .26**  .28**  .89** .66** 1        
15  .10  .07  .00  .06  .17**  .39**  .27**  .28**  .47**  .21**  .31**  .82** .58** .64** 1       
16  .20**  .13**  .04  .02  .15**  .28**  .51**  .24**  .25**  .52**  .28**  .64** .84** .65** .49** 1      
17  .09  .13** -.03 -.03  .09  .26**  .39**  .22**  .23**  .27**  .53**  .61** .82** .59** .60** .57** 1     
18 -.05  .02  .16**  .07  .06  .24** -.02  .24**  .14* -.05  .05  .29** .08 .30** .19** .11* .10 1    
19  .18**  .05 -.06 -.01  .09 -.09  .35** -.11 -.02  .36**  .17**  .05 .29** .06 .08 .31** .18** -.39** 1   
20 -.10 -.04 -.03 -.06 -.10  .16 -.05  .16**  .10 -.08  .05  .22** .01 .20** .16** .09 .05  .57** -.30** 1  
21  .11  .04  .08 -.01  .11* -.03  .24** -.04 -.01  .26**  .09  .08 .22** .11 .08 .23** .11 -.26**  .58** -.29** 1 
 Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
1. Dispositional Confirming Items Recalled 8. Combined: % Confirming Sit Info Selected 15. Combined: Disconfirming Sit Info Relevance 
2. Dispositional Disconfirming Items Recalled 9. Combined: % Disconfirming Sit Info Selected 16. Combined: Confirming Dis Info Relevance 
3. Situational Confirming Items Recalled 10. Combined: % Confirming Dis Info Selected 17. Combined: Disconfirming Dis Info Relevance 
4. Situational Disconfirming Items Recalled 11. Combined: % Disconfirming Dis Info Selected 18. Combined: Problem Identification  Sit T4 
5. Total Items Recalled 12. Combined: Sit Info Relevance 19. Combined: Problem Identification  Dis T4 
6. Combined: % of Sit Information Selected 2 13. Combined: Dis Info Relevance 20. Combined: Decision  Sit T4 
7. Combined: % of Dis Information Selected 2 14. Combined: Confirming Sit Info Relevance 21. Combined: Decision  Dis T4 
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Table 20. Forms of Sensemaking 
Codes 
 
Combined 
% 
Westerly Foundation 
% 
Production Dilemma 
% 
Code 1 
 
Code 2 
 
Code 3 
 
Code 4 
 
Code 5 
 
Code 6 
 
Code 7 
 
Code 8 
 
Code 9 
 
Not Coded 
 
Withholding 
14.3 
 
  5.7 
 
  3.8 
 
42.0 
 
16.3 
 
  3.2 
 
  1.3 
 
  5.3 
 
    .8 
 
  6.6 
 
    .6 
 
10.3 
 
  3.8 
 
  2.9 
 
51.3 
 
16.7 
 
  1.9 
 
    .6 
 
  4.8 
 
    .3 
 
  6.4 
 
  1.0 
 
18.3 
 
  7.7 
 
  4.8 
 
32.7 
 
16.0 
 
  4.5 
 
  1.9 
 
  5.8 
 
  1.3 
 
  6.7 
 
    .3 
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Table 21. Means and Standard Deviations 
Variables N M SD 
Age 312 19.61 3.66 
High School GPA 305 3.32   .54 
College GPA 276 3.04   .71 
Overall AH Score 312 4.64   .49 
Attention 312 4.43   .94 
Attribution 312 4.80   .99 
Tolerance for Contradiction 312 4.70   .85 
Perception of Change 312 4.65   .78 
The Need for Cognitive Closure 312 3.30   .69 
The Need for Cognition 312 3.31   .65 
Tolerance for Ambiguity 312 8.24 2.86 
Combined: Problem Identification  Sit T1 312 4.86   .86 
Combined: Problem Identification  Dis T1 312 3.95 1.14 
Combined: Problem Identification  Sit T2 312 5.11 1.03 
Combined: Problem Identification  Dis T2 312 4.26 1.50 
Combined: Problem Identification  Sit T3 312 5.49   .81 
Combined: Problem Identification  Dis T3 312 4.50 1.27 
Combined: Problem Identification  Sit T4 312 5.53   .95 
Combined: Problem Identification  Dis T4 312 4.39 1.31 
Combined: Decision Sit T1 312 4.82 1.02 
Combined: Decision Dis T1 312 3.80 1.08 
Combined: Decision Sit T2 312 4.75 1.15 
Combined: Decision Dis T2 312 4.04 1.34 
Combined: Decision Sit T3 312 5.15   .99 
Combined: Decision Dis T3 312 4.31 1.17 
Combined: Decision Sit T4 312 5.24 1.08 
Combined: Decision Dis T4 312 4.27 1.22 
PD: Problem Identification  Sit T1 312 4.94 1.15 
PD: Problem Identification  Dis T1 312 3.72 1.50 
PD: Problem Identification  Sit T2 312 5.22 1.34 
PD: Problem Identification  Dis T2 312 3.99 1.83 
PD: Problem Identification  Sit T3 312 5.63 1.11 
PD: Problem Identification  Dis T3 312 4.25 1.72 
PD: Problem Identification  Sit T4 312 5.68 1.24 
PD: Problem Identification  Dis T4 312 4.07 1.77 
PD: Decision Sit T1 312 4.85 1.37 
PD: Decision Dis T1 312 3.89 1.42 
PD: Decision Sit T2 312 4.71 1.50 
PD: Decision Dis T2 312 3.94 1.65 
PD: Decision Sit T3 312 5.08 1.32 
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Variables N M SD 
PD: Decision Dis T3 312 4.29 1.53 
PD: Decision Sit T4 312 5.13 1.50 
PD: Decision Dis T4 312 4.15 1.62 
WF: Problem Identification  Sit T1 312 4.78 1.16 
WF: Problem Identification  Dis T1 312 4.19 1.40 
WF: Problem Identification  Sit T2 312 5.01 1.18 
WF: Problem Identification  Dis T2 312 4.53 1.67 
WF: Problem Identification  Sit T3 312 5.35 1.05 
WF: Problem Identification  Dis T3 312 4.74 1.44 
WF: Problem Identification  Sit T4 312 5.38 1.09 
WF: Problem Identification  Dis T4 312 4.71 1.52 
WF: Decision Sit T1 312 4.80 1.28 
WF: Decision Dis T1 312 3.70 1.34 
WF: Decision Sit T2 312 4.79 1.36 
WF: Decision Dis T2 312 4.15 1.60 
WF: Decision Sit T3 312 5.22 1.14 
WF: Decision Dis T3 312 4.33 1.47 
WF: Decision Sit T4 312 5.34 1.19 
WF: Decision Dis T4 312 4.40 1.51 
Combined: Numbers of Category Selected 312 5.87 2.37 
PD: Numbers of Category Selected 312 5.81 2.69 
WF: Numbers of Category Selected 312 5.92 2.58 
Combined: % of Information Selected (1&2) 312    56.25    14.35 
PD: % of Information Selected (1&2) 312    56.29    15.60 
WF: % of Information Selected (1&2) 312    56.21    15.37 
Combined: % of Information Selected 1 312    52.01    17.62 
PD: % of Information Selected 1 312    51.87    19.45 
WF: % of Information Selected 1 312    52.15    19.19 
Combined: % of Information Selected 2 312    60.49    15.30 
PD: % of Information Selected 2 312    60.71    17.06 
WF: % of Information Selected 2 312    60.27    16.41 
Combined: % of Sit Information Selected 2 312    64.40    16.79 
Combined: % of Dis Information Selected 2 312    56.58    19.01 
PD: % of Sit Information Selected 2 312    64.64    20.51 
PD: % of Dis Information Selected 2 312    56.78    24.30 
WF: % of Sit Information Selected 2 312    64.15    18.51 
WF: % of Dis Information Selected 2 312    56.39    20.30 
Combined: Overall Info Relevance 312 5.14   .71 
PD: Overall Info Relevance 312 5.09   .82 
WF: Overall Info Relevance 312 5.19   .75 
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Variables N M SD 
Combined: Sit Info Relevance 312 5.24   .78 
Combined: Dis Info Relevance 312 4.85   .90 
PD: Sit Info Relevance 312 5.10   .96 
PD: Dis Info Relevance 312 4.91 1.10 
WF: Sit Info Relevance 312 5.39   .81 
WF: Dis Info Relevance 312 4.79 1.01 
Combined: Confirming Info Relevance 312 5.26   .70 
Combined: Disconfirming Info Relevance 312 4.74   .96 
PD: Confirming Info Relevance 312 5.12   .84 
PD: Disconfirming Info Relevance 312 5.01 1.04 
WF: Confirming Info Relevance 312 5.40   .74 
WF: Disconfirming Info Relevance 312 4.48 1.17 
Combined: Difference in PI T4 312     -1.14 1.72 
PD: Difference in PI T4 312     -1.62 2.53 
WF: Difference in PI T4 312     -0.67 1.86 
Combined: Abs Difference in PI T4 312 2.01 1.14 
PD: Abs Difference in PI T4 312 2.51 1.63 
WF: Abs Difference in PI T4 312 1.51 1.26 
Combined: Difference in Decision T4 312     -0.96 1.76 
PD: Difference in Decision T4 312     -0.97 2.50 
WF: Difference in Decision T4 312     -0.95 2.03 
Combined: Abs Difference in Decision T4 312 1.96 1.16 
PD: Abs Difference in Decision T4 312 2.15 1.60 
WF: Abs Difference in Decision T4 312 1.77 1.37 
Combined: % Confirming Sit Info Selected 312    66.99    17.68 
Combined: % Disconfirming Sit Info Selected 312    55.77    24.76 
Combined: % Confirming Dis Info Selected 312    59.98    20.11 
Combined: % Disconfirming Dis Info Selected 312    45.25    26.25 
Combined: Confirming Sit Info Relevance 312 5.28   .74 
Combined: Disconfirming Sit Info Relevance 312 4.93 1.05 
Combined: Confirming Dis Info Relevance 312 5.24   .80 
Combined: Disconfirming Dis Info Relevance 312 4.56 1.10 
Dispositional Confirming Items Recalled 312 2.88 1.62 
Dispositional Disconfirming Items Recalled 312   .80   .75 
Situational Confirming Items Recalled 312 2.70 2.02 
Situational Disconfirming Items Recalled 312   .53   .75 
Total Items Recalled 312 8.53 3.75 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A Framework of Individual’s Sensemaking Process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Weick’s General Model of Sensemaking 
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Figure 3. Sensemaking Activities represented in the Data Frame Model (Klein et al., 
2007) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Sections in Each Sensemaking Scenario 
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 Figure 5. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Situational PI Judgment 
 
 
 
 
Dispositional PI Judgment at Different Level of AHS
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Figure 6. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Dispositional PI Judgment 
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Situational DecisionJudgment  at Different Level of AHS
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Figure 7. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Situational Decision Judgment 
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Figure 8. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Dispositional Decision 
Judgment 
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Dispositional Decision Judgment at Different Level of AHS (WF)
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Figure 9. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Dispositional Decision 
Judgment (WF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dispositional Decision Judgment at Different Level of AHS (PD)
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Figure 10. Simple slopes for high and low AH thinkers on Dispositional Decision 
Judgment (PD) 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Sensemaking Assessment Development  
1) Pilot Study 1: Interview with participants  I first interviewed nine 
undergraduate participants. The goals of these interviews were to find relevant scenarios 
for undergraduates, to collect information that can be use in the scenarios, and to 
understand the use of information by participants. In each interview, participants were 
asked to recall a complex event in their life where they had to seek information and make 
sense of multiple perspectives to come to a conclusion about the event. During the 
interviews, participants were asked how the event unfolded, the strategies they used for 
searching information, the types of information that facilitated their understanding, how 
they acted at each decision points, and their final decision making. 
 When participants had difficulty in providing an event, hypothetical events were 
presented for exploratory discussion. These included conflict with a roommate, disputes 
in a working environment, job search after graduation, finding an apartment, and 
financial difficulty in an organization. I looked for events that have two contrasting 
options. For example, in the apartment search, participants were questioned on 
characteristics of an apartment versus attributes of a potential roommate. They were 
asked to provide both supporting and non-supporting information for picking the 
apartment based on its characteristics or attributes of the potential roommate. 
 While the interviews provided possible scenarios such as selecting a major, 
choosing between two colleges, and plans after high school, they lacked the contrast 
between dispositional versus situational factors (i.e. picking between two majors). 
132 
 
However, some scenarios such as conflict at work, and conflict with roommates provided 
content useful for developing research scenarios.  
 2) Pilot Study 2: Information development In order to allow for the testing of 
the proposed hypotheses, several types of information were created iteratively for each 
scenario. The selection of information for the scenarios included both Situational and 
Dispositional information as explained below.  
Three initial scenarios were developed to provide a contrast between dispositional 
and situational information. The scenarios titled, ‘Financial Mess’, ‘Production 
Dilemma’, and ‘Westerly Foundation’ all presented a problematic situation and 
contrasting perspectives that suggested both dispositional and situational causes. The 
situational causes included the dynamic changes in the organization and its external 
environment. ‘Financial Mess’ and ‘Production Dilemma’ were from previous research 
(Lin, 2004). These scenarios were modified for the purpose of the present study while 
‘Westerly Foundation’ was created for this study.   
To develop the scenarios, I developed information that suggested two opposing 
causes: dispositional and situational. Dispositional attribution was operationalized as 
finding causal factor(s) as internal to a person (i.e. personality, feelings, and values). 
Therefore, dispositional information was operationalized as information about an 
individual. For example, “Andy is a troublemaker.”  Situational attribution was 
operationalized as finding causal factor(s) as external to a person (i.e. surrounding people 
and environment). Situational information was operationalized as information about the 
changing environment surrounding the person and the organization as a whole. For 
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example, “The economy is facing a recession.” The scenarios presented dilemmas and 
allowed participants to engage in sensemaking.  
 ‘Financial Mess’ involved an organization facing financial problems. Some 
information focused dispositional concerns with a new, inexperienced young hire (i.e. 
Kevin does not like to take risks) while other information pinpointed the problem to the 
changing environment surrounding the person and the organization (i.e. the retirement of 
the Marketing Manager, the economy, the lack of leadership). ‘Production Dilemma’ 
involved a chaotic production department and a CEO who wanted a fair report on the 
activities of the department. Some information pinpointed the problem to a worker in the 
production department (i.e. Andy became less motivated to work) while others pointed to 
the changing situation surrounding the person and the organization (i.e. the changes that 
were being implemented, the economy, the lack of training). ‘Westerly Foundation’ 
involved a non-profit organization that was facing a shortage of funds. Some information 
located the problem with the current director (i.e. Michael does not have good social 
skills) while others pointed to the changing environment surrounding the person and the 
foundation (i.e. policy changes, the economy, history of the foundation). 
In order to evaluate dispositional and situational information, 19 undergraduates 
were asked to rate how relevant each information item was in reference to dispositional 
cause and situational cause. Instructions asked participant to judge whether each 
information item support or refutes that the person is the cause or situation is the cause. 
Participants rated item from +3 (Strongly Support) to -3 (Strongly Refutes). If an 
information item was irrelevant to the cause, they were asked to mark ‘X’ and rate ‘0’ if 
an information item was relevant but does not indicate whether it supported or refuted a 
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cause. Participants first judged information items against one cause and then judged the 
same items against the other cause. Items rated high on one cause and low in another in 
support or refute were retained. These items were used in scenarios for information 
manipulation. Items that were rated non applicable or irrelevant were used as fillers (i.e. 
introduction and ending). Ambiguous items were rephrased for clarity. 
 3) Pilot Study 3: Evaluation of scenarios and information  Scenarios 
were revised after Pilot Study 2. They were balanced so that both situational and 
dispositional causes were reasonable. Several graduate students (N= 5) reviewed the three 
scenarios. They also evaluated the information for each scenario as described above. 
They were asked about the balance and strength of information in each scenario, and their 
relevance for undergraduate students. This evaluation helped in refining the scenarios. 
Changes were made iteratively with the feedback of each graduate student. 
The graduate students were also asked which two of the three scenarios, were 
most suitable for the study. ‘Production Dilemma’ and ‘Westerly Foundation’ were 
chosen while ‘Financial Mess’ was judged as too complicated as there were more 
individuals involved in the story. ‘Production Dilemma’ and ‘Westerly Foundation’ were 
also judged as more parallel, comparable in terms of format of story, length, and 
readability.  
4) Pilot Study 4: Sensemaking Assessment Package development  In 
order to test the hypotheses and answer research questions, the scenarios had to present 
information in an unfolding manner. The purpose of these scenarios was to tap the 
outcome measures: Problem identification, Information need, Decision, Information trust, 
Information selection, and Information relevance. The purpose of Pilot Study 4 was to 
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test the sensemaking scenarios with Pilot Study 3 scenarios divided into sections and with 
response measures incorporated into these sections. 
 In Section A of each scenario (see Table 2 and Appendix B), a problem was 
presented (i.e. the Production Department is in trouble or Westerly Foundation is facing a 
shortage of funds). Two possible causes were presented, a person in the organization (i.e. 
Andy, or Michael) or situational changes surrounding the organization (i.e. the changes in 
the company). Participants responded to problem identification, decision, and information 
need questions. Hence, Section A measured these three outcome scores. There were two 
problem identification scores, one represented situational cause and the other represented 
dispositional cause. Participants were asked to rate independently the extent to which 
they thought that the person and the situational changes were the problems by rating ‘1’ 
(Not at all) to ‘7’ (Most Likely). There were also two decision scores for each scenario. 
One choice represented taking decision towards the individual and the other represented 
decision towards the situation. These were also rated independently. For example, 
participants rated how likely they would take each of these actions, ‘To give warning to 
Andy’ and ‘To make changes in the company.’ Information need in this study measured 
the extent participants still needed information to make sense and make decision. This 
section provided the baseline of problem identification, decision, and information need. 
 In Section B, participants chose information that they believed would help better 
understand the situation. This assessed the number of information items chosen. It also 
included the number of categories of information needed. There were nine categories 
with 2-5 information pieces in each category. Section B provided two outcome scores for 
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information selected and number of categories used. This was the first time information 
selection was measured. 
Section C provided the first information presentation manipulation. Information 
was presented to suggest one problem (disposition or situational). Participants then make 
judgments of problem identification, decision, information need, and information trust. 
They were also asked to judge the relevance of information presented by rating items 
from ‘1’ (Not at all) to ‘7’ (Very Relevant). Problem identification, decision, and 
information need were measured the second time. Two other outcomes measures, 
information trust and information relevance, were measured for the first time. 
Information trust measured the extent participants trusted the information presented to 
them. Information relevance measured the extent each information item was relevant.  
In Section D, the second information presentation was presented. When Section C 
presented dispositional cause, Section D presented situational cause and vice versa. This 
section provided the third measure of problem identification, decision, and information 
need, and the second measure of information trust and information relevance.  
During Pilot Study 4, an additional condition provided a mixed set of information 
and asked participants to evaluate information. From this pilot testing, the third section of 
information presentation was incorporated in the second and third section of each 
scenario. This section was dropped from the final research tool. 
In Section E, the last section, participants were presented all the information and 
were asked to select information they would use in their recommendation. Then they 
made the final judgment on problem identification and decision. Participants were asked 
to list additional information that they would like to receive. This gave the fourth 
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measure of problem identification, decision, and information need.  This section also 
gave the second measure of information selection. 
In the sequential sections of the scenarios, Open Ended Questions queried what 
participants thought happened in the scenario. These questions tap the qualitative 
sensemaking, specifically by examining the different forms of sensemaking presented in 
the Data Frame Model (Klein et al. 2007). These open ended were asked four times in 
each scenario.  
To evaluate this developed material in Pilot Study 4, 21 undergraduates from a 
senior level psychology class were observed and timed while completing the task. After 
completing the task, they were asked about the balance of information, redundancy of 
questions, the flow of scenarios, length and difficulty of the measure, and for 
improvements for the measure. Comparisons were also made between the two scenarios. 
Changes were made iteratively after feedbacks. 
After Pilot Study 4, several changes were made. Redundant questions were 
removed from the original measure, while information need was asked for problem 
identification as well as action, 66.7% of the participants gave the same ratings for both. 
For this reason, these questions were asked once for problem identification in the final 
version.   
After checking responses between problem identification and action for 
redundancy, it was found that most participants did not rate them the same. 55.6% gave 
different ratings between problem identification and decision judgments. Therefore, the 
original format of these questions was retained. The categories for information selection 
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remained nine categories but the range of information item was changed to 3-5 pieces in 
each category. 
5) Pilot Study 5: Testing of All Measures The revised sensemaking assessment 
scenarios, together with the other measures were given to undergraduate participants. 
Time of completion was recorded.  A memory recall task was included in this study. This 
task was to measure the kind of information items participants recalled. 
6) Pilot Study 6: Final Sensemaking Assessment Package After the Pilot Study 
5, the third section of information presentation was incorporated in the second and third 
section of each. The final scenarios were as described in Pilot Study 4 with these 
exceptions: removal of redundant questions, the range of categories for information 
selection was changed to 3-5 pieces in each category, Section E was dropped, and a 
memory recall task was added. [Note: Original Section F is the new Section E]. Two 
items were added for each type of problem identification and decision, making three 
dispositional problem identification items, three situational problem identification items, 
three dispositional decision items, and three situational decision items.        
The final experimental booklet each contained versions of the two scenarios with 
causal version counterbalanced for order and the memory recall task. The Dispositional 
version starts with the information presentation that indicates the cause to be an 
individual (i.e. Andy or Michael) and the other version indicates the changes that are 
happening in the organization to be the cause. In each scenario, there were thirteen items 
in each of the two information presentation manipulation, making it a total of 26 items. In 
the information presentation that suggested dispositional cause, there were eleven 
dispositional items and two situational items. In the information presentation that 
139 
 
suggested a situational cause, there were eleven situational items and two dispositional 
items. The memory recall task a participant received was related to the first scenario the 
participant received. Hence, half the participant received the memory recall task for 
Westerly Foundation and half received Production Dilemma. See Appendix B for 
scenarios. See Appendix D for memory recall task.  
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Appendix B 
“Production Dilemma” 
 
A. The CEO of your company, Brilliant Electronics Incorporated (BEI) recognizes that their 
Production Department is in trouble. Some people say that Andy Smith, a worker in the 
production, is disrupting work and others argued that the fault lies with the many changes 
underway in the company not with any one person. Your job is to investigate and report to the 
CEO so he can resolve the problem. 
 
How likely do you think that each of this is the problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most 
likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Changes in BEI       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Characteristics of Andy       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. How the organization adjusted       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Andy, the employee       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Change in the company’s situation       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Andy’s traits       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the 
problem in the Production Department. 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
What do you think happened? 
 
 
 
 
How likely are you to recommend each of these actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most 
likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Makes changes in BEI       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Replace Andy with another worker       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. Change organization to adjust       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Gives warning to Andy       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Adapt company to the situation       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Assigns Andy to another task       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
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B. Mark ‘X’ for items that will best help you understand the problem. Select from lists A through 
I or just a few; select any number of items or no items from each list. Remember, time is short. 
 
A. Company information: 
The financial status of the company 
Organizational and physical structure of 
the company 
The mission statement and goals of the 
company 
Company’s history 
Current changes in the company 
 
B. Employees information: 
Employees’ job satisfaction  
Turnover rate 
Pay and compensation 
Employees’ job performance  
 
C. Department information: 
The current orders that the department is 
handling 
Department’s history  
The goal and vision of the department 
 
D. Andy Smith’s information: 
Level of education 
Past performance records 
Evaluation by peers and subordinate 
Personality & background information 
Andy’s family background 
 
E. Supervisor’s information: 
Level of education 
Supervisors past performances 
Evaluation by peers and subordinate 
Personality & background information 
Supervisor’s family background 
 
F. Competitor’s information: 
The number of competitors 
Current changes with the competitors 
Market shares compared to BEI 
Collaborations with BEI 
 
G. Market’s information: 
General economy 
Rules and regulations for the industry 
Related industries 
Price of the raw material  
 
H. Customer’s information: 
Customers’ product 
Liaison from customer’s company 
Customer’s satisfaction with BEI 
 
I. Work group information: 
Group composition 
Competency of each group member 
Group performance 
 
C. First, you talked to some workers. You were not able to gather all the information you wanted. 
Only the information below is available: 
 
BEI produces electronic components for car stereos. It has been in business in downtown 
Dayton, Ohio for over 20 years. The company started with about 30 employees. Today, there are 
over 100 employees, mostly in the Production Department. These employees are organized into 
small work groups. BEI has good market reputation and it has had great relations with its 
customers. 
Recent implementation in the department was a big change for Andy Smith, the 
production line worker. At 46, Andy did not feel he should have to adapt to a new task 
assignment. He is a senior worker that had been in the company since the beginning. He knows a 
lot about the production process.  Hence, he feels he can direct his coworkers. He felt that things 
were fine the way they were and that changing tasks were complicating things.  
Andy became less motivated to work – he came later and later to work and took longer 
breaks. He became less efficient, barely meeting the minimum requirement. Andy felt his actions 
were justified as he was only reflecting his coworkers’ feeling of being downgraded. His 
immediate supervisor, Chris Lester was very busy, therefore, did not give him specific feedback. 
The management felt that the new customer should help the company financially and that the 
changes were necessary. 
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Chris is doing all he could. He feels Andy is not committed to the job and company. He 
had heard that Andy was looking for jobs with BEI’s competitors. He sees Andy as hot headed 
and a troublemaker. To improve production changes were necessary. Chris does not understand 
the resentment. 
 
Now that you have additional information, how likely do you think that each of this is the 
problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Changes in BEI       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Characteristics of Andy       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. How the organization adjusted       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Andy, the employee       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Change in the company’s situation        1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Andy’s traits       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the 
problem in the Production Department. 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
How much do you trust the information that was presented to you? 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
What do now you think happened? 
 
 
 
 
 
Now that you have additional information, how likely are you to recommend each of these 
actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Makes changes in BEI       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Replace Andy with another worker       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. Change organization to adjust       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Gives warning to Andy       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Adapt company to the situation       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Assigns Andy to another task       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
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Please rate from 1 (Not at all Relevant) to 7 (Very Relevant) how relevant is each item below. 
 
  Not at all                              Very  
Relevant                                              Relevant
1. At 46, Andy did not feel he should have 
to adapt to a new task assignment. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
2. Andy is a senior worker that had been in 
the company since the beginning.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
3. The new implementation was a big 
change for Andy Smith, a production 
line worker. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
4. Andy’s immediate supervisor, Chris was 
very busy, therefore, did not give him 
specific feedback. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
5. Andy felt his actions were justified as he 
was only reflecting his coworkers’ 
feeling of being downgraded. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
6. Andy knows a lot about the production 
process.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
7. Andy felt that things were fine the way 
they were and that changing tasks was 
complicating things.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
8. The management felt that the new 
customer should help the company 
financially and that the changes were 
necessary. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
9. Andy is perceived as a person who is 
not committed to the job and company. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
10. Andy became less motivated to work – 
he came later and later to work and took 
longer breaks.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
11. Andy became less efficient, barely 
meeting the minimum requirement. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
12. It was mentioned that Andy was looking 
for jobs with BEI’s competitors. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
13. Andy is perceived as hot headed and a 
troublemaker. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
 
D. You received additional from your conversation with Chris Lester, the Production Manager: 
 
Six months ago the long-term supervisor of Production was assigned to a new position in 
management. The company replaced the supervisor with a young recent business graduate, Chris 
Lester. The management met with and explained the plan for changes to production workers. The 
more competent employees were selected and trained to operate the new machines. The company 
attracted a new customer with great potential for growth. Chris decided on changes to help keep 
customers happy. To speed up production, the department needed new machinery. Problems 
occurred after the implementation. Production was slower because the new machines were 
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different and the trained employees were still getting used to them. Andy Smith was unhappy 
with these changes. He and other workers were reassigned with some training. Chris understood 
that change would take time but would be better for the company in the long run.  
Chris was facing an overwhelming situation. He wished the employees were more patient 
and understanding with the changes. He was also under a lot of pressure from the top to layoff 
people because the recent recession had hurt the company. He wanted to succeed at his new job 
and he also hoped the company would be able to retain long-term employees. 
The production department is in chaos and this worries the CEO. He is afraid that the 
employees will strike or slow down production. He fears these might interfere with keeping the 
new and long-term customers. He wants to know what is happening and he wants to resolve the 
problem. 
 
Now that you have additional information, how likely do you think that each of this is the 
problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Changes in BEI       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Characteristics of Andy       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. How the organization adjusted       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Andy, the employee       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Change in the company’s situation        1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Andy’s traits       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the 
problem in the Production Department. 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
How much do you trust the information that was presented to you? 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
What do you now think happened? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
145  
Now that you have additional information, how likely are you to recommend each of these 
actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Makes changes in BEI       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Replace Andy with another worker       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. Change organization to adjust       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Gives warning to Andy       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Adapt company to the situation       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Assigns Andy to another task       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Please rate from 1 (Not at all Relevant) to 7 (Very Relevant) how relevant is each item below. 
 
  Not at all                              Very 
Relevant                                             Relevant 
1. Chris decided on changes to help keep 
customers happy. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
2. The more competent employees were 
selected and trained to operate the new 
machines.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
3. Six months ago the long-term supervisor 
of Production was assigned to a new 
position in management. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
4. Andy Smith and other workers were 
reassigned with some training.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
5. To speed up production, the department 
needed new machinery. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
6. Production was slower because the new 
machines were different and the trained 
employees were still getting used to 
them.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
7. Chris wanted to succeed at his new job 
and he also hoped the company would be 
able to retain long-term employees. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
8. The management met with and explained 
the plan for changes to production 
workers.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
9. The company replaced the supervisor 
with a young recent business graduate, 
Chris Lester. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
10. Andy Smith was unhappy with these 
changes.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
11. The company attracted a new customer 
with great potential for growth. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
12. Chris was facing an overwhelming 
situation. 
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
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13. The management had pressured to layoff 
people because the recent recession had 
hurt the company. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
 
E. The production department is in chaos and this is worrying the CEO. He is afraid that if this 
continues the company might lose its customers. He wants to know what happened and he wants 
to resolve the problem. Because figuring out the situation is important, you decide to review all 
the information in order to use them to support your recommendations.  Please select information 
that is relevant for your report by marking ‘X’ in the boxes below. 
 
 Chris wanted to succeed at his new job and he also hoped the company would be able to retain 
long-term employees. 
 Andy is a senior worker that had been in the company since the beginning.  
 Andy felt that things were fine the way they were and that changing tasks was complicating 
things.  
 Andy’s immediate supervisor, Chris was busy, therefore, did not give him specific feedback. 
 The management felt that the new customer should help the company financially and that the 
changes were necessary. 
 Andy is perceived as hot headed and a troublemaker. 
 Andy knows a lot about the production process.  
 Andy became less efficient, barely meeting the minimum requirement. 
 Andy is perceived as a person who is not committed to his job and company. 
 The management had pressured to layoff people because the recent recession had hurt the 
company. 
 Changes were made in order to keep the new customer happy. 
 The more competent employees were selected and trained to operate the new machines.  
 At 46, Andy did not feel he should have to adapt to the new task he was assigned. 
 The new implementation was a big change for Andy Smith, a production line worker. 
 A month ago the long-term supervisor of Production was assigned to a new position in 
management. 
 Chris was facing an overwhelming situation. 
 Andy became less motivated to work. 
 The company replaced the supervisor with a young recent business graduate, Chris Lester. 
 The company attracted a new customer with great growth potential. 
 Andy felt justified in the way he was acting as he was only reflecting his coworkers’ feeling 
of being downgraded. 
 Production was slower because the new machines were different from the old ones and the 
trained employees needed to get used to them. 
 Plan for changes were explained to production workers. 
 It was mentioned that Andy was looking for other jobs with BEI’s competitors. 
 Andy Smith and other workers were reassigned with some training.  
 Andy was unhappy with the changes.  
 The company had to speed up production and new machinery was needed to anticipate the 
customer’s request. 
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How likely do you think that each of this is the problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most 
likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Changes in BEI       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Characteristics of Andy       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. How the organization adjusted       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Andy, the employee       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Change in the company’s situation        1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Andy’s traits       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the 
problem in the Production Department. 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
How likely are you to recommend each of these actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most 
likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Makes changes in BEI       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Replace Andy with another worker       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. Change organization to adjust       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Gives warning to Andy       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Adapt company to the situation       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Assigns Andy to another task       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Summarize what you now think had happen with BEI’s Production Department and what would 
you do if you were the CEO? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If any, what other information would you like to know? Please list them. 
1. ______________________________________________________________________ 
2. ______________________________________________________________________ 
3. ______________________________________________________________________ 
4. ______________________________________________________________________ 
5. ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
148 
“Westerly Foundation” 
 
A. You are an advisor for non-profit organizations. The Westerly Foundation is a non-profit 
organization that awards scholarships to college students. There is now a shortage of funding that 
might reduce next year’s awards. Some people think the Director, Mr. Michael Smith, is not 
managing the funds well while others think that external factors and changes are the problem. 
Your job is to understand the situation and recommend actions.  
 
How likely do you think that each of this is the problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most 
likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Changes in Westerly 
 
      1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Characteristics of Michael       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. How the organization has adjusted       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Michael, the director       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Change in the foundation’s 
situation 
      1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Michael’s management skill       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the 
problem with the scholarship funding. 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
What do you think happened? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How likely are you to recommend each of these actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most 
likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Make changes in Westerly       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Replace Michael with another 
director 
      1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. Change organization to adjust       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Assigns Michael to another 
position 
      1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
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5. Adapt foundation to the situation       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Train Michael’s management skill       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
B. Mark ‘X’ for items that will best help you understand the problem. Select from lists A through 
I or just a few; select any number of items or no items from each list. Remember, time is short. 
 
A. Foundation information: 
The financial status of the foundation 
Organizational and physical structure of 
the foundation 
The mission statement and goals of the 
foundation 
Foundation’s history 
Current changes in the foundation 
 
B. Employees information: 
Employees’ job satisfaction  
Turnover rate 
Pay and compensation 
Employees’ job performance  
 
 
C. Hiring Process information: 
Candidate requirement 
Interview committee 
Number of applicants 
 
D. Michael Smith’s information: 
Level of education 
Past performance records 
Evaluation by peers and subordinate 
Personality & background information 
Michael’s family background 
 
E. Previous Directors’ information: 
Level of education 
Previous directors’ past performances 
Evaluation by peers and subordinate 
Personality & background information 
Previous directors’ family background 
 
F. Other Foundations’ information: 
Number of similar foundations  
Current changes with the other 
foundations 
Funds of other foundations compared to 
Westerly 
Collaborations with Westerly 
 
G. External environment’s information: 
General economy 
Rules and regulations for charitable 
organization 
Taxation rules 
University’s policy on scholarships 
 
H. Donors’ information: 
Donors’ contribution 
Other foundation(s) donors funded 
Donors’ satisfaction with Westerly 
Foundation 
 
I. Work group information: 
Group composition 
Competency of each group member 
Group performance 
 
C. First, you talked to Michael Smith, the present Director. You were not able to gather all the 
information you wanted. Only the information below is available:  
 
Westerly Foundation was founded in 1983 to help students finance their college 
education. Each year the foundation receives many applicants for scholarships. Westerly awards a 
full year scholarship to applicants that best fulfill the academic and financial criteria. Recipients 
continue to receive the scholarship if they maintain the required GPA. In the past, many 
recipients benefited from this scholarship. 
Michael Smith is currently the Director of Westerly Foundation. Three years ago, 
Michael was in between jobs when the foundation offered him the director’s position. His 
expertise did not lie within non-profit organizations though he has a degree in Financial 
Management. Nevertheless, Michael seemed to be up to the challenge.  
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For the past years, the foundation has had difficulty maintaining its scholarship program. 
When Michael took over he changed the strategy for getting funds. Instead of relying on a few 
big donors, he felt the foundation should approach moderate donors to increase funds. Many in 
the organization dislike that Michael was running the foundation like a business. The new 
strategy to approach moderate donors was risky, required more planning and coordinating, and 
took resources that could go to scholarships.  It also cost money for brochures to attract donors. 
Although the foundation had relied on several big donations, many employees still think the old 
strategy works better.  
An employee recalled a recent event that might have lowered the funds. Michael had a 
conflict with one of the foundation’s biggest donors. She felt that Michael does not have the 
social skill needed to communicate with potential donors. Because of this, Michael had to change 
the fund raising strategy. She believes that Michael does not understand the foundation’s goals 
and its philosophy.  
 
Now that you have additional information, how likely do you think that each of this is the 
problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Changes in Westerly 
 
      1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Characteristics of Michael       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. How the organization has adjusted       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Michael, the director       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Change in the foundation’s 
situation 
      1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Michael’s management skill       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the 
problem with the scholarship funding. 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
How much do you trust the information that was presented to you? 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
What do you now think happened? 
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Now that you have additional information, how likely are you to recommend each of these 
actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Make changes in Westerly       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Replace Michael with another 
director 
      1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. Change organization to adjust       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Assigns Michael to another position       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Adapt foundation to the situation       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Train Michael’s management skill       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Please rate from 1 (Not at all Relevant) to 7 (Very Relevant) how relevant is each item below. 
 
  Not at all                                       Very  
Relevant                                           Relevant
1. Three years ago, Michael was in between 
jobs when the foundation offered him the 
director’s position.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
2. Michael had a conflict with one of the 
foundation’s biggest donors. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
3. Many in the organization dislike that 
Michael was running the foundation like a 
business. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
4. Michael has a degree in Financial 
Management. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
5. Michael’s expertise did not lie within non 
profit organizations.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
6. The new strategy to approach moderate 
donors was risky, required more planning 
and coordinating, and took resources that 
could go to scholarships.   
         
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
7. Many employees still think the old strategy 
works better.  
      1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
8. Michael seemed to be up to a challenge.        1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
9. It also cost money for brochures to attract 
donors. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
10. Michael felt the foundation should approach 
moderate donors to increase funds. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
11. The foundation relies on several big 
donations. 
      1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
12. Michael does not understand the 
foundation’s goals and its philosophy. 
      1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
13. Michael does not have the social skill needed 
to communicate with potential donors. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
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D. You received additional information from your conversation with some employees: 
 
Before Michael took over the foundation, two previous directors faced many challenging 
situations associated with the scholarship funds. Organization policies were mostly set up by Mr. 
Spector, the first director. He decided to approach some key donors in supporting the foundations 
effort. Being very personable, he was successful in getting large donations. The key donors have 
high praise for Mr. Spector. Then, there were increases in universities tuition before Mr. Spector 
retired. Funding may have been affected by this increase. Mr. Tanner, the second director, 
continued the policy and effort of Mr. Spector. Due to recession the funds started dropping under 
Mr. Tanner’s management.  To solve the problem, some funds were put in a high-risk investment 
and this did not return a profit. Unable to change the situation, Mr. Tanner decided to resign. Mr. 
Tanner felt that Michael was a good candidate. His only concern is that Michael is new to 
fundraising. 
Several employees speculated that two similar foundations established this past year 
affected the donation to their foundation. Since it was also an election year, some donors might 
have contributed less. Recent tax policy on charitable donations may have changed donation 
patterns of the key donors.  
 The shortage of funds worries the Board of Directors. They are concerned about the 
foundation’s ability to provide scholarships. They feared that this might affect deserving students 
as well as the foundation’s goals. They want to know what happened and how they should 
manage the problem. 
 
Now that you have additional information, how likely do you think that each of this is the 
problem? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Changes in Westerly 
 
      1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Characteristics of Michael       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. How the organization has adjusted       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Michael, the director       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Change in the foundation’s 
situation 
      1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Michael’s management skill       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the 
problem with the scholarship funding. 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
How much do you trust the information that was presented to you? 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
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What do you now think happened? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now that you have additional information, how likely are you to recommend each of these 
actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most 
Likely 
1. Make changes in Westerly       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Replace Michael with another director       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. Change organization to adjust       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Assigns Michael to another position       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Adapt foundation to the situation       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Train Michael’s management skill       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Please rate from 1 (Not at all Relevant) to 7 (Very Relevant) how relevant is each item below. 
 
  Not at all                                 Very 
Relevant                                               Relevant 
1. Organization policies were mostly set 
up by Mr. Spector, the first director. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
2. Two similar foundations established 
this past year affected the donation to 
Westerly Foundation. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
3. The key donors have high praise for Mr. 
Spector. 
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
4. Before Mr. Smith took over the 
foundation, two previous directors faced 
many challenging situations associated 
with the scholarship funds. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
5. Mr. Tanner felt that Michael was a good 
candidate. 
      1      2     3    4    5     6
  7 
6. Mr. Tanner continued the policy and 
effort of Mr. Spector. 
      1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
7. Being very personable, Mr. Spector was 
successful in getting large donations. 
      1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
8. Due to recession the funds started 
dropping under Mr. Tanner’s 
management. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
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9. Mr. Tanner only concern is that Michael 
is new to fundraising. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
10. There was an increase in university 
tuitions. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
11. Some funds were put in a high-risk 
investment and this did not return a 
profit. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
12. Since it was also an election year, some 
donors might have also contributed less.  
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
13. Recent tax policy on charitable 
donations may have changed donation 
patterns of the key donors. 
       
     1   2        3        4       5         6   7 
 
E. The funds for the foundation are low and this might affect the effort to provide next 
year’s scholarships. As the foundation is for a good cause, many involved hope to solve 
the problem. Because figuring out the situation is important, you decide to review all the 
information in order to use them to support your recommendations.  Please select 
information that is relevant for your report by marking ‘X’ in the boxes below. 
 
 Organization policies were mostly set up by Mr. Spector, the first director. 
 Michael does not have the social skill needed to communicate with potential donors. 
 Mr. Tanner continued the policy and effort of Mr. Spector. 
 Being very personable, Mr. Spector was successful in getting large donations. 
 There was an increase in university tuitions. 
 Mr. Tanner felt that Michael was a good candidate. 
 Mr. Tanner only concern is that Michael is new to fundraising. 
 Recent tax policy on charitable donations may have changed donation patterns of the key 
donors. 
 Michael does not understand the foundation’s goals and its philosophy. 
 Since it was also an election year, some donors might have also contributed less.   
 Some funds were put in a high-risk investment and this did not return a profit. 
 The key donors have high praise for Mr. Spector. 
 It also cost money for brochures to attract donors. 
 Michael seemed to be up to a challenge.  
 Michael’s expertise did not lie within non profit organizations.  
 The foundation relies on several big donations. 
 Many employees still think the old strategy works better.  
 Many in the organization dislike that Michael was running the foundation like a business. 
 Two similar foundations established this past year affected the donation to Westerly 
Foundation. 
 The new strategy to approach moderate donors was risky, required more planning and 
coordinating, and took resources that could go to scholarships.   
 Michael has a degree in Financial Management. 
 Michael felt the foundation should approach moderate donors to increase funds. 
 Before Mr. Smith took over the foundation, two previous directors faced many challenging 
situations associated with the scholarship funds. 
 Michael had a conflict with one of the foundation’s biggest donors. 
 Three years ago, Michael was in between jobs when the foundation offered him the director’s 
position. 
 Due to recession the funds started dropping under Mr. Tanner’s management. 
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How likely do you think that each of this is the problem?  Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most 
likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most 
Likely
1. Changes in Westerly 
 
      1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Characteristics of Michael       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. How the organization has adjusted       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Michael, the director       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Change in the foundation’s situation       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Michael’s management skill       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Rate from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (A lot) the extent you need more information to investigate the 
problem with the scholarship funding. 
 
Not at all          A lot 
     1               2           3        4      5    6  7 
 
How likely are you to recommend each of these actions? Rate from 1 (Not likely) to 7 (Most 
likely). 
 
  Not Likely                           Most Likely 
1. Make changes in Westerly       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
2. Replace Michael with another director       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
3. Change organization to adjust       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
4. Assigns Michael to another position       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
5. Adapt foundation to the situation       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
6. Train Michael’s management skill       1      2     3    4    5     6  7 
 
Summarize what you now think had happen with Westerly’s funding situation and what would 
you recommend as an advisor? 
 
 
 
 
 
If any, what other information would you like to know? Please list them. 
 
1. ______________________________________________________________________ 
2. ______________________________________________________________________ 
3. ______________________________________________________________________ 
4. ______________________________________________________________________ 
5. ______________________________________________________________________
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Appendix C 
 
Qualitative Sensemaking Coding  
 
Initial Frame 
(Response 1) 
Info Presentation 1 
(IP1) (Dis or Sit) 
Response 2 Info Presentation 2 
(IP2) (Dis or Sit) 
Response 3 Response 4 Code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dispositional 
 
 
 
= 
Dispositional 
Info 
 
 
Dispositional 
 
≠ 
Situational 
Info 
Dispositional - Code 1 
Situational - Code 4 
 
 
Situational 
 
= 
Situational 
Info 
Dispositional - Code 7 
Situational - Code 6 
 
 
 
≠ 
Situational 
Info 
 
 
Dispositional 
 
= 
Dispositional 
Info 
Dispositional - Code 1 
Situational - Code 9 
 
 
Situational 
 
≠ 
Dispositional 
Info 
Dispositional - Code 5 
Situational - Code 8 
Both/Need 
Info/Not Sure ? Dispositional 
= 
≠ Dispositional Dispositional Code 2 
Dispositional = ≠ Dispositional 
= 
≠ Dispositional Situational/Both Code 3 
= Consistent   ≠ Inconsistent
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Descriptions of Qualitative Sensemaking Codes 
 
Code 1: Consistent All the Way [R1=IP1=R2≠IP2≠R3; R1≠IP1≠R2=IP2=R3] 
This code is given when participants did not change in their sense making. They remained with 
their initial frame from beginning to end even when information presented contradicted their 
view. These are people who explained away contradictory information or they kept elaborating 
their initial frame by seeking information consistent with their frame. For example, these 
participants would consistently identify the problem to be situational, dispositional/person, or 
both across all open ended responses.  
 
Code 2: Open Then Consistent All the Way [R1?IP1=R2≠IP2≠R3; R1?IP1≠R2=IP2=R3] 
This code is given when participants did not have an initial frame or respond to initial frame as 
both person and situation or either person or situation as the problem. Participants may indicate 
they need more information or just restate the problem when they do not have an initial frame; 
they want to remain open to changes in their sensemaking. Then participants changed or have a 
frame after the first information presentation and stayed with that frame throughout the remaining 
responses. For example, they may change from saying both were the problem to situation or 
dispositional being the problem for the rest of the scenario. They may not have a frame to begin 
with but then adopt one and stayed consistent with the frame the rest of the scenario. 
 
Code 3: Consistent Then Change [R1=IP1=R2≠IP2≠R3 (R2≠R3); R1≠IP1≠R2=IP2=R3 (R2≠R3)] 
This code is given when participants have an initial frame; did not change with both information 
presentations but changed at the last open ended response. For example, these participants would 
consistently identity the problem to be situational, dispositional, or both and then switched to 
dispositional/both, situational/both, or, situational/dispositional, respectively. 
 
Code 4 & 5 changed with the direction of information presented 
Code 4: Consistent With Information Presentation (IP) 1 And Change With IP 2. 
[R1=IP1=R2≠IP2=R3] 
This code is given when participant initial frame was same as the content of information 
presentation 1. For example, when a participant indicated the person to be the problem and 
received dispositional information in the first information presentation; the frame was consistent 
with information received. The second response given was also consistent with the first 
information given. Sensemaking did not change but frame is elaborated. Because the current 
frame was consistent with the previous information, the second information presentation would 
automatically be inconsistent with the current frame. Participants then changed their current 
frame to be consistent with the second information presentation. The current frame was 
questioned and a new frame was adopted. For example, before the second information was given, 
the problem was the person but now the problem is situational. 
 
Code 5: Inconsistent With IP 1, Changed with IP 1 And Changed With IP 2. 
[R1≠IP1=R2≠IP2=R3] 
This code is given when a participant initial frame was different as the content of information 
presentation 1. For example, when a participant indicated the person to be the problem and 
received situational information in the first information presentation. The frame was inconsistent 
with information received. Upon receiving the inconsistent information, participants switched 
their frame/explanation to be consistent with the information received. For example, they 
switched from dispositional explanation to situational explanation upon receiving situational 
information. Hence, they adopted a new frame (re-framing). Because the current frame was 
consistent with the previous information, the second information presentation would 
automatically be inconsistent with the current frame. Again, participant would switch their 
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frame/explanation to be consistent with the second information received. Again, they switched to 
adopt a new frame (re-framing).  For example, participant would switch from situational 
explanation to dispositional explanation upon receiving dispositional information. 
 
Code 6 - 9 changed with the direction Opposite of information presented 
Code 6: Consistent with IP 1, Changed Opposite of IP [R1=IP1≠R2=IP2=R3] 
This code is given when a participant’s initial frame was the same as the content of information 
presentation 1. For example, when a participant indicated the person to be the problem and 
received dispositional information in the first information presentation. The frame was consistent 
with information received. But frame was changed at the second open ended response. Here, the 
second information presented would be consistent with the current frame. Participants then 
remained with the same frame consistent with the second information presentation.  
 
Code 7: Consistent but Changed Opposite of IP at both Information Presentations 
[R1=IP1≠R2=IP2≠R3] 
This code is similar to participants who have a pattern of Form 6 but these participants changed 
their frame opposite to both the Information Presentation. For example, when information 
presentation was situational, participants switched frames to dispositional and vice versa. While 
participants with Form 6 went with one and opposed the other, participants with Form 7 opposed 
both information presentations. 
 
Code 8: Inconsistent with IP 1, Changed with IP 1 But Not IP 2. [R1≠IP1=R2≠IP2≠R3] 
This code is similar to Form 5 where participants’ initial frames were not consistent with the first 
information received but changed in the second response with the information presented. For 
example, they switched form dispositional explanation to situational explanation upon receiving 
situational information. Hence, they adopted a new frame (re-framing). Because the current frame 
was consistent with the previous information, the second information presentation would 
automatically be inconsistent with the current frame. Differ from Form 5, participants did not 
switch their frame/explanation to be consistent with the second information received. They 
remained the same as their second frame.  
 
Code 9: Inconsistent with IP 1, Did Not Change with IP 1 But Changed With IP 2. 
[R1≠IP1≠R2=IP2≠R3] 
This is similar to Form 8 with inconsistent initial frames compared to information received except 
that participants did not change in the second frame based in the information they received. For 
example, they begin with and stayed with dispositional explanation upon receiving situational 
information. Because the current frame is inconsistent with the previous information, the second 
information presentation would automatically be consistent with the current frame. Participants, 
however, changed their explanation on the third frame even when the information received was 
consistent with the second information presentation. For example, participants would switch from 
dispositional explanation to situational explanation upon receiving dispositional information. 
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Appendix D 
 
Earlier in this session, you were presented with the Production Dilemma scenario. 
 
The CEO of your company, Brilliant Electronics Incorporated (BEI) recognizes that their Production 
Department is in trouble. Some people say that Andy Smith, a worker in the production department, is 
disrupting work and others argued that the fault lies with the many changes underway in the company not 
with any one person. Your job is to investigate and report to the CEO so he can resolve the problem. 
 
Instructions 
 
In the scenario, you were presented with information about Andy and about the changes in the Production 
Department.  In the space provided below, write down as many pieces of information as you can remember. 
You can write them in any order with one piece of information on each line. If you need more lines use the 
back to continue.  
 
1. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. ________________________________________________________________________ 
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Earlier in this session, you were presented with the Westerly Foundation scenario. 
 
You are an advisor for non-profit organizations. The Westerly Foundation is a non-profit organization that 
awards scholarships to college students. There is now a shortage of funding that might reduce next year’s 
awards. Some people think the Director, Mr. Michael Smith, is not managing the funds well while others 
think that external factors and changes are the problem. Your job is to understand the situation and 
recommend actions.  
 
Instructions 
 
In the scenario, you were presented with information about Michael and about the external factors and 
changes in the foundation. In the space provided below, write down as many pieces of information as you 
can remember. You can write them in any order with one piece of information on each line. If you 
need more lines use the back to continue.  
 
1. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. ________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. ________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix E 
 
Coding System for Memory 
 
[If present, code ‘1’; if absent, code ‘0’]. Coding for this system is mutually exclusive 
for some codes, that is, an item that is coded ‘1’ will have ‘0’ for other codes. This is true within 
the Attributional codes and within the Confirming/Disconfirming codes. Coding between 
Attributional Codes and Confirming/Disconfirming codes are not mutually exclusive. That is for 
each statement you code for an Attributional code and a Confirming/Disconfirming code. 
 
Attributional Codes: 
Dispositional:  Information that is related to internal attributes o a person such as personality, 
beliefs, feelings, physical attributes, etc. 
 
• Dispositional [Target]: There is a target person in each story (WF: Michael Smith, PD: 
Andy Smith). This code is present when dispositional information is requested for the 
target person. [DT] 
Example: “Michael did not have social skills,” “Andy came late and took longer breaks,” 
“Michael ran the company like business” 
 
• Dispositional [Non-Target]: In each scenario there are other people that are non target 
person (WF: other directors and employees, PD: Chris and other employees). This code is 
present when dispositional information is requested for a non-target person. [DNT] 
Example: “The second director failed,” “The old director was good with donors,” “Some 
employees were not trained,” “Chris was overwhelmed”  
 
Situational: Information that is related to external factors of a person (i.e. events surrounding the 
person, industry and organizational information, economy, etc.). This code is present when 
situational information is requested. [S] 
Example: “The change in economy,” “The company hired a young business grad,” “BEI took 
in new customer” 
 
Confirming/Disconfirming Codes: 
 
Confirming: Confirming information is information that is consistent and supports a current 
sense of a situation. This is operationalized as information that confirms a cause to be the 
problem.  
Example: “Andy is a troublemaker” supports an individual to be the problem. 
“The economy is facing a recession” supports the situation to be the problem.  
 
Disconfirming: Disconfirming information is information that is inconsistent and can shift the 
current sense of a situation. This is operationalized as information that refutes a cause to be the 
problem. 
Example: “Andy knows a lot about the production process” refutes an individual to be the 
problem. 
“The management met with and explained the planned changes to production workers” 
refutes the situation to be the problem.  
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Appendix F 
 
Rate each item on the scale ranging from1 to 7 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
 
Strongly Disagree                      Strongly Agree 
 1         2      3           4  5          6             7 
 
1. An individual who is currently honest will stay honest in the future.  
2. Any phenomenon has numerous numbers of causes, although some of the causes are 
not known. 
 
3. Everything in the universe is somehow related to each other.  
4. We should consider the situation a person is faced with, as well as his/her 
personality, in order to understand one’s behavior. 
 
5. Nothing is unrelated.  
6. A person who is currently living a successful life will continue to stay successful.  
7. Any phenomenon entails a numerous number of consequences, although some of 
them may not be known. 
 
8. Even a small change in any element of the universe can lead to significant 
alterations in other elements. 
 
9. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.  
10. Future events are predictable based on present situations.  
11. When disagreement exists among people, they should search for ways to 
compromise and embrace everyone's opinions. 
 
12. Everything in the world is intertwined in a causal relationship.  
13. It is more desirable to take the middle ground than go to extremes.   
14. Current situations can change at any time.  
15. The whole, rather than its parts, should be considered in order to understand a 
phenomenon. 
 
16. It is not possible to understand the parts without considering the whole picture.  
17. If an event is moving toward a certain direction, it will continue to move toward that 
direction. 
 
18. Every phenomenon in the world moves in predictable directions.  
19. It is more important to pay attention to the whole than its parts.  
20. It is more important to pay attention to the whole context rather than the details.  
21. It is desirable to be in harmony, rather than in discord, with others of different 
opinions than one’s own. 
 
22. Choosing a middle ground in an argument should be avoided.  
23. It is important to find a point of compromise than to debate who is right/wrong, 
when one’s opinions conflict with other’s opinions. 
 
24. We should avoid going to extremes.  
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Appendix G 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
For each of the statement below, please indicate to what extent the statement is characteristic of you 
by circling a number. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristics of you (not at all like you) please 
circle “1”; if the statement is extremely characteristics of you (very much like you) please circle “5”. 
Of course, a statement may be neither extremely uncharacteristics nor extremely characteristic of you; 
if so, please use the number in the middle of the scale that describes the best fit. Please keep the 
following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements below:  
 
Extremely   Somewhat    Uncertain      Somewhat           Extremely 
Uncharacteristics Uncharacteristics       Characteristic           Characteristic 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my 
thinking abilities. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in depth 
about something. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
7. I only think as hard as I have to. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve heard them. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important 
but does not require much thought. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I feel relieve rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix H 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you would agree with each 
according to your attitudes, beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following 
scale, using only one number for each statement. 
 
1 = Strongly disagree    4 = Slightly agree 
2 = Moderately disagree    5 = Moderately agree 
3 = Slightly disagree    6 = Strongly agree 
 
 
1 In case of uncertainty, I prefer to make an immediate decision, whatever it may be. 1    2    3    4    5    6 
2 When I find myself facing various, potentially valid, alternatives, I decide in favor of one of them quickly and without hesitation. 1    2    3    4    5    6 
3 I never been late for work or for an appointment 1    2    3    4    5    6 
4 I prefer to decide on the first available solution rather than to ponder at length what decision I should make. 1    2    3    4    5    6 
5 I get very upset when things around me aren’t in their place. 1    2    3    4    5    6 
6 Generally, I avoid participating in discussions on ambiguous and controversial problems. 1    2    3    4    5    6 
7 When I need to confront a problem, I do not think about it too much and I decide without hesitation 1    2    3    4    5    6 
8 When I need to solve a problem, I generally do not waste time in considering diverse points of view about it.  1    2    3    4    5    6 
9 I prefer to be with people who have the same ideas and tastes as myself. 1    2    3    4    5    6 
10 Generally, I do not search for alternative solutions to problems for which I already have a solution available. 1    2    3    4    5    6 
11 I feel uncomfortable when I do not manage to give a quick response to problems that I face. 1    2    3    4    5    6 
12 I have never hurt another person’s feelings  1    2    3    4    5    6 
13 Any solution to a problem is better than remaining in a state of uncertainty.  1    2    3    4    5    6 
14 I prefer activities where it is always clear what is to be done and how it need to be done.  1    2    3    4    5    6 
15 After having found a solution to a problem I believe that it is a waste of time to take into account diverse possible solutions.  1    2    3    4    5    6 
16 I prefer things that I am used to over those I do not know, and cannot predict. 1    2    3    4    5    6 
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Appendix I 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
Please do not spend too much time on the following items. There are no right or wrong answers 
and therefore your first response is important. Circle your answers and please be sure to answer 
every question. 
 
1. A problem has little attraction for me if I don’t think it has a solution. True False 
2. I am just a little uncomfortable with people unless I feel that I can 
understand their behavior. 
True False 
3. There’s a right way and a wrong way to do almost everything. True False 
4. I would rather bet 1 to 6 on a long shot than 3 to 1 on a probable winner. True False 
5. The way to understand complex problems is to be concerned with their 
larger aspects instead of breaking them into smaller pieces. 
True False 
6. I get pretty anxious when I’m in a social situation over which I have no 
control. 
True False 
7. Practically every problem has a solution. True False 
8. It bothers me when I am unable to follow another person’s train of thought. True False 
9. I have always felt that there is a clear difference between right and wrong. True False 
10. It bothers me when I don’t know how other people react to me. True False 
11. Nothing gets accomplished in this world unless you stick to some basic 
rules. 
True False 
12. If I were a doctor, I would prefer the uncertainties of a psychiatrist to the 
clear and definite work of someone like a surgeon or X-ray specialist. 
True False 
13. Vague and impressionistic pictures really have little appeal for me. True False 
14. If I were a scientist, it would bother me that my work would never be 
completed (because science will always make new discoveries). 
True False 
15. Before an examination, I feel much less anxious if I know how many 
questions there will be. 
True False 
16. The best part of working a jigsaw puzzle is putting in the last piece. True False 
17. Sometimes I rather enjoy going against the rules and doing things I’m not 
supposed to do. 
True False 
18. I don’t like to work on a problem unless there is a possibility of coming 
out with a clear-cut and unambiguous answers. 
True False 
19. I like to fool around with new ideas, even if they turn out later to be a total 
waste of time. 
True False 
20. Perfect balance is the essence of all good composition. True False 
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Appendix J 
Information Sheet 
 
1. Age:     _______ Years 
  
2. Gender:    _______ Male   _____Female 
 
3. Place of Birth    _____________________________(City, State, Country) 
 
4. Place of childhood (0-18 years old) years: Urban _____    Suburban_____     Rural _____  
    
   Other: _________ 
 
3. Academic major:   _________________ 
 
4. Grade point average (High School)         ________           
 
5. Grade point average (College)  ________ 
 
6. Your year in school:  Year 1 (Freshman)  ____ 
 
Year 2 (Sophomore)  ____ 
 
Year 3 (Junior)   ____ 
 
Year 4  (Senior)  ____ 
 
7. Nationality/Ethnic/Cultural background: Please circle  
 
(1) African American (2) Caucasian American (3) Asian American (4) Native American  
 
 (5) Hispanic American (6) Other: __________              
 
List the job(s) you previously and currently have, beginning with the most current.  
 
 Job Title Hours work per week Duration 
1.    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
 
Thank you for your help 
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